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Much of the current debates in the social service delivery have focused on the blurring 
boundaries between three sectors – the nonprofit, business and public sector.  Surprisingly no 
empirical research has been given to this phenomenon from macro and comparative perspectives.  
First contribution of the study to is the conceptual and methodological model to link organization 
and strategic management theory with network theory.  The study calls this new framework as 
collaboration network.  Second, this survey of 33 nonprofit organizations in the Allegheny 
County, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania uncovers the hidden patterns of collaboration between the 
sectors including empirical evidence of blurring boundaries.  In order to reveal the hidden 
patterns of collaboration, the study adopts blockmodel from network analysis that is useful to 
reduce complex networks into concise and easily understandable forms.  Major findings 
uncovered by network analysis are; 1) Network structures are different according to specific 
types of collaboration relationships.  Network structures become less dense as the collaborative 
relationships intensify.  While nonprofits do not have to spend much of their valuable resources 
such as time and money on maintaining informal or infrequent information sharing or work 
referral relations, nonprofits should commit themselves to maintaining intensive relations such as 
formal contract or joint program.  In addition, the types of six network structures are different 
from each other.  For example, while formal contract network is shaped as a cohesive subgroup 
structure, resource sharing network shows a central-periphery system. 2) When three sector 
organizations are participated in the work referral network, the social service system emerges.  
Three sectors play a unique role respectively – a sender for public agencies, a service provider 
for businesses.  As a major actor in the social service field, nonprofits not only play these two 
roles, but also play a coordinating or broker role between three sectors.  3) When either of the 
business or public sector is introduced in the collaboration network, new network structures 
replace the network structure which is composed exclusively of nonprofits.  For example, when 
 iv
the public sector is involved in the formal contract network, the network structure changes from 
a cohesive subgroup system to a hierarchy system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Currently, it is not unusual to witness collaboration across three sectors – the nonprofit, for-profit, 
and public sectors - in the social service field.  These collaborative relationships reflect the 
interdependency among the sectors (Hall, 1987; Saidel, 1991), which originates in the 
complexity of social problems.  Social problems are so inherently complex that the public, for-
profit, or nonprofit sectors cannot solve these problems by one sector alone.  Rather, it is 
necessary that all the three sectors must work together to solve social problems simultaneously 
(Sagawa and Segal, 2000; Shore, 1999).   
In addition to dealing with the complexities of social problems, the nonprofit sector, as a 
leading player in the social service field, is experiencing rapid changes in its external 
environments, such as declines of government grants and private donations, changes in public 
policies (i.e., devolution), and increases in demands for social services (Alexander, 2000; 
McCormak, 1996: Salamon, 1993, 1995, 2002).  In response to these and other challenges, many 
nonprofits have established new types of partnerships with other nonprofits, businesses and 
government organizations in order to minimize risk, conserve scarce resources, and enhance the 
prospects for mission accomplishment.  As a result of increases in interdependency through 
cross-sector collaboration efforts, the boundaries between the three sectors are blurring.  This 
phenomenon of blurring boundaries among sectors can be called “the seamless economy”.   
There is abundant anecdotal evidence (i.e., case studies about collaboration between two 
or three organizations) of successful partnerships or collaboration between nonprofits and for-
profits (e.g., see Austin, 2000a; Dees, et al., 2001; Sagawa and Segal, 2000; Shore, 1999).  Also, 
of the literature provides normative advice for developing successful cross-sector collaborations 
(e.g., see Austin, 2000a, 2000b; Dees, et al., 2001; Sagawa and Segal, 2000).  However, there 
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has been neither macro level research on cross-sector collaboration nor comparative research of 
same-sector and cross-sector collaboration.   
On the basis of these knowledge gaps, the main thrust of this study is to open new ways 
of seeing collaboration efforts in the seamless economy.  Since the seamless economy is 
composed of diverse and complex relationships, macro level analysis using social network 
analysis and/or regression analysis will reveal hidden patterns of collaboration which previous 
case studies did not explore.  These patterns may involve same-sector as well as cross-sector 
relationships among organizations.  Thus, this research will make a significant contribution to 
the literature, which has yet to empirically document these complex patterns of relations with 
respect to nonprofits, business, and government organization.   
This study proposes the concept of a “collaboration network,” defined as a network that 
catalyzes and facilitates collaboration strategy by helping organizations identify new 
opportunities and build social capital.  Theoretically, the collaboration network is an integrated 
model of two mutually reinforcing concepts: collaboration and network.  Practically, the concept 
of collaboration originating from organizational theory and strategic management theory will 
provide a construct of collaboration operationalized as a continuum of collaboration from 
informal information exchange to formal agreements for collaborative service delivery.      
1.2 KNOWLEDGE GAPS 
As stated in the problem statement, the main purpose of this study is to address knowledge gaps 
in the existing literature that fail to address a variety of issues regarding the cross-sector 
collaboration.  The existing literature has many case studies of cross-sector collaboration but 
provides no strong empirical research regarding patterns of collaboration between many 
organizations in a given geographic area.  Also, there is very little evidence regarding the 
distinctive features of cross-sector collaboration patterns compared to same-sector collaboration 
patterns.  
Previous studies explore individual collaborations at the micro level (i.e., the case study 
of two or three organizations and anecdotal evidences from the case study) in terms of forms, 
perceived outcomes, and problems of collaboration.  However, no study has explored hidden 
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patterns of interactions at the macro level (i.e., both formal and informal relationships including 
communications, information and resources exchanges, etc.).  Moreover, we do not know the 
distinctive features of cross-sector collaboration because there has been no comparative study of 
within-nonprofit sector and cross-sector collaboration.  The uncovered macro-level patterns of 
this comparative study may show several patterns of cross-sector collaboration that are deeper 
and broader than previous studies.   
1.3 GOAL OF THE STUDY 
This study will be an exploratory study that will generate hypotheses for future research as well 
as describe hidden patterns of collaboration in the seamless economy.  It does not test existing 
theories or propositions.   
The research questions of this study are:  
• Do network patterns of collaboration among nonprofit, government, and business 
organizations suggest the existence of a “seamless economy” of mutual 
interdependence? 
• What if any characteristics of the seamless economy emerge from the comparison 
of same-sector and cross-sector collaboration patterns? 
• What are the implications of these patterns of interdependency for promoting 
collaboration or partnership among organizations? 
1.4 ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study assumes that nonprofits’ current efforts to collaborate, especially cross-sector 
collaborations, produce positive results.  Many studies about collaboration also assume it as a 
positive strategy that empowers organizational efficiency.  However, there is a dark side to 
collaboration.  Nonprofits can make collaborations with inappropriate intentions, such as only to 
escape from a short-term financial problem, that have long-run negative effects.  In addition, if 
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nonprofits blindly chase with limited capacity or purpose, collaboration with others may cause 
the nonprofit to deviate from their mission, as one nonprofit executive noted in the course of this 
research.   
1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
There are two types of research findings in this study – those of localized or issue-specific and 
those of broader methodological and theoretical implications to the nonprofit sector.  Since issue-
specific findings are mainly of local importance, they are explored in the body of the study.   
There are three main theoretical and methodological contributions, which are briefly 
described below.  Firstly, this study provides future research of a theoretical and empirical 
framework to explore collaboration (Chapter 2).  The most valuable conceptual and 
methodological contribution of the study is its linkage of the conceptual model of collaboration 
from organizational and strategic management theory and methodological models of network 
structures.  This combination of the concept of collaboration as a continuum and the concept of 
network is useful in uncovering hidden patterns of collaboration. These patterns provide 
evidence of the blurring boundaries between the sectors.   
Secondly, from a macro and comparative perspective, this study helps bridge the 
knowledge gap of previous research.  This research provides empirical evidence of distinctive 
collaboration patterns between within the nonprofit sector and across the sectors.    
Thirdly, this study creates a distinctive approach by exploring the concept of 
collaboration from multiple levels and methodologies.  Using network analysis, this study 
explores collaboration patterns both at an individual and group level (Chapter 4, 5 and 6).  At the 
same time, combination of network analysis and regression analysis shows two different 
dimensions of the collaboration simultaneously – the external, structural aspect of collaboration 
and the internal, organizational aspect of collaboration (Chapter 6 and 7).  
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1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is composed of 8 chapters.  Chapter 1 describes the problem statement of this study; 
the current research does not offer systemic empirical studies of the blurring boundaries between 
the nonprofit, business and public sector in macro and comparative perspectives.  Chapter 2 
explains the historical background and the current debate about why the cross-sector 
collaboration is indispensable for the nonprofit sector.  Then, the theoretical framework for the 
actual research is presented, which is a collaboration continuum measured by the intensity of 
collaborative relationships.  This framework is rooted on theories of collaboration, organizational 
and strategic management.  Chapter 3 presents a blueprint for the research of this study, 
including research questions, explanation about research method used, data collection, data 
analysis and so forth.  Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, analyses report the results.  Chapter 4, 5 and 6 
present external properties of collaborative relationships with the help of network analysis.  
Chapter 4 describes features of collaboration patterns within the nonprofit sector by presenting 
various network properties both at the individual and group level.  Diverse analyses, such as 
distance analysis, correlation analysis between six collaborative relations, network centralization 
analysis and actor centrality analysis, uncover interesting patterns of collaboration, including the 
importance of strategically significant actors in a network.  Most significantly, a sociogram maps 
complex relationships among organizations in two dimensional space.  This visual mapping 
enables observation of different patterns of collaboration.  Chapter 5 repeats the same analysis 
technique in Chapter 4 for cross-sector collaboration networks.  Simple comparisons of 
sociograms and other analysis resulting from cross-sector collaboration networks (Chapter 5) and 
within the nonprofit sector collaboration networks (Chapter 4) show that a new network structure 
emerges when business and public organizations are introduced, which is different from the 
network structures that is composed exclusively of nonprofits.  Chapter 6 provides more detailed 
evidence of structural changes through a sophisticated technique – blockmodel.  These structural 
changes are evidence of the blurring boundaries between sectors.  Blockmodeling shows that the 
impact of business in nonprofit collaboration networks is different from the impact of public 
agencies.  Chapter 7 focuses on the influence of the internal (i.e., organizational) attributes of the 
collaboration patterns of the nonprofit sector.  Two regression models – multiple regression and 
logistic regression – reveal which organizational factors enhance collaboration.  The logistic 
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model, in particular, shows which organizational characteristics are helpful in strategically 
collaborating with business or public sector organizations.  Chapter 8 summarizes analysis 
results from Chapter 4 to 7 and proposes several policy implications resulting from analysis.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes theories regarding the cross-sector collaboration from the previous studies.  
Then, on the basis of organization and strategic management theory, the framework for this study 
– a continuum of collaboration by the intensity – is presented.  This framework is a starting point 
for the design and empirical research in the following chapters.   
2.2 THE SEAMLESS ECONOMY: BLURRING BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 
SECTORS 
2.2.1 The new governance system: Characterizations of the seamless economy 
2.2.1.1 Interactions among three sectors prior to the 1980s 
Before the 1980s, three sectors – the public, nonprofit and for-profit sectors – were seen 
as distinct from each other in “organizational terms, in motivational values, in their source of 
support, and in the work they carried out” (Young and Salamon, 2002, p.440), although “there 
was much interaction among them” (p.439).  Then, as now, a major difference between the 
sectors was perceived to be their respective sources of revenue.  Governments raise money from 
taxes and businesses generate profits from selling goods or services to their customers.  
Nonprofits, on the other hand, raise money from more diversified sources such as government 
grants and contracts, private donations as well as commercial activities and fees for services 
(Drucker, 1990).  According to Ferris and Graddy (1989), blurring boundaries between the 
nonprofit and other sectors begin from this diversification of revenue source, which makes 
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nonprofits intensely interact with other sectors.  In other words, the very nature and composition 
of their diverse revenue streams places nonprofit organizations in direct contact (sometimes 
competitive) with the other two sectors.   
Until recently, the principle assumption was that each sector operated independently of 
the others with governments providing public goods, business providing private goods, and 
nonprofits providing the rest (Ostrander and Langton, 1987).  Under this assumption, unequal 
exchanges were conducted across sectors (Austin, 2000a, 2000b).  The idea of unequal exchange 
between the nonprofit sector and other sectors means that providers of (financial) resources – 
governments or for-profit organizations – to nonprofits are not direct beneficiaries for their 
supports.  The below Figure II-1 exhibits these interactions among three sectors. 
 
 
                                   
                                               ①                     ⑤ 
                                                   ②            ⑧    ⑦        ⑥ 
                                                           
   ③ 
                                                              ④ 
Nonprofits 
Government For-profits 
 
Figure II-1) Interactive relationships among three sectors from the mid 1960s to the early 1980s. 
 
In the above Figure II-1, straight lines indicate actual resource flows such as financial 
resources from government to nonprofits.  Conversely, dotted lines designate indirect resources.   
First, grants or contracts flow from government to nonprofit and/or for-profit organizations 
(straight lines ① and ③ in the Figure II-1).  In return, nonprofit and for-profit organizations 
provided public services (dotted lines ② and ④ in the Figure II-1) (Saidel, 1991) which are not 
direct returns to government.  Because many nonprofit organizations depended on governments 
for most of their financial resources, two problems arose: 1) resource dependence of nonprofits 
on governments leaving them vulnerable to shifts in government priorities and 2) 
bureaucratization of nonprofits as they establish mechanisms for complying with the every 
growing array of government rules and guidelines as a condition for government funding (Smith 
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and Lipsky, 1993; Ott, 2001).  Moreover, a purely financial relationship between the nonprofit 
sector and the for-profit sector was not mutual exchanges, but one-way relationships (i.e., 
unequal exchanges) typified by businesses making charitable donations or gifts in-kind to 
nonprofits with little or no return on their investment other than helping to fulfill their 
philanthropic obligations. Straight line ⑤ in the Figure II-1 refers to subcontracts of government 
contracts from nonprofits to for-profits (O’Regan and Oster, 2000) in return for provisions of 
public services by for-profit organizations indicated by the dotted line ⑥ in the Figure II-1.  On 
the other hand, corporate donations flow from for-profits to nonprofits as indicated by straight 
line ⑦ in the Figure II-1.  Usually, nonprofits did not return anything for these donations but 
provisions of public services (dotted line ⑧ in the Figure II-1). Also, in dotted line ⑧ , 
nonprofits provide for-profits with a “good feeling” of having fulfilled their charitable obligation.    
In sum, prior to the 1980s, the character of interactions between government, nonprofits, 
and businesses was that there was no direct mutual benefit among interactive actors.  A nonprofit 
organization, as a charitable entity, took resources from the other sectors, but did not return 
practical benefits to them.   
2.2.1.2 New governance – 1980 to present 
Young and Salamon (2002; Salamon, 2002) argue that old solutions or programs from the 
old governance structure – distinct separation among three sectors – have not responded to 
persistent social problems such as poverty.  Complex social problems such as hunger and 
poverty cannot be solved by any one sector’s efforts alone but by coordinated efforts of cross-
sector partnerships (Shore, 1999; Sagawa and Segal, 2000).  
Cross-sector collaboration is not a new phenomenon.  For example, it has existed 
especially between universities, industries, and governments for many years (see, Geisler, 1997; 
Weisbrod, 1998a, chapter 9).  Currently, cross-sector mutually beneficial partnerships in the 
social service field, especially between nonprofits and for-profits are increasing.  Beyond old 
types of interaction of which purpose is to raise more money, the new types of reciprocal 
partnerships are aimed at strategic goals and outcomes.   
The new reciprocal partnerships in the seamless economy are different from the old 
partnerships in terms of two things: 1) mutual benefits for all participating parties (Austin, 2000a, 
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2000b) and 2) the so-called “double bottom line” of nonprofit organizations wherein social 
missions are used to generate income streams as well (Dees et al, 2001: Shore, 1999).  The 
characteristics of the new partnership will be discussed in the next section.   
Current challenges in the social service nonprofit sector such as scarce resources and 
increasing demands for social services force nonprofit organizations to change their perspectives.  
Light (2002) argues that environmental challenges drove nonprofit organizations to reform their 
managerial paradigm from passive taker of donations or grants to active seeker of their new 
types of resources and partnerships.   
As an active and pragmatic response to environmental challenges, nonprofits become 
engaged in the market and adopt business sector strategies for social sector successes (Kearns, 
2000).  The nonprofits’ market involvements can be explained as commercialization and 
entrepreneurial approach to social purposes.  Practically, nonprofits’ market involvement 
strategies are summarized into three – fees for services, experimentations with commercial 
ventures, and cross-sector collaboration (Young and Salamon, 2002).  Among them, this study 
focuses on the cross-sector collaboration. 
b
a c
Nonpro
fits 
For-
Profits 
Govern
ments 
 
Figure II-2) The seamless economy1: Blurring boundaries among the three sectors 
                                                 
1 The term “seamless economy” and Figure 2 is first introduced by Kevin P. Kearns in his class lectures.  
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Due to interdependent relationships between sectors, boundaries between them are more 
blurring or blending.  Young and Salamon (2002; Salamon, 2002) argue that the new 
collaboration relationships form the new governance system in the social service field.  The 
specific characteristic of the new governance is nonprofits’ market involvement in terms of 
obtaining resources (Weisbrod, 1998a) as well as enhancing their organizational capacities (Letts 
et al., 1999).  This study calls the new governance system “the seamless economy.”  The above 
Figure II-2 illustrates the relationships among three sectors which are blurring each other (a, b, 
and c area in the Figure II-2).  
In this new governance system, a fundamental problem that nonprofits are facing in the 
market involvement is “whether nonprofits can adapt without compromising the qualities that 
distinguish them from for-profit organizations” (Ryan, 1999, p.128; Dees, 1998a; Weisbrod, 
1998a). 
Since the focus of this study is the nonprofit sector, relationships between governments 
and for-profits (b in the above Figure II-2) will not be considered.  Specifically, in order to 
investigate nonprofits’ market involvement, the main attention will be on the area c in the Figure 
II-2, which are collaborative interactions between the nonprofit and for-profit sector.   
Blurring areas in Figure II-2 can be explained in two ways – competition and 
collaboration.  The main focus of this study will be on the collaboration aspect of the seamless 
economy.  Next sections will describe characteristics of the seamless economy in detail.   
2.2.2 Interactive relationships between nonprofits and governments 
Most of the nonprofit literature views relationships between nonprofits and governments as 
collaborative, not competitive.  However, a few authors have noted that the relationship between 
nonprofits and government has certain competitive elements that occasionally produce tension 
between the two.  Young (2000) notes that nonprofits and governments sometimes pursue 
competing interests.  For example, nonprofits often engage in advocacy for minorities and 
underserved populations, challenging government to do more to meet their needs.  When these 
populations do not receive public services they want, they may organize voluntary associations 
(i.e., a nonprofit organization) to advocate for their interests and eventually to reflect their 
interests on public policy.  As an answer to minorities’ advocacy, “government may react by 
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trying to defend majority interests” (p.157).  Another form of tension between government and 
nonprofits involves the tax exempt status of nonprofits.  Weisbrod (1998b) notes that nonprofits 
compete with governments from the economic perspective; “when nonprofits expand, 
government loses revenue” (p.401).  Because nonprofits do not pay corporate income taxes and 
property tax, the expansion of nonprofit organizations results in loss of tax revenue, especially in 
the local government level.   
Collaborative relationships between nonprofits and governments can be explained in two 
ways.  First, contracting out is the most common form of partnerships between nonprofits and 
governments (O’Regan and Oster, 2000).  Nonprofits are complementary to government in that 
nonprofits provide social services on behalf of governments (Young, 2000).  In other words, 
government finances public services and nonprofits deliver them (Salamon, 1995).  In this 
partnership, grants or contracts are flowing from governments to nonprofits; public service 
provision from nonprofits to governments.    Because social service (delivery) is inherently 
complex, governments prefer the nonprofit sector to for-profit sector in contracting out (O’Regan 
and Oster, 2000).  Saidel (1991) views these partnerships as resource interdependence (or 
symmetrical resource dependence) between nonprofits and governments.  According to Saidel, 
governments provide resources such as “revenues; information, including expertise and technical 
assistance; political support and legitimacy in the sense of external validation; and access to the 
nonlegislative policy process” (p.381).  In return for these provisions, nonprofits “supply their 
service-delivery capacity, information, political support, and legitimacy to state agencies” 
(p.381).   
Second, though it is rare, there are some cases of joint venture between nonprofits and 
governments.  For example, “the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), is collaborating 
with the state government of California to sell a license plate that finances student scholarships” 
(Weisbrod, 1998b, p.402).  
Finally, current literature reported interesting findings that nonprofit-government 
collaboration relationships are initiated and maintained by the existing personal relationships 
rather than economic or managerial incentives of government such as reducing costs, gaining 
flexibilities by moving money around from year to year among nonprofits reflecting changing 
priorities, or placing more responsibility on the private nonprofit sector to define and solve 
problems (Shaw, 2003; Van Slyke, 2004).  “The successful partnerships… were built not on 
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negotiated agreement but on years of experience with partner agencies on the part of the 
individuals who actually worked together and had genuine affection of each other” (Shaw, 2003, 
p.118).   
2.2.3 Interactive relationships between nonprofits and for-profits  
2.2.3.1 Competition aspects of blurring boundaries between nonprofits and 
for-profits 
During the past two decades, for-profit organizations have penetrated nonprofit markets 
where nonprofit organizations were exclusively dominant in the pre-1980s, and vice versa 
(Salamon, 1993, 2002; Weisbrod, 1998a).  As a result of for-profits’ market penetration, 
nonprofits are losing their market share over for-profits in certain services (Salamon, 2002).  For 
example, nonprofits’ percentage of child care jobs declined from 52% to 38% and percentage of 
home health jobs declined from 60% to 28% between 1982 and 1997 (Salamon, 2002, p.15).  
During the same period, governments’ outsourcing for social services grew, and accordingly the 
scope of social service market expanded (Ryan, 1999).  As government agencies adopt “a 
business mind-set” (p.129), governments seem to prefer for-profit organizations as their contract 
partners.  Eventually, the market penetration brings severe competition between the nonprofit 
and for-profit sector.  It is difficult to clearly explain why competition happens during the last 
two decades (Salamon, 2002), but the following four reasons partly describe the reason 
(Gronjberg and Salamon, 2002).  
First, privatization of government to the non-governmental sector intensifies competition 
between the nonprofit and for-profit sector.  Because governments promoted for-profits to 
engage in contracts for various social services where nonprofits used to be dominant, the real 
impact of the privatization has been “to increase for-profit competition for many of the grants 
and contracts that nonprofit organizations were already receiving” (Gronjberg and Salamon, 
2002, p.454).  
Second, the shift to consumer-side subsidies “made it easier for-profit firms to enter 
markets formerly dominated almost exclusively by nonprofits” (Gronjberg and Salamon, 2002, 
p.455; Salamon, 2002).  The format of government support was shifted from “producer-side” 
subsides to “consumer-side” subsidies. While producer-side subsidies – direct support to the 
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producer of services through grants or contracts – decreased, consumer-side subsides such as 
vouchers, tax credits, and loan guarantees have increased substantially over the past decade.  For 
example, in 1986, more than 70 percentage of federal support to nonprofits were consumer-side 
subsidies (p.455).  
Third, governments award contracts to social service providers not by “what they are,” 
but by “what they can do” (Ryan, 1999, p.129).  Pressures of high performance on nonprofits 
drive nonprofit organizations to make their efforts on cost-control or efficient service delivery 
with which nonprofits are not familiar.  Because nonprofits usually are not good at managing 
cost-control or efficiency, for-profit organizations that are inherently good at management of 
efficiency have competitive advantages to enter markets traditionally dominated by nonprofits.   
Fourth, the welfare reforms in 1996 shifted the focus of federal support “from services 
and income support to work readiness and employment, not fields where traditional nonprofit 
social service agencies have had a particular advantage” (Gronjberg and Salamon, 2002, p.458).  
For this reason, the number of state governments that choose for-profits as contract partners are 
growing (Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 2000).   
Another critical issue to consider in nonprofit – for-profit competition is the mythology 
of competition.  Recently, Van Slyke (2003) reported that marketization trends in the social 
service field may not result in more efficient social service delivery.  On the contrary, the author 
argued that the mythology – competition will bring efficiency – is not always true because of 
several barriers to develop competition.  These are environmental constraints, actions by 
nonprofit organizations, networked relationships, and government-enacted barriers (Van Slyke, 
2003).  According to Van Slyke, environmental constraints of government indicate that 
government does not have enough capacity to monitor multiple nonprofit organizations’ 
performance and to enforce accountability.  Actions by nonprofit organizations are reflected on 
niche market specialization of the nonprofit sector.  Because a few nonprofits in the specific 
service field provide services which nobody wants to provide or deliver, they can achieve an 
expertise and specialization in these particular service areas.  Thus, it is difficult to find out 
competitors in that specific service area.  Personally or politically connected network 
relationships are positively correlated with winning contracts.  For example, if the newly elected 
officials are formerly connected with nonprofit personnel who helped officials in the election 
campaign, contracts decided by these officials would be by no means competitive or objective.  
 14
Lastly, because public-public partnership reduces costs of contracting out, sometimes 
governments select other government agencies as their partners instead of the private sector 
(neither nonprofits nor for-profits).  These government-enacted barriers would reduce or 
eliminate competition among nonprofits.     
In sum, changes in market share among sectors reflect “a complex set of shifts in the 
basic composition” – i.e., blurring boundaries - of social service industry (Salamon, 1993).  
2.2.3.2 Collaboration aspects of blurring boundaries between nonprofits and 
for-profits 
Currently, cross-sector collaboration between nonprofits and for-profits is growing.  This section 
will first briefly review incentives for cross-sector collaboration for nonprofit and for-profits 
respectively.  Then, specific characteristics of cross-sector collaboration will be discussed.   
 
Driving forces of cross-sector collaboration  
a. Driving forces in the nonprofit sector 
From the nonprofit standpoint, the following incentives drive nonprofits to collaborate 
with for-profits: 1) financial pressure such as decline of government (federal, state, and local) 
funding (McCormak, 1996; Salamon, 1993, 1995, 2002) and decline of private/corporate 
donations (Salamon, 1993, 2002), which makes nonprofits spend more time and energy on 
securing revenue sources, 2) devolution of federal, state, and local government services 
(Alexander, 1999) increases responsibilities of service delivery as well as workloads, and 3) 
social and demographic shifts have resulted in increases in the demand for social service that 
nonprofits have traditionally provided (McCormak, 1996; Salamon, 1993, 1995, 2002).  These 
three incentives provided nonprofits with both challenges (1 and 2) and opportunities (3).  In 
responding to these challenges and opportunities, nonprofits harness challenges and 
opportunities by expanding their partnerships with businesses through utilizing nonprofits’ 
peculiar assets, such as “reputational capital” (Salamon, 2005, p.94).  In other words, these cross-
sector collaboration driving forces “are leading to a blurring of sector boundaries and a call for 
more entrepreneurial spirit in the social sector.  Specifically, they have led social entrepreneurs 
to search for more sustainable solutions to social problems and to more sustainable funding 
sources” (Dees et al., 2001, p.13). 
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Governments have been one of the most valuable partners as sources of financial 
resources to nonprofits.  However, due to the severe fiscal cutback of the social service field in 
the Regan Administration (in the early 1980’s), “federal support to nonprofit organizations, 
outside of Medicare and Medicaid, declined by approximately 25 percent in real dollar terms in 
the early 1980s and returned to its 1980 level only in the late 1990s” (Salamon, 2002, p.12).  
“Although … these fiscal pressures eased significantly during the 1990’s, the experience of the 
1980s and the early 1990s left a lingering financial scar.  That scar has been reopened in the 
early years of the new century by a combination of tax reductions, economic recession, and 
increased military and antiterrorism spending that is causing new cutbacks in health, education, 
and social welfare funding and hence new pressures on nonprofit finances” (Salamon, 2005, 
p.84).  On the other hand, between 1977 and 1997, private giving’s share of total revenue in the 
nonprofit sector was declined from 27 percent to 20 percent (Salamon, 2002).  Moreover, though 
not a big potion of private giving, corporation’s contribution “fell 14.5% in real dollars in 2001, 
and over the last 15 years, corporate giving as a percentage of profits has dropped by 50%” 
(Porter and Kramer, 2002, p.57).  At the same time, corporation’s spending money on nonprofits 
is shifting to “favor more commercial approaches” (Dees, 1998a, p.140; Anderson, 1996) from 
the previous “check writing” relationships.  Along with these fiscal pressures, social service 
needs are increasing from the several reasons such as growing number of older people, downturn 
of the economy, and governments’ devolution of responsibilities of social services to the private 
sector.   
As the “resilient sector”, nonprofits have successfully responded to these incentives of 
cross-sector collaboration by adopting entrepreneurial approach to market (Salamon, 2002).  For 
example, nonprofits “view earned-income-generating activities as more reliable funding sources 
than donations and grants” (Dees, 1998a, p.140).  In other words, nonprofits become more 
entrepreneurial -- working with business and becoming more businesslike -- to grow enough to 
meet more social needs rather than maintaining the old sources of money.  As the best way to 
learn business methods of management and as a growing strategy (i.e., horizontal integration 
through collaboration) to meet growing needs, nonprofits become strategically interacting with 
for-profits.  
 
b. Driving forces in the for-profit sector 
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Porter and Kramer (2002) argue that for-profits can enhance their competitive advantage 
through cross-sector collaboration.  In the long-term perspective, for-profits adopt a strategic 
approach to philanthropy to improve their “competitiveness context – the quality of the business 
environment in the location or locations where they operate” (Porter and Kramer, 2002, p.58; 
Shore, 1999).  According to Porter and Kramer, “philanthropy can often be the most cost-
effective way…. It enables companies to leverage not only their own resources but also the 
existing efforts and infrastructure of nonprofits and other institutions” (p.61).  
In order to achieve this strategic competitiveness, corporations change their relations with 
nonprofits from “giving” or “writing checks” to business “partnerships.”  Deep involvement in 
social problems “is not charity; it is R&D – a strategic business investment” (Kanter, 1999, 
p.124).  For example, funds for cause-related marketing which is the strategic collaboration 
between nonprofits and for-profits do not come out of philanthropic or corporate giving budget, 
but from marketing budget (Anderson, 1996).  
 
Characteristics of the new relations between nonprofits and for-profits 
The incentives for cross-sector collaboration described above require a new paradigm 
(Gronjberg and Salamon, 2002; Kanter, 1999; Light, 2002; Sagawa and Segal, 2000) or new 
partnership (Salamon, 1993, 2002) which encourages active engagement by both for-profits and 
nonprofits in the resolution of social problems.  A new paradigm aims at “real change – 
sustainable, replicable, institutionalized change that transforms schools, job prospects, and 
neighborhood” (Kanter, 1999, p.124).  Therefore, the new partnership should see cross-sector 
relationships differently from the traditional relationships.  Anderson (1996) summarizes key 
conditions for achieving a new paradigm: 
• Nonprofits’ goal and corporate strategy should align with each other;  
• Each partner should have complementary competencies that the other does not 
have; and  
• Collaboration efforts should be long-term relationships.   
This study assumes that cross-sector collaboration has two characteristics – a new concept of 
exchange and double bottom line, which will be illustrated in the next two sections.  
 
a. New concept of exchange 
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Along with the marketization of the social service field, cross-sector collaboration is 
designed “to leverage the competencies of each partner and create two-way value” (Austin, 
2000a, p.2).  Indeed, nonprofit - for-profit collaboration relationships are shifting from 
“philanthropic stage” toward strategic collaboration, which is characterized by strategic fit and 
mutual benefits (Austin, 2000a).  In order to gain the most from cross-sector collaboration, 
nonprofits adopt strategic approaches from the business sector.  On the other hand, under the 
new exchange paradigm, business transfers its unique skills and capabilities (e.g., Bell Atlantic’s 
engagement in wireless education in inner city in New Jersey) beyond the simple charity giving 
(Kanter, 1999).   
In this new paradigm of cross-sector interaction, nonprofits make efforts to collaborate by 
exploring strategic fit between nonprofits and for-profits, and also by discovering common 
objectives.  When it comes to actual cross-sector collaboration, both nonprofits and for-profits 
should “invest” their resources on the common objectives, because “investment by both partners 
builds mutuality” (Kanter, 1999, p.128).  On the basis of this new approach to cross-sector 
collaboration, the characteristic of exchange is changing from unequal to equal exchange (Austin, 
2000).  Opposed to the old type of exchange, “an (new) exchange occurs when a business and 
social sector organization recognize that their needs can be met by the other” (Sagawa and Segal, 
2000, p.11).   
These new exchanges eventually result in mutual benefits to both sector organizations.  
From the passive grant-takers, nonprofits shift its relationships with for-profits to strategic 
exchanges.  For example, through cross-sector collaboration, nonprofits can learn or receive 
training of business management skills or knowledge which many nonprofits simply do not 
possess.  In addition to these intangible resources, nonprofits can get such benefits as cost 
savings, economies of scale and scope, synergies, and revenue enhancement (Austin, 2000a, 
pp.8-11).  Specifically, via cross-sector collaboration, nonprofits build two types of 
organizational capacity – tangible and intangible capacity (Dees et al., 2001).  Tangible capacity 
is built through tangible resources.  Nonprofits can usually receive financial resources as well as 
facilities or technologies (expertise) from the for-profit sector.  Intangible capacity is built upon 
diverse intangible resource exchanges such as business managerial skills and knowledge, 
credibility, and visibility of the market or industry. 
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Beyond a charitable receiver of the corporate giving, nonprofits provide strategic values 
to their for-profit partners such as good images of nonprofits (Anderson, 1996), greater visibility 
in the community (Sagawa and Segal, 2000), strategy enrichment, human resource management, 
culture building, and business generation (Austin, 2000a, pp.11-14 ;Dees, 1998).  Cross-sector 
collaboration “complements the corporation’s goals and eventually increases its bottom line” 
(Anderson, 1996, p.130).  In the short term, nonprofits provide mostly intangible resources of 
which for-profits don’t possess.  These intangible resources are likely to enhance organizational 
capacity of the for-profit sector as well.  However, in the longer-term, these intangible values 
turn into tangible values.  Indeed, through cross-sector collaboration, for-profits can save costs 
(e.g., see Kanter (1999) as Marriott did with its engagement in Pathways to Independence, and 
also create higher productivity and market expansion (i.e., horizontal integration).  
The background of these mutual exchanges is acknowledgement of strategic fit between a 
nonprofit and a for-profit organization (Austin, 2000a).  In other words, nonprofits have what 
for-profits don’t have and vice versa.  For example, nonprofits have programmatic expertise, 
social capitals (networks in community and neighborhood level), and skills to build employee 
favor atmosphere.  On the other hand, for-profits have size (i.e., economies of scale), 
responsiveness, capital (or better access to capital), and managerial skill for efficiency (Ryan, 
1996).  Through these complementary capabilities, both parties “are able to accomplish more 
together than they are separately” (Austin, 2000a, p.10).  When these complementary capabilities 
are met, both sector organizations can enjoy synergy effects.   
Strategic fit also comes out of inherent differences between nonprofit and for-profit 
sector organizations.  Differences in economic characteristics of each sector organization such as 
differences in tax (exemption) status and in availability in resources (e.g., volunteers) create 
mutual benefits out of exchanges between nonprofits and for-profits (Weisbrod, 1998a).   
The strategic fit between two sector organizations can be seen as “inescapable 
interdependent relationships”2  (Austin, 2000).  Strategic fit and sectoral difference coupled 
with nature of social problems that cannot be solved by any one sector organization illustrate 
why relationships between nonprofits and for-profits are inescapably interdependent.    
                                                 
2 The concept that no single entity has all the inputs necessary to address an identified social need effectively 
(Austin, 2000, p.10).  
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When this interdependency of the two sector organizations transforms to cross-sector 
collaboration, both sector organizations can benefit from what Huxham calls “collaborative 
advantage” (Huxham, 1996).  Collaborative advantage is achieved when objectives of partners or 
strategic fit between partners are met.  Collaborative advantage focuses on “outputs of 
collaboration that could not have been achieved except through collaborating” (p.15) … In some 
cases, it should also be possible to achieve some higher-level… objectives for society as a whole 
rather than just for the participating organizations” (p.14).   
In short, the new type of exchanges between nonprofits and for-profits will enhance 
social well-being as a whole in the end.    
 
b. Double bottom line 
The term “double bottom line” refers to the simultaneous achievement of the charitable 
mission as well as financial performance through market engagement, social enterprise, or 
collaboration with for-profit firms (Dees, 1998a, p.146).  Simply put, the double bottom line 
involves the generation of social capital thereby promoting social improvements for communities.  
In order to achieve the double bottom line, many nonprofits are adopting business management 
methods.  As nonprofits embrace market values and methods, leaders in nonprofit organizations 
become a social entrepreneur (Dees, et al., 2001; Shore, 1999).  Through social entrepreneurship, 
the ultimate goal of nonprofits should be to make sustainable social changes to meet demands of 
social services or solve social problems such as hunger, homelessness, and so forth.  Social 
entrepreneurs pay attention to achieving the double bottom line through blending social and 
commercial methods.  Social entrepreneurs are different from commercial entrepreneurs in that 
“social entrepreneurs set out with an explicit social mission in mind” (Dees et al., 2001, p.4).  
“Social entrepreneurs act as change agents” (p.5) by creating social values, social engaging 
innovation, pursuing new opportunities, and exploring all resource options.   
These entrepreneurial approaches enable nonprofits to enter into new partnerships with 
for-profit organizations (Dees et al, 2001; Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004; Reis and Clohesy, 1999).  
While engaging in the social entrepreneurship, nonprofits should be careful not to fall into 
money-chasing which makes nonprofits deviate from their core missions.  In other words, 
generating income through cross-sector collaboration or other commercial activities such as fees 
for services “should not drive out philanthropic initiatives” (Dees, 1998a, p.136) 
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The best suitable organizational form for achieving double bottom line is a hybrid form 
which locates between pure philanthropy and pure commercial business (Dees et al., 2001).  The 
hybrid form is also a bi-product of the seamless economy (Dees, 1998a; Dees et al., 2001; Young 
and Salamon, 2002).  The hybrid form is called as social enterprise.  As a blurring or hybrid form, 
social enterprise is identified not by a particular organizational form (i.e. nonprofit or for-profit 
organizations), but by intent or purpose of organizations (i.e., pursuit of social mission).  In other 
words, social enterprise is an organization that pursues public or social goals regardless of its 
sectoral identity (Young and Salamon, 2002).   
Dees (1998a, 1998b; 2001) puts forward three characteristics of hybrid form which go 
hand in hand with the concept of the double bottom line.  First, method of hybrid form is mission 
and market driven method.  Second, goals in a hybrid form are to accomplish social and 
economic values at the same time.  Third, motives for hybrid form are mixed with pure 
philanthropic and commercial motives.  
  In order to achieve double bottom line, nonprofits need the strategic restructuring toward 
entrepreneurial cross-sector collaboration.  The strategic restructuring should wisely integrate 
“social impulses3” with the “best aspects of business practice” (Dees, 1998a).  By doing so, 
cross-sector collaboration can become a successful hybrid form.  Shore (1999) suggests several 
tips for nonprofit organizations to achieve double bottom line through entrepreneurial 
approaches. First, nonprofits should facilitate partnerships with businesses in order to create 
resources to redistribute social wealth, not just to collect and redistribute the social wealth.  
Second, unlike the simple check writing relations with for-profits, nonprofits should cultivate a 
new donation culture - donating skills as well as money (Shore, 1999).   
 
c. Advantages of cross-sector collaboration strategy  
As discussed in the above, nonprofits can reap many benefits from the cross-sector 
collaboration.  Through a shared commitment to the same social mission, both nonprofits and 
for-profits can achieve mutual benefits (Austin, 2000a; Dees et al., 2001).  Specifically, cross-
sector collaboration can result in additional financial resources, services or goods, access to other 
corporations, technology and expertise, new perspectives, and greater name recognition (Austin, 
                                                 
3 Something that cannot get out of market transaction, but out of “giving” (Dees, 1998, p.165). 
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2000(b), p.76).  In the mid to long term, cross-sector collaboration offers the following 
advantages (Dees et al., 2001, p.14): 
- It improves efficiency or effectiveness 
- It models self-sufficiency 
- It provides an unrestricted funding stream 
- When nonprofit organizations experience risks, partnerships with for-profits can allow 
nonprofits “to leverage resources beyond their own organizations that may prove critical 
to their ability to anticipate, negotiate, and manage a variety of potential risk factors” 
(Dees et al., 2001, p.148).  
 
In sum, numerous successful stories about cross-sector collaboration from the literature have 
showed that working together closely with each other nonprofits and for-profits can produce 
mutual advantages and have positive impacts on social problems and needs.  
2.3 FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY: THE COLLABORATION NETWORK 
2.3.1 Collaboration network 
This section will define the concept of the collaboration network.  The collaboration network is 
combination of two mutually reinforcing concepts, collaboration and network.  First, networks 
are “incubators of collaboration” (King, 2004; Prusak and Cohen, 2001) because networks help 
organizations collaborate through providing new information, opportunities and social capitals.  
In return, successful collaboration not only reinforces existing relationships, but also is likely to 
create new relationships which eventually reinforce networks of one organization.  “Successful 
collaboration in one endeavor builds connections and trust – social assets that facilitate future 
collaboration in other, unrelated tasks” (Putnam, 1993, cited from Prusak and Cohen, 2001, p.93).  
Thus, this study argues that synergy effects are likely to emerge through these mutually 
reinforcing processes.  On the basis of this argument, this study defines the collaboration 
network as networks that catalyze and facilitate collaboration strategy by helping organizations 
identify new opportunities and build social capitals.   
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2.3.1.1 Collaboration continuum: a definition of collaboration 
When one tries to figure out the meaning of “collaboration”, she or he will encounter 
semantic ambiguity because a definition of collaboration varies over different perspectives of 
researchers (for example, see Appendix1).  There is general agreement on four aspects of 
collaboration.  First, collaboration is used as a positive meaning opposed to negative 
interorganizational relations, such as conflicts (Huxham, 1996).  Second, collaboration goes 
beyond simple form of sharing information (i.e. personal connections) and has to be more than 
resource sharing with mutual obligations (Snavely and Tracy, 2000).  Third, collaboration 
creates a “high degree of (perceived) opportunity for joint value creation” among participating 
organizations (Jarillo, 1988, p.38).  The joint value creation comes out of mutual exchanges and 
mutual adjustment (Powell, 1998).  Fourth, collaboration does not conform to just one form or 
approach.  That is, collaboration spans from informal to formal collaboration (O’Looney, 1994; 
Rogers and Whetten, 1982).   
 
Table II-1) Collaboration continuum: Summary of literatures 
Collaborative efforts Strategic Restructuring       Collaboration type by                             intensity 
 
Characteristics Tactical Collaboration Strategic Collaboration Corporate Integration 
Shared Goal/ Mission Low overlapping Moderate to high overlapping Mission integration 
Autonomy Autonomy Interdependence Integration 
Shared Rule Yes/No Yes Yes 
Structure’s Duration Temporary Mid- to long-term Permanent 
Inter/Intra Sector Both Both Mostly intra sector 
Decision Making Remains with individual orgs. Shared 
Dissolution to one or 
more orgs. 
Interaction level Moderate Moderate to intensive / Regular N/A 
Strategic value Low to modest Modest to high High 
Example Information exchanges and work referrals 
Joint venture and 
programs, and resource 
sharing 
Merger 
 
Considering complex concepts of interactive relationships, it is helpful to propose a 
conceptual framework for collaboration that captures the range and intensity of collaborative 
relationships rather than to adhere to one definition.  Also, a continuum of collaboration is 
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suggested by many researchers (See appendix 2).  Table II-14 elaborates complex dimensions of 
collaboration based on previous literatures.   
Though not many authors include tactical collaboration in various types of collaboration, 
this study includes it because of its potential value for future collaboration5.  Most authors see 
collaboration as strategic collaboration (Arsenault, 1998; Kanter, 1994; Kearns, 2000; La Piana, 
1998, 2001).   
Collaboration is aligned with intensity of interactions.  Tactical collaboration involves 
less intense relationships between organizations such as information exchanges or work referrals.  
In these relations, it is not necessary for partners to mutually exchange tangible or intangible 
resources.  These relations can be a passive form (i.e., work referrals) or just offering something 
without expecting a return from a partner (i.e., information exchanges).  Because these relations 
do not demand much effort from each partner, each partner maintains their autonomy.  Relations 
in the tactical collaboration also do not mandate an organization to commit its efforts to initiate 
and/or maintain these types of relations.  These relations are relatively loosely connected 
relations and thus, could be temporary (but not necessarily).  On the other hand, Strategic 
collaboration means that there are moderate to intensive relationships between partners.  
Intensive relations directly suggest that partners mutually exchange intangible and/or tangible 
resources.  Examples of strategic collaboration are joint venture, joint planning, resource sharing, 
or cause-related marketing between nonprofits and for-profits.  In order to gain the most out of 
these relationships, partners sometimes agree to share decision making processes for a shared 
goal in which they are involved together.  Thus, their relationships can be described as 
interdependent relationships.  
 Finally, as the most intensive form of interorganizational relations, strategic restructuring 
(i.e., corporate integration) is different from collaboration because it involves “a total change in 
the locus of control of one or more of the partnering organizations” (La Piana, 2001, p.6).   
A definition of collaboration in this study is a little different from Table II-1.  First, this 
study will not include strategic restructuring in the collaboration continuum.  Theoretically, 
strategic restructuring, especially merger, is an important dimension of the collaboration 
continuum because it can reduce wastes of resources by decreasing overlapping services and 
                                                 
4 Characteristics in this table are made based on Austin (2000a), Gray (1989) and La Piana (2001). 
5 For examples of including tactical collaboration in the collaboration definition, see Huxham, (1996) and Murray 
(1999). 
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programs within the same geographical area (La Piana, 1998, 2001).  However, this study will 
not consider strategic restructuring because this happens mostly intra-sector, and once merger is 
conducted, it is difficult to measure relations between two organizations. 
Second, this study includes irregular information exchanges – informal and/or irregular 
contacts such as exchanges of information or advice – in the definition of collaboration.  The 
importance of irregular information exchanges in networks is evidenced in three ways.  First, 
information exchanges result in “blurring of professional and personal relationships” (Williams, 
2002, p.110).  Thus, information exchanges bring many positive features to organizations that 
maintain these relations, such as sharing values, building trust, and so forth.   
Second, information exchange relations have enough potential to be developed into more 
intense forms of collaboration.  When these relations are accumulating through continuous 
contacts, organizations that maintain these relations can build the ability to use these 
relationships as a form of human capital (Mandell, 1999b).   
Third, information exchanges represent “weak ties” which are important in building social 
capital.  Although weak tie is strategically important (Granovetter, 1973; Gummer, 2001; Seibert, 
Kraimer, and Liden, 2001), most of the literature does not regard weak ties as a form of 
collaboration because it pertains to a relationship that is too loosely connected.  However, due to 
its strategic value, this study includes information exchanges in the collaboration continuum, 
especially to measure weak ties.   
On the basis of the above arguments, this study proposes Table II-2 as the definition of 
collaboration in this study.   
 
Table II-2) Collaboration continuum: Definition of collaboration in this study 
Irregular information 
exchange Tactical collaboration Strategic collaboration 
Informal affiliation Formal affiliation 
Exchanges of 
information and 
advice 
Work 
referrals 
Regular 
meeting 
Physical/ 
personnel 
resource sharing 
Formal 
contracts 
Strategic 
alliances 
Intensity of collaboration efforts 
Weak                                                                                                                                         Strong 
 
The definition of collaboration in this study is composed of three different collaborative 
relationships which are irregular information exchanges, tactical collaboration, and strategic 
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collaboration.  As stated in the above, these are arrayed according to its intensity of collaboration 
relationships.   
Information exchanges are either short-term or long-term “informal relations that exist 
without any defined mission, structure, or planning effort” (Winner and Ray, 1994, p.22).   
Tactical collaboration – work referrals and regular meeting - is different from information 
exchanges in that organizations connected with tactical collaboration relations “share 
information only about the subject at hand” (Winner and Ray, 1994, p.22), while organizations 
connected with information exchange relations communicate general subjects.       
Compared with strategic collaboration, the first feature of tactical collaboration is 
informal affiliation6.  Organizations with tactical collaboration relations usually don’t rely on 
formal written documents for maintaining these relations but mostly on trust between 
organizations7.  Another feature of tactical collaboration is maintenance of total autonomy over 
decision making and administrative operations.  That is, organizations connected via tactical 
collaboration maintain their independence and autonomy in operations, governance, and strategy.  
The third feature of tactical collaboration is that strategic value, in terms of joint goals and/or 
joint values, is low to moderate because organizations connected with these relations are 
independent in operating their missions. 
Tactical collaboration relations are subdivided into work referrals and regular meetings.  
Tactical collaboration includes work referrals which are not cited by the previous researchers.  
Work referrals are not usually based on the formal written documents among human service 
organizations.  However, work referrals are important to provide human services in a timely 
manner because work referrals are an open conduit where organizations can ask for help when 
they have clients whose problems are beyond their ability.   
Strategic collaboration relations are subdivided into physical/ personnel resource sharing, 
formal contracts, and strategic alliances.  Physical/ personnel resource sharing occurs when 
organizations share personnel and/or physical resources such as offices.  Formal contract in this study 
refers to a contract with other organization(s) to perform or jointly perform services.  Strategic alliances 
involve joint activities such as joint programs or joint venture.  In the cross-sector collaboration, 
                                                 
6 However, regular meeting is not necessarily informal. 
7 Trust as long standing relationships is “faith in the moral integrity or goodwill of the other” (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994). Trust is different from mere interpersonal relationships.  Trust is built on recognition of professional respects 
which come from excellent performance in the past.   
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strategic alliances includes cause-related marketing (such as transaction-based promotions, joint 
issue promotions or licensing, Anderson, 1996), loyalty arrangement or event-sponsorship.  The 
first feature of strategic collaboration is formal affiliation.  Organizations connected with 
strategic collaboration relations often maintain their collaborative relationships based on formal 
written documents.  The second feature is interdependency.  Based on written agreements, 
organizations connected via strategic collaboration relations share decision making processes to 
achieve shared goals.  The third feature is creation of strategic value.  Through these 
collaboration relations, the possibility of creating joint goal and value is higher than less 
intensive types of collaborative relations.   
In sum, the collaboration continuum proposed above has two advantages.  First, the 
continuum is practically fitted to a human service system.  The definition includes two relations 
– information exchanges and work referrals – which are not usually included in the previous 
collaboration study.  Second, the continuum allows for collaboration relationships that are 
dynamic because organizations can maintain multiple relations with others simultaneously 
(maximum six relations at the same time).  Since collaboration relations are defined as multiple 
relations, decision makers in organizations can strategically choose from a very large number of 
combinations of relations based upon their needs and capabilities. 
2.3.1.2 Potential contributions of networks on collaboration 
The most substantial contribution of social network to collaboration is its ability to 
support partnerships and alliances between organizations (Cross and Parker, 2004).  “Social 
network analysis can illuminate the effectiveness of such (collaboration) initiatives in terms of 
information flow, knowledge transfer, and decision making” (p.8).  Network analysis is more 
useful when it comes to examination of informal relations, because informal relations represent 
an important type of collaboration initiatives.  Specifically, social network analysis provides both 
practical and new information which is crucial to cross-sector collaboration.  
Social network analysis provides practical ideas or information that can be directly used 
by practitioners when they undertake a collaboration strategy.  In other words, “getting an 
accurate view of a network helps with managerial decision making and informs targeted efforts 
to promote effective collaboration” (Cross and Parker, 2004, p.7).  Network analysis can give 
practical information such as who are overloaded by information flows, who are disconnected 
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from most of others, or who bridges between subgroups of a network.  If a manager in a 
nonprofit organization undertakes collaboration initiatives “without understanding the inner 
workings of a network” or does not know where her organization places and who the most 
significant organization in the network is, she might waste precious resources to search for as 
many connections as possible based on “an implicit philosophy that more connections and 
collaboration are better” (p.7).   
From the strategic point, “rather than pursue initiatives that create connections 
indiscriminately 8 , managers need to make a more targeted approach, keeping in mind that 
collaboration has a cost….. Managers who target strategic points in social networks can quickly 
increase an organization’s effectiveness, efficiency, and opportunities for innovation” (p.8).  
Therefore, for example, if a manager in a nonprofit organization not only acknowledges that her 
organization is relatively insular from other organizations in the network, but also understand the 
importance of networks and who strategically significant actors in the network are, she could 
improve overall connectivity by making connections with a few organizations who has many 
important relationships with another central organizations or who bridge between other 
organizations.  On the other hand, if a manger discovers that her organization is overloaded by 
information flows in the network, she could develop a strategy to decrease time-consuming 
connections using network analysis (Cross and Parker, 2004).  
Network analysis can reveal new information that is often contradictory to intuitive 
perception of nonprofit managers (Cross and Parker, 2004).  For example, contrary to the 
common sense, an organization with excellent reputation could be insular in terms of its 
connectivity with other organizations.  Another piece of valuable information obtained through 
network analysis is discovery of strategically significant actors in terms of their unique relational 
patterns distinctive from those of others.  For example, “connectors” (Gladwell, 1999) or 
“gatekeeper” (Flemming and Juda, 2002) in networks can be discovered by network analysis.  
Connectors are small number of individuals (or organizations) who are responsible for a large 
percentage of interactions such as information sharing, work referral flows, or resource flows, 
both within and across a subgroup.  Mostly, connectors place in between subgroups where actors 
have strong and dense ties.  Burt (1992) argues that connectors are strategically significant in the 
                                                 
8 An indiscriminate increase in connections can be a drag on productivity (Cross and Parker, 2004, p.8).  
 28
network because they are rich in structural holes9.  This argument is directly connected to social 
capital which will be discussed in the below.   
Practically, in order to gain the most out of cross-sector collaboration, nonprofits need to 
build organizational capacities that will facilitate them to work together with for-profits smoothly.  
These capacities can be built from managing social networks.  Specifically, Dees et al. (2001) 
suggest two critical managerial issues that would improve network management for cross-sector 
collaboration: opportunity recognition and building social capital.  
First, networks allow nonprofits to understand when a window of opportunity is open.  
When nonprofits are “in the right place at the right time,” nonprofits can increase chances to 
meet for-profits that have strategic fit with nonprofits.  “Being in the right place at the right time 
has more to do with the connections people make than their geographical position….. The more 
connections you make and the more people who know and understand your mission, the greater 
your chances of finding new opportunities” (Dees et al., 2001, p.47).  In other words, through the 
“relational capability of organizations,” nonprofits can recognize “how and when organizations 
are able to combine their existing competencies with the abilities of others” (Powell, 1998, 
p.229).   
Second, social capital is a useful concept for nonprofits to develop strategic partnerships 
and to enhance community relations (King, 2004).  It is said that nonprofits have fluent social 
capital because “nonprofits represent the epitome of social capital in action: groups of people 
coming together voluntarily to meet a collective need” (King, 2004, p.483).  Besides, nonprofits 
have been playing a role of building social capital (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004).  This social 
capital inherent in nonprofits is very useful to mobilize resources for launching social enterprise 
(in this study, cross-sector collaboration), because social capital coming out of network relations 
is likely to provide practical and new information about other organizations that would be 
potential matches as collaboration partners (Dees, et al., 2001).   
Though there are numerous differences in definitions of social capital (see Adler and 
Kwon, 2002), most agree that social capital not only can be represented by relationships with 
others, but also is built through networks (King, 2004).  Roughly, social capital is explained by 
two different aspects: bonding and bridging social capital (King, 2004).  While bonding social 
                                                 
9 “A structural hole is a relationship of nonredundancy between two contacts.  The hole is a buffer, like an insulator 
in an electric circuit.  As a result of the hole between them, the two contacts provide network benefits that are in 
some degree additive rather than overlapping” (Burt, 1992, p.18).   
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capital focuses on networks rich in connections, bridging social capital focuses on networks rich 
in structural holes.  Bonding social capital “conveys standard norms for its members, helping 
them to optimize performance”.  On the other hand, bridging social capital “facilitates bringing 
information and resources” (p.476).  Between two types of social capital, bridging social capital 
is more appropriate in this study because this study explores strategic values created from diverse 
relationships (i.e., information and resource flows) among organizations.  In this sense, this study 
follows a simple definition of social capital which is more relevant to interorganizational 
relationships: “the relationships that make organizations work effectively” (Prusak and Cohen, 
2001, p.86). 
2.3.2 Independent Variables 
In addition to external properties such as relationships with other organizations or social capital, 
this study will take into account organizations’ internal properties coming out of each 
organization’s specific features.  As Blau (1982) argued, the whole picture of actors’ behavior 
can be taken into account when actors’ network properties from external relationships and 
attributes from internal characteristics are analyzed in a complementary way.  In this context, this 
study proposes six organizational attributes which are important in this study.   
First, sectoral differences are expected to be associated with an organization’s choice of 
collaboration partners, because there is a tendency for organizations to have strong connections 
between organizations that share similar professional norms (Provan and Milward, 1991).   
Second, prior research showed that size is an important variable to explain patterns of 
collaboration.  The size of organizations is measured in different ways, such as the number of 
employees, the amount of assets, and the degree of revenue or expenditure (Miller, 1991).  
Among these three measurements, the number of employees has been used most often as a 
measurement of organizational size, but this measurement is very sensitive to the technology 
(Miller, 1991).  In other words, the number of employees is negatively correlated with the 
technology.  An organization may be quite large with relatively few employees if the 
organization employs high degree of technology which can reduce the number of employees.  
Thus, in addition to the number of employees, this study will use revenue and expenditure as a 
measurement of size because this measurement is less affected by the technology.   
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Third, the goals of organizations (i.e., a mission or programs) may affect an 
organization’s choice of collaboration partners (Wood and Gray, 1991).  In other words, 
organizations that have the same or similar programs and target population are expected to have 
more possibility to work together.    
The fourth variable is geographical proximity.  Geographical proximity means physical 
distance between organizations.  Many research found that geographical distance tends to 
decrease chances of contacts (e.g., Baker, 1992; Blau and Schwartz 1984; Kearns, 1989).  Thus, 
it is reasonable to assume that organizations near each other would have more chance to contact 
each other and would be more willingly to collaborate with each other.   
Finally, other variables such as diversity of board members, diversity of programs, 
proportions of administrative expenditures, generating revenue from social enterprise, 
government grants or commercial activities, and diversity of revenue sources will be included 
because these internal features could have impacts on collaboration patterns with other 
organizations.  For example, if a nonprofit organization has a board member whose background 
is for-profit management, this nonprofit would have more possibility to have connections with a 
for-profit organization.  
2.4 SUMMARY 
Complex and rapid changing environments have required nonprofits to collaborate with each 
other as well as with businesses and/or public agencies.  The phenomenon of the seamless 
economy is not unfamiliar with academics or practitioners.  The cross-sector collaboration 
enables nonprofits to improve organizational efficiency (or effectiveness) through strategic fit 
and active market involvement.  This study proposes the collaboration continuum which 
combines organizational and strategic management theories, as a framework to analyze 
collaboration phenomenon.  This framework links two mutually reinforcing concepts – the 
concept of collaboration and of network structure.  
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
On the basis of the literature review, this chapter outlines the research scheme by presenting 
research questions, data collection, and research methods.  These are the blueprint to the actual 
research and analysis. 
3.2 RESEARCH METHODS 
This study represents what Kerlinger and Lee (1999) call a field study.  As a field study, this 
research is exploratory.  The purpose is to propose hypotheses for further research rather than 
test or replicate an existing theory to check the accuracy of the evidence or make predictions (i.e., 
causal inference).  In other words, the goal of this study is to discover unknown or hidden 
relationships, and finally generate hypotheses for future studies (i.e., descriptive inference) (King, 
Keohane, and Verba, 1994).  Unlike a simple description of facts or explanation of results from 
analysis, the descriptive inference is “the process of understanding an unobserved phenomenon 
on the basis of a set of observations” (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p.55) and the processes 
of “distinguishing between that which is systematic about the observed facts and that which is 
nonsystematic” (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994, p.34).   
Specifically, this study adopts the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Straus, 1967) in 
order to produce relevant explanation of structural patterns in various kinds of networks.  
Through the analysis of evidence in hand (i.e., various types of collaborative relationships and 
characteristics of actors), this study purposes to uncover and generate certain patterns of 
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collaboration networks.  On the basis of comparisons of uncovered patterns, certain categories 
emerge to illustrate the collaboration patterns in the macro perspective. 
In sum, this study tries to “to lay the groundwork for later, more systematic and rigorous 
testing of hypotheses” (Kerlinger and Lee, 1999, p.586) by discovering or uncovering hidden 
patterns of collaboration.      
3.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Do human service nonprofit organizations display identifiable patterns of 
collaboration with each other and with organizations from the business and 
government sectors? 
 
In order to answer this research question, this study proposes the following researchable sub-
research questions.  
 
1. What are the characteristics of interactions among nonprofits in the human service sector 
and across other sectors?  How pervasive are collaboration partnerships and what is the 
variety of forms and contents of these relationships? 
 
2. Is network analysis useful in uncovering hidden patterns of interactions within and across 
sectors?  
 
2-1. Are there distinctive patterns of interactions between same-sector and cross-sector 
collaboration?  
2-2. What communication roles are displayed in the network and what organizations play 
these various roles? 
2-3. How are diverse organizational attributes related to the nature and extent of cross-
sector and same-sector collaboration? 
 33
2-4. How is intangible organizational competence built through network management 
(i.e., such as social capital or reputation of an organization) related to the nature and 
extent of cross-sector and same sector collaboration? 
2-5. Are there identifiable differences between the sectors in terms of their collaborative 
relationships? 
 
3. What practical implications and hypotheses can be drawn from the analysis? 
3.4 DATA COLLECTION 
3.4.1 Population boundary: Selection of target organization  
The research design for the network analysis is different from the traditional survey research 
design in terms of sampling; the research design in network methods does not draw samples 
(Hannemen, 2001; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). “Because network methods focus on relations 
among actors, actors cannot be sampled independently to be included as observations.  If one 
actor happens to be selected, then we must also include all other actors to whom our ego has (or 
could have) ties” (Hanneman, 2001, p.5).  Instead of sampling, this study draws a population 
boundary by “demographic” or “ecological” approach (Hanneman, 2001).   
First, it is necessary to define actors of collaboration who generate and maintain 
collaborative relations in this study.  As stated, the focal type of organization is nonprofit 
organizations.  Nonprofit organizations are linked in complex webs of relationships among 
diverse stakeholders.  These stakeholders include beneficiaries of services, capital providers 
(foundations, individual donors, governments, loans from banks, and fees), work forces (paid 
staffs, volunteers, and board members), and other organizations (organizations that offer related, 
similar, and substitutable programs and services) (Dees et al., 2001; Kearns, 2000).  This study 
includes capital providers and other organizations as the objective of analysis because the main 
interest of this study is to explore external relationships of nonprofit organizations. 
Second, it is difficult to make a complete list of organizations (nonprofit organizations, 
capital providers, and other organizations) for the purpose of this study.  For this reason, this 
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study uses a list of target organizations10 supplied by an informant organization - the North Hills 
Community Outreach11 - based on a prescribed geographical boundary12, and their involvement 
in human service programs13.  In effect, this study is undertaken in a quasi-laboratory setting, by 
studying relations among organizations in a relatively small and discreetly bounded geographic 
area.  Many, but not all, of these organizations are presumed to have relationships of various 
types and intensity with each other as a result of their shared geographic marketplace.  Moreover, 
the informant organization, North Hills Community Outreach (NHCO), is in a good position to 
define the population boundary for this study because it is a focal point and clearinghouse for 
many of the social service activities in this particular geographic area, and therefore is familiar 
with many of the primary social service actors in the region.   
3.4.2 Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis is an organization and its relationships within the nonprofit sector and across 
other sectors (i.e., the business and public sectors) both at the micro (i.e., individual) and macro 
(i.e., the whole network) level.  The individual level relational data is used for macro level 
analysis in the network analysis; ties between two individual organizations are meaningful “as 
parts of the social networks in which they are embedded” (Wellman, 1988, p.37).    
                                                 
10 For the complete list of organizations, see appendix 4.  
11 This study chose North Hills Community Outreach as an informant for following reasons: 1) NHCO’s service area 
- in terms of geographical area as well as human service area - covers most of the North Hills Community with one 
headquarter and two branch offices. 2) As a renowned and leading organization in terms of service delivery and 
collaboration efforts in the North Hills community, NHCO not only recognizes the importance of collaboration in 
the human service field, but also practices numerous collaborative works across business, governments, and secular 
nonprofits, as well as Faith-Based organizations.  NHCO’s work relationships range from formal collaboration 
partnerships (about 60 organizations) to informal, but important service referral relationships (several hundreds 
organizations).  In addition, NHCO was a founding member of the North Hills Nonprofit Consortium, which 
coordinates human service areas among nonprofits in order to prevent unnecessary competition.   
12 See the Appendix 3 map for the geographical boundaries.  
13 This study defines human service programs based on the NTEE (National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities) code.  
They are;  Children’s, youth services, Family services, Personal social services, Emergency Assistance (food, 
clothing, and/or cash), Residential, custodial care, Services to promote the independence of specific population (P), 
Mental health , crisis intervention (mental health treatment, alcohol or drug abuse, hot lines for rape etc.) (M), 
Employment assistance, job training , vocational rehabilitation (J), Food Service, Free Food Distribution Programs 
(K), Housing development/Home repairs, rent assistance (L), Crime prevention/ legal services(I), and Recreation, 
sports, leisure, and athletics (N). 
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3.4.3 Design of collection of relational data 
In network analysis, it is important to design a method of collecting relational data.  In this study, 
two types of relational data must be collected; collaborative relationships within nonprofits and 
collaborative relationships between nonprofits and two other sectors – businesses and public 
agencies.  On the basis of this research scheme, this study used two methods for collecting 
network data given the population boundaries.  First, the full network method (Hanneman, 2001, 
p.7) was applied for the 33 nonprofit organizations that responded to the study.  This study 
collected all six types of collaboration relations between the responded nonprofits.  Second, the 
ego-centric network method (Hanneman, 2001, p.9) was applied to identify businesses and 
public agencies to which responded nonprofit organizations are connected.  Taken in 
consideration of the research questions, the collaborative relationships of social service provider 
among businesses, among public agencies, or between businesses and public agencies are not of 
significance for this study.  For this reason, this study approached the ego-centric network 
method by collecting network data between focal actors (i.e., nonprofit organizations) and the 
two other types of alter (i.e., businesses and public agencies).    
3.4.4 Data collection 
Data was collected in the two rounds.  The first round of surveys began on 10 May 2005 and 
ended on 6 June 2005.  Surveys went to 42 nonprofit organizations and 13 surveys were returned.  
After the first round, the investigator contacted the 29 non-responding organizations with three 
options for survey completion; personal visiting to 26 organizations, emails and phone calls to 29 
organizations, and resending the survey in mail to 7 organizations.  It took 6 weeks to finish the 
second round of data collection (6 June 2005 to 16 July 2005).  Through the second round, 20 
more surveys were returned.  In total, 33 out of 42 surveys were collected, with a response rate 
of 78.6% (Table III-1).  Considering the difficulties in mail-in survey in the nonprofit sector 
(Cordes, Henig, Twombly, and Saunders, 1999; Hager, Wilson, Pollack, and Rooney, 2003; 
Kearns, Park, and Yankosky, 2005), this response rate can be considered strong for the analysis.  
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Table III-1) Response organizations 
 
Number Name of Organization Abbreviation Response 
1 AARP AARP Yes 
2 Allegheny County Bar Association ACBA Yes 
3 Allegheny Valley Association of Churches AVAC Yes 
4 Bradley Center BC No 
5 Bread of Life Food Pantry BLFP Yes 
7 Community Auto CA Yes 
8 Crisis Center North CCN Yes 
6 Christian Literacy Associates CLA Yes 
9 Emanuel Lutheran Church ELC Yes 
10 Forbes Funds FF Yes 
11 Glenshaw Valley Presbyterian GVP No 
12 HEARTH HEAETH Yes 
13 Holy Family Institute HFI Yes 
14 Hosanna Industries HI Yes 
15 Light of Life Ministries LLM Yes 
16 Lutheran Service Society  LSS Yes 
17 Manchester Craftsmen’s Guild MCG Yes 
18 Millvale Food Cupboard MFC Yes 
19 Mt. Nazareth MN Yes 
27 Northern Area Multi Service Center NAMSC No 
28 Northside Common Ministries NCM Yes 
20 Network of Hope NH Yes 
21 North Hills Community Outreach NHCO Yes 
22 North Hills Food Bank NHFB Yes 
23 North Hills YMCA NHYMCA Yes 
24 North Hills Youth Ministry Counseling Center NHYMCC Yes 
25 North Suburban Adult Services NSAS Yes 
26 North Way Christian Community Pantry NWCCP Yes 
29 Open Door Ministries ODM Yes 
30 Papen-North Chapter PNC No 
31 Priority Two PT Yes 
37 St. Mary’s Church SMC Yes 
36 St. Margaret Foundation SMF No 
33 Share One Food Pantry SOFP Yes 
38 St. Paul’s United Methodist Church SPUMC Yes 
35 Society of St. Vincent DePaul, Council of Pittsburgh SSVD Yes 
34 Sharpsburg/ St. Vincent DePaul SVD Yes 
32 Sewickley Valley YMCA SVYMCA Yes 
40 Treasure House Fashions THF Yes 
39 Tickets for Kids Foundation TKF No 
41 United Way of Allegheny County UWAC No 
42 YWCA of Greater Pittsburgh Center for Race Relations YWCA Yes 
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During the second round of data collection, two reasons were identified for the non-
response.  The first is the turnover of the CEO around the survey periods (three organizations 
among 9 non-responses: 33%).  Second, four organizations (44% of 9 non-responses) identified 
busy schedule or being tired of the frequent surveys as a reason for non-response.  Several CEOs 
directly mentioned that they are tired of frequent surveys from outside of their organizations.  
Two organizations stated that they would return the survey in the second round, but did not, 
despite several contact attempts.  
3.4.5 Bias in the population of this study 
Even though the target organizations in this study are defined as a ‘population’ suited for the 
network analysis, these 42 nonprofit human service organizations are a part of a bigger 
population, nonprofit human service organizations in Allegheny County.  Using budget data 
from the 32 responses14 in this study and the recent study of Allegheny County human service 
nonprofit organizations (Kearns, Park, and Yankosky, 2005), this study identified if there was a 
bias in the 33 respondent organizations in terms of budget size.   
 
Table III-2) Revenue Distribution Comparisons 
Revenue  
Population 
(Allegheny County) 
Population 
(this study) 
Survey 
(Kearns et. al, 2005) 
N 680 32 226 
Year data collected 2000-2001 2005 2004 
Median $303,889.50 $422,526.5 $612,750 
Mean $1,982,380.71 $4,112,203.0 $3,000,637 
Standard Deviation $14,028,386 $11,249,140.05 $7,400,005 
Less than $25,000 1.3% 18.8% 3.5% 
Less than $100,000 27.6% 37.5% 17.3% 
More than $1,000,000 23.2% 31.2% 39.4% 
25% quartile $82,405 $26,702.2 $167,550 
50% quartile $303,889 $422,526.5 $612,750 
75% quartile $960,581 $1,575,000.0 $2,309,875 
 
The respondent organizations are skewed to middle to large organizations.  The median 
annual revenue of respondents in this study is $422,526 (mean is $4,112,203), whereas the 
                                                 
14 Among 33 responses, one organization did not answer its annual budget.   
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median annual revenue of Allegheny County nonprofit human service organizations is $303,889 
(mean is $1,982,380).  In comparison to Allegheny County population distribution, the skewness 
of respondents in this study is shown in three ways.  First, small scale nonprofits (annual revenue 
less than $25,000) are over-represented (1.3% in the Allegheny County vs. 18.8% in this study).  
Second, middle scale nonprofits (annual revenue from $25,000 to $1,000,000) are under-
represented (75.5% in the Allegheny County vs. 50% in this study).  Third, large scale nonprofits 
(annual revenue more than $1,000,000) are over-represented (23.2% in the Allegheny County vs. 
31.2% in this study).  
3.5 MEASUREMENT 
3.5.1 Development of survey instrument  
The first draft of the survey questionnaire was designed to measure both interorganizational 
relations and various organizational attribute variables.  Potential variables were drawn from 
extensive review of the literature.  The basic design of the survey was drawn from the survey 
questionnaires used in the previous research in which the author participated (Kearns, Park, and 
Yankosky, 2005).  After making the first draft, the survey was discussed with Professor Kevin 
Kearns and two nonprofit CEOs (Ms. Fay Morgan from NHCO and Sister Linda Yankosky from 
Holy Family).  Based on several discussion sessions with them, the initial draft of the survey was 
revised into the second draft of the survey.  The pilot test of the survey was completed by seven 
nonprofit CEOs (22 March 2005).  With feedback from the pilot test, Prof. Kevin Kearns and 
other dissertation committee members, a final draft of the survey was completed (7 April 2005).   
The final draft includes several questions about organizational attributes (i.e., 
independent variables) and five tables asking for interorganizational relations.  The following 
components are questions of the survey (See Appendix 4):   
· Organization information 
· Description of mission 
· Age of organization  
· Programs provided  
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· Diversity of board members  
· Diversity of revenue sources 
· Number of full-time staff members and volunteers 
· Total revenues and expenditures 
· Percentage of program and administrative expenditures 
· Six interorganizational relationships between the target organizations 
· Six interorganizational relationships between the target organizations and other nonprofit 
organizations not listed  
· Six interorganizational relationships between the target organizations and business 
· Six interorganizational relationships between the target organization and public agencies  
· Positive and negative aspects of collaboration 
3.5.2 Operational definition of variables 
First, interorganizational relationships are measured on the basis of the collaboration continuum 
described earlier.  This study measures a total of six relationships; 1) irregular information 
exchanges, 2) work flows (service referrals received and sent), 3) regular meetings, 4) 
physical/personnel resource sharing, 5) formal contract, and 6) joint programs.  The definitions 
of the six relationships, as presented in the survey are; 
 
· Irregular information exchange: Your organization has informal and/or irregular contacts 
such as exchanges of information or advice with the organization listed. 
· Referrals received: Your organization receives client referrals with some regularity from the 
organization listed.  
· Referrals sent: Your organization refers clients with some regularity to the organization 
listed. 
· Regular meeting: Your organization meets regularly (at least quarterly) to discuss problems 
or to share knowledge with the organization listed. 
· Physical resource sharing: Your organization shares personnel and/or physical resources 
such as offices with the organization listed. 
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· Formal contract: Your organization has a contract with the organization listed to perform or 
jointly perform services.   
· Joint programming: Your organization undertakes joint activity such as joint programs or 
joint ventures with the organization listed.  
 
Among these six relationships, one relationship is measured as directed ties (work referrals) and 
the remaining five are measured as bonded or undirected ties (information exchanges, regular 
meetings, physical/personnel resource sharing, financial resource sharing, and joint programs). 
Using the above six relationships, this study introduces the collaborative relation index 
(hereafter CRI).  This index measures the degree of collaboration efforts by aggregating the six 
collaborative relationships.  Since the six collaborative relationships are differentiated by the 
intensity of collaboration efforts, the aggregation of the six relations expresses “how much a 
nonprofit has made an effort to collaborate with other organizations” and “the strength of the 
collaborations a nonprofit maintains.”  The calculation of the CRI is done in two steps; weighting 
by 1) intensity of collaborative relationships and 2) reciprocity.  First, this study uses weights in 
order to differentiate between intensive and less intensive relationships.  Based on intensity of 
relationship, this study assigns weights of one to irregular information sharing, two to tactical 
collaboration (work referrals and regular meetings), and three to strategic collaboration 
(physical/personnel resource sharing, formal contract and joint programs).  Second, in measure 
of the work referral tie, this study applies the principle of reciprocity.  When the work referral is 
one way (i.e., not reciprocal), this study assigns a weight of one instead of two.   
The CRI is expressed in the following equation;  
 
CRI =  
1 × (the number of information sharing + the number of work referrals received + the 
number of work referrals sent) +  
2 × (the number of regular meetings + the numbers of physical resource sharing) +  
3 × the number of formal contracts + the number of joint programs)   
 
For example, nonprofit A shares information with two organizations, has one sending (but no 
receiving) referral relationship with one organization, has one regular meeting with one nonprofit 
and one joint program with one organization.  Therefore, its CRI is calculated as; 1×(2 
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information sharing + 1 work referral) + 2×(1 regular meeting) + 3×(1 joint program).  CRI = 
1×3 + 2×1 + 3×1.  CRI in nonprofit A is 8.   
Second, the independent organizational variables, as discussed in the above chapter, are 
sectoral difference, size, organizational goal (a mission or programs), geographical proximity, 
budget-related variables (revenue from government, revenue from social enterprise, revenue 
from commercial activity, revenue diversity and proportion of administrative expenditure), 
program diversity, proportion of board members from the business sector, and years in 
operation.  
For the measurement of sectoral differences, this study divides sectors to either the public, 
for-profit, or nonprofit sectors.  Size is measured in terms of a budget size (revenue or 
expenditure in US dollar).  An organizational goal is measured through programs that the 
organization currently operates (For details see Appendix 4 survey questionnaire).  The 
geographical proximity is measured by the shortest driving distances (miles) between each of the 
42 organizations.  Other organizational attributes are used in regression analysis as independent 
variables.  Operational definitions and scales of other organizational variables are presented in 
detail in Chapter 7.  
3.5.3 Validity and reliability 
3.5.3.1 Accuracy 
Because this study relies on the self-reported responses of interorganizational 
relationships and most respondents depended on memory, there is a risk of inaccuracy.  In order 
to reduce this inaccuracy, this study defines the time period of interactions as “within the past 
year.”   In addition, in order to reduce another possible inaccuracy from differences between unit 
of analysis (organizations) and unit of observation (individuals), the surveys were completed by 
persons who are designated as representatives of the organization.  Among the 33 respondents, 
27 were completed by the CEO or CEO equivalents (such as president, chairperson, or pastor).  
The remaining seven respondents occupied at least a director level position.  As in the 
Galaskiewicz’s research (1985), this study assumes that the CEO equivalent who answered the 
survey “in fact has knowledge of the information being sought” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, 
p.57). 
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3.5.3.2 Validity 
● Construct validity 
In network study, among other validities, construct validity is important because 
definitions of relationships could be ambiguous (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  This study 
double-checked the definitions of the six interorganizational relationships by asking eight CEOs 
and one staff member within the nonprofit sector to review the definitions.  All of them stated 
that they could clearly understand what the six interorganizational relationships meant.  From 
this result, this study assumes that survey respondents understood the definitions of 
interorganizational relationships accurately.         
 
● External validity 
As described in the previous section, there are budget size biases in the target 
organizations in this study.   In addition to this, there is the obvious artificial element of the 
design of the study because of the selection bias.  The organizations in the population are 
selected on the basis of known activities and involvement in the social service delivery system in 
the North Hills communities; the probability of interaction among these organizations is much 
higher than the probability of interaction among randomly selected organizations.  Thus, it 
should be noted that the generalization of results is difficult because the selection of 
organizations is not random.    
3.5.3.3 Reliability 
According to the literature, there are three methods ensuring reliability of measurement in 
network research (Marsden, 1990; Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  Among them, this study uses 
“comparison of alternative question formats” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.58).  For this 
comparison, this study conducted correlation tests of two pairs of variables to test reliability.  
First, two variables which are ‘the number of programs in collaboration with other organizations’ 
and ‘CRI’ (collaborative relation index) were analyzed.  If an organization provides many 
service programs in collaboration with others, this nonprofit is likely to have many (strong) 
collaborative relationships with other organizations.  The correlation coefficient between these 
two variables is 0.47, which is statistically significant at 0.01 level.  Second, this study applied 
two other variables which are ‘revenue from government’ and ‘formal contract relation with 
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public agencies.’  The relationship between these two variables is also intuitively assumed as 
highly correlated to each other because when nonprofits generate revenue from government, they 
are likely to have formal contracts or other types of strategic collaboration with public agencies.  
87.1% of responses showed their consistency in their answer15 .  The correlation coefficient 
turned out to be quite high, 0.714, which is statistically significant at 0.01 level.  Following these 
results, this study assumes that answers from respondents are reliable.   
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
The most suitable method to explore the hidden patterns of interaction within and across sectors 
is through network analysis.  Social network analysis enables one to map invisible patterns of 
various interorganizational relationships.  For example, because network analysis can discover 
who is overloaded or critically disconnected from others, it is helpful in revealing patterns of 
connectivity in specific types of ties and types of organizations (i.e., nonprofit, for-profit or 
nonprofit organizations) (Cross and Parker, 2004).  In this study, simple techniques of traditional 
network analysis model, such as sociogram and actor centrality analysis, are used in Chapter 4 
and 5.  Although those techniques are useful in exploring the overall shape and characteristics of 
a network, it is difficult to see whether there are systemic structural differences (or similarity) 
between different types of networks.  For example, when network figures in Chapter 4 and 5 do 
not particularly reveal any distinctive patterns because they are too complex and/or sometimes 
look similar.  For this reason, this study applies a blockmodel to uncover an underlying dynamics 
of interconnectedness and compare different types of networks (Chapter 6) because the 
blockmodel can reduce complex networks into simple and easily understandable figures.  This 
method not only enables comparison of different types of collaboration networks within and 
across sectors but also explores whether there is a strategically significant position in a network.  
Simply put, blockmodeling partitions individual actors in a network to a small number of blocks 
that cluster actors that have substantially similar patterns of relationships with each other 
                                                 
15 This study designates consistency of answer as parallel answers to a pair of survey questions.  For example, in the 
case of the question five (revenue generation from government) and eleven (formal contrat with government) , if a 
respondent gives positive (or negative) answers to both questions – a respondent raises revenue from government 
and  has formal contracts with public agencies at the same time –, this study recognizes it as consistent answering.  
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(Wasserman and Faust, 1992; Doreian, et.al., 2005).  Blockmodeling is composed of three 
separate analyses – validation of a blockmodel using organizational attributes, description of 
block positions and description of overall blockmodel.  Since blockmodeling is a specific 
technique, the following section explains what blockmodeling is and how this study applies it to 
answer the research questions in detail.  In addition to network analysis, this study uses 
regression analysis to explore relationships between dependent variables (collaboration 
relationships) and independent variables such as years, size, etc.  Since this study does not intend 
to explain causal relationships, regression analysis addresses whether there is a plausible 
relationship between dependent and independent variables rather than to test causal relationships.  
This study uses UCINET and SPSS computer programs for network analysis and regression 
analysis respectively.  
3.6.1 Network analysis: Blockmodel  
3.6.1.1 Equivalence model 
As stated in the above, blockmodeling aims to reduce the complexity of networks by 
partitioning actors into a small number of blocks called positions16.  For example, an information 
sharing network composed of 95 actors is reduced into six positions through blockmodeling and 
each pair of six positions may have a tie within or between the positions (See 6.4.1 in Chapter 6).  
By assigning individual actors into positions, the blockmodel “presents general features of the 
network, such as the ties between positions, rather than information about individual actors 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.395).   Assigning actors to blocks is done through equivalence or 
similarity of relational patterns.  Simply put, equivalence (model) is to group actors who are 
equivalent or similar.  Grouping similar actors clarifies structural roles and positions within a 
network.  Thus, equivalence model is “a vehicle for describing the structure of role relations” 
(Burt, 1987, p.1293).  Equivalence model is different from such traditional network models as 
prominence (e.g., actor centrality) and cohesion model (i.e., subgroup by clique) in that “the 
analytical frame of reference shifts from dyad to social system” (Burt, 1987, p.1294).   
This study applies two equivalence models - structural equivalence and regular 
equivalence. Structural equivalent actors are substitutable actors.  Two actors are structurally 
                                                 
16 The technique to identify several types of block positions will be discussed in the following section.   
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equivalent if two actors “occupy the same position in the social structure and so are proximate to 
the extent that they have the same pattern of relations with occupants of other positions.  More 
specifically, two people are structurally equivalent to the extent that they have identical relations 
with all other individuals in the study population” (Burt, 1987, p.1291).   Regularly equivalent 
actors are “regularly equivalent if they are equally related to equivalent (but not necessarily the 
same, or same number of) actors” (Hanneman, 2001, p.137).  In other words, two actors are 
regularly equivalent if “actors have similar ‘types’ of actors at similar distances in their 
neighborhoods” (Hanneman, 2001, p.138).  Unlike structural equivalence, actors are regularly 
equivalent “if they have similar ties to any members of other sets” (Hanneman, 2001, p.127).   
 
                         a)          C             D                          b)      c       d       f 
 
                                        A                       B                          a                    b 
 
                                                  E                      F                         g       h       i 
 
• : actor (node)                              : relation (tie) 
 
Figure III-1) Structural equivalence and regular equivalence 
   
Figure III-1 clearly illustrates this difference.  As shown in a), actors A and B are 
structurally equivalent because A and B have the same pattern of ties with the same other actors 
(actor C, D, E and F).  And A and B are substitutable each other.  On the other hand, as shown in 
b), actors a and b are regularly equivalent but not structurally equivalent because two actors have 
the same pattern of ties with different actors (i.e., a is connected with c, d and f, and b with g, h 
and i).  Actor a and b are not substitutable each other because they have relationships with 
different set of actors.     
Structural and regular equivalence are different in terms of information redundancy (Burt, 
1992).  Regular equivalence is strategically better than structural equivalence because regularly 
equivalent actors have non-redundant information sources, while structurally equivalent actors 
have the same (redundant) sources of information.  For example, actor A and B in the above 
Figure a) share four redundant information sources while they maintains five relationships.  
Actor a and b in Figure b) share six different sources of information while each of them 
maintains four relationships.  In sum, the difference between structural and regular equivalence 
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can be explained by substitutability among structural equivalent actors and information 
redundancy in structural equivalent actors.   
3.6.1.2 Blockmodel building procedures 
In order to identify the most appropriate blockmodels, this study applies the generalized 
blockmodeling approach (Doreian et.al., 1994; 2005).  The logic of grouping actors into blocks 
in this type of blockmodel is different from the conventional blockmodel.  The logic of the 
conventional approach to build blockmodels is to first choose types of equivalence between 
structural or regular equivalence and then to identify blocks on the basis of the specified methods, 
which are profile approaches such as Euclidian distance and Pearson correlation.  Finally the 
specified blockmodel is evaluated (for details, see Burt, 1976; Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
However, there are some weaknesses in this approach; 1) the profile approach that is normally 
used in conventional blockmodel is likely to mispredict certain kinds of class homogeneities, and 
2) the post-evaluation of the conventional blockmodeling is limited to certain types of 
blockmodel (Hanneman, 2001).   
 
 Cj  Cj  Cj
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 Ci
1 1 1 1 1 
Ci
0 0 0 1 0 
Ci
0 0 1 0 1 
Complete 
 
Row-dominant 
 
Column-dominant 
 
 Cj  Cj  Cj
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 Ci
1 1 0 0 0 
Ci
0 1 0 0 1 
Ci
0 0 0 0 0 
Regular 
 
Row-regular 
 
Column-regular 
 
 Cj  Cj  Cj
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 Ci
0 0 0 0 0 
Ci
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Ci
0 0 0 1 Null 
 
Row- functional 
 
Column-functional 
* Table borrowed from Doreian et.al. 2005. p.86.    
 
Figure III-2) Examples of ideal types of blocks with types of connections 
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Instead of separating the two processes of determining the type of equivalence and the 
process of evaluating equivalence, generalized blockmodel conducts partitioning and evaluation 
at the same time.  A key to this approach is its use of ideal types of block that is represented as 
nine ideal types of blocked adjacency matrices in Figure III-2.  Doreian suggests using nine ideal 
types of blocks to partition and conform block type instead of sticking to a strict definition of 
structural or regular equivalence.  According to Doreian (Doreian et.al. 1994), the generalized 
blockmodel approach typically provides better partitioning, or at the minimum level the same, 
than the conventional approach.  The following four steps are procedures for building 
blockmodel in this study.   
1. There is no rule of thumb to identify the best blocked adjacency matrixes that are either 
structural or regular equivalent matrix.  Rather, the best blockmodel is usually found 
through trial and error processes.  In order to identify blocked adjacency matrix similar to 
Figure III-2, this study first presents 10 different candidate blocked adjacency matrixes17.  
These 10 candidate matrixes are produced by Tabu searches 18 .  Then, this study 
compares the 10 different blocked adjacency matrixes each other. 
2. Among the 10 matrixes, this study selects the most acceptable blocked adjacency matrix 
based on the Doreian’s ideal model criteria19 (Figure III-2).  This study identifies a block 
as a structural or regular equivalent block if an adjacent matrix of this block falls into any 
of the above nine ideal types of blocks in the above figure.   
3. In order to build the best blocked adjacency matrix, this study conducts permutations by 
changing or exchanging actors from one block to another.  Again, target actors for 
permutations are selected to satisfy the Doreian’s ideal blocks to the best degree. 
4. Finally, this study transforms blocked adjacency matrix into image matrix by assigning 
one or zero to blocks. 
 
                                                 
17 In order to produce the best blockmodel, it is best to try several possible blockmodels that are different in terms of 
the number of blocks.  This study tries 10 blocked adjacency matrixes for the initial point to identify the best 
blockmodel.  The 10 candidates are made by the number of blocks from three to seven times two different 
equivalence models (5×2=10).  The reason to make a range of the number of blocks from three to seven is that 
blockmodels should be simple enough to be understandable (Hanneman, 2001).  If the number of blocks is smaller 
than two, it may be too simple to find the significant structural patterns.  On the other hand, if the number of blocks 
is greater than eight, relationships among blocks may be too complicate.  This is likely to prevent this study from 
identifying meaningful structures and comparing different blockmodels with each other. 
18 In order to obtain the initial partitioning, this study conducts tabu searches.  As a recent development for 
blockmodeling, tabu search relies on extensive use of the computer.  Tabu search partitions blocks “by searching for 
sets of actors who, if placed into a block, produce the smallest sum of within-block variances in the tie profiles” 
(Hanneman, 2001, p.109). 
19 It is used in two ways; 1) Criteria to find (specify) the best blockmodel (plus the number of inconsistency) and 2) 
Criteria to determine zero and one block. 
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This study applies two criteria to assign one or zero to blocks.  The first criterion is α density 
criterion (Wasserman and Faust, 1992), which is the most commonly used method to determine 
one or zero block.  The observed block is assigned one if the density of the block is greater than 
or equal to α.  The value of α in this study is network density20.  The second criterion assigns one 
if an observed block is more than row- or column-functional, which is a minimum condition for 
regular equivalence (Doreian et.al. 2005).  Only if an observed block satisfies both two criterions 
simultaneously, it is assigned a value of one.   
 
Table III-3) Properties of one block and zero blocks 
                             Characteristic 
 
Type of relation 
Directly substitutable each 
other (the same patterns to 
the same actors) 
Compatible each other (the 
same patterns with different 
actors) 
Structurally 
equivalent relation Yes Yes 1 block Regular equivalent 
relation No Yes 
0 block No equivalent relation No No 
 
There are two types of one block in this study (Table III-3).  In the real social network, it 
is difficult to have a perfect structural equivalent block of density one in an observed block.  
Therefore, this study regards an observed block as a structural equivalent block (hereafter SE) if 
its block density is greater than 0.75, which is considerably large.  Second, in this study, a 
regular equivalent block (hereafter RE) means that block density is not only greater than overall 
network density, but also it is at least row/column functional block.  Otherwise cases are zero 
blocks.   Table III-3 summarizes meanings of one block and zero blocks. 
3.6.1.3 Interpretation of patterns of relationships among blocks  
 
a. Validation of a blockmodel using actor attributes 
Actors’ attributes can describe structural positions in a blockmodel for two reasons.  First, 
“if there are systemic differences between positions in the characteristics of their members, then 
we have some external validation for the blockmodel” (Faust and Wasserman, 1992, p.28).  
Second, research has showed that the likelihood of interaction is dependent on homogeneity of 
                                                 
20 A definition is; “the proportion of all ties that could be present that actually are” (Hanneman, 2001, p.42). 
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actors’ characteristics or the homophily principle; social interactions are more likely to occur 
among actors who share similar characteristics, such as socio-demographic attributes or a 
common reference framework (McPherson and Ranger-Moore, 1991; McPherson, Smith-Lovin 
and Cook, 2001).  All types of social network ties in this study, such as information flows, 
resource exchanges, friendships, and so forth, depend on this homophily principle.  On the basis 
of the above two arguments, this study explores both socio-demographic and structural 
characteristics of block positions to identify whether blocks show systemic differences in 
characteristics (Table III-4).  
 
Table III-4) Organizational and structural attributes 
 Scale NPO network 
NPO and business 
(government) 
Size (budget)  Ratio Yes No 
Years in operation Raito Yes No 
Revenue from government source (RG) Ratio Yes No 
Revenue from commercial activity (RC) Ratio Yes No 
Socio-
demographic 
characteristics 
Proportion of business (public) sector Ratio No Yes 
Collaborative relation index (CRI) Ratio Yes Yes 
Power centrality Ratio Yes Yes Structural characteristics Betweenness centrality Ratio Yes Yes 
 
Structural characteristics 21  are complimentary to socio-demographic attributes.  The 
mean of CRI identifies which block is more active or has more interests in collaboration.  Mean 
of power (Bonacich) centrality is used in a limited way because this measure is only suitable to 
networks with real flows of contents.  Rather, it is used to infer directions of information flows, 
resource flows and money flows by identifying dependency relationships among blocks.  Thus, 
power centrality will be listed only in three types of collaboration network (i.e., information 
sharing, resource sharing and formal contract).  Means of betweenness centrality identify which 
block occupies broker positions.   
 
b. Descriptions of block positions 
In the last decades, methodology to describe structural positions of blocks has 
significantly progressed.  Among others, two approaches are most popular – Burt’s typology 
(Burt, 1976) and graph theorists’ classification (e.g., Harary et al. 1965; Marsden, 1989).  When 
applied alone, either approach can fail to make a correct distinction of different types of block 
                                                 
21 The definition of the power and betweenness centrality will be presented in the next chapter.  
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positions, especially in non-directed networks.  Thus, this study not only adopts both approaches, 
but also adds one more classification.  
The first typology of block positioning comes from Burt’s framework (1976), which 
divides block positions into four different positions – primary22 , broker23 , sycophant24 , and 
isolate25 - on the basis of relationships of within-block ties and received ties (Table III-5).    
 
Table III-5) Typology of positions by Burt 
  Total number of ties 
received in block k ~ 0 
Total number of ties 
received in block k > 0 
 
Number of ties within block k 
 
Total number of Ties sent from block k 
 
gk – 1 
≥ 
g -1 
Isolate Primary 
 
Number of ties within block k 
 
Total number of Ties sent from block k 
 
gk – 1 
≤ 
g -1 
Sycophant Broker 
 
* g: the number of actors in a network.  gk: the number of actors within a block k.  
** This table is adopted from Faust and Wasserman (1992) p.33.  
 
The second typology is adopted from graph theorists’ idea which focuses on nodal in- 
and out-degree relationships.  Using ratio of ties received to ties sent, this study distinguishes 
three block positions - a receiver, sender and carrier.  When a block has significantly different 
patterns of sending from receiving ties 26 , this block is named as a sender (or a receiver).  
Otherwise blocks are assigned as carrier if they have similar proportion of sending and receiving 
ties.  The followings are the specific criteria to distinguish these three positions. 
● Receiver: the ratio (ties received/ties sent) ≥ 2 
● Sender: the ratio (ties received/ties sent) ≤ 0.5 
● Carrier: 0.5 < the ratio (ties received/ties sent) < 2 
This typology is applied only to the work referral network because only this network has nodal 
in- and out-degrees.  
                                                 
22 The prmary psoitin receives “choices” both from other positions, and from its own members (Faust and 
Wasserman, 1992, p.32). 
23 Brokers both receive “choices” and send ‘choices’ to other positions (Faust and Wasserman, 1992, p.32). 
24 Sycophants give more “choices” to other positions than to themselves, and do not receive many “choices” (Faust 
and Wasserman, 1992, p.32). 
25 Isolate positions neither give many “choices” nor do they direct many choices to other positions (Faust and 
Wasserman, 1992, p.32). 
26 For example, if ties received in a block are more than two times the ties sent, this study calls the block as 
“receiver”, and vice versa. 
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Finally, this study proposes another typology to distinguish block positions, which 
focuses on external relations of blocks.  This typology identifies which block has denser 
relationships with other blocks without considering the reflexive relationships (i.e., within block 
ties).  In this typology, the stronger a block’s external relationships with other blocks, the more 
central the block becomes.  This study uses block degree centrality to produce four types of a 
position – central, intermediate, periphery, and isolate positions.  Let P(BB
                                                
k) be the function of 
this typology.  This function is computed as follows; 
 
P(Bk) = CD(Bk) × d(Bk) -------- Equation 1 
 
Where, CD(Bk) =    Block k’s degree centrality27  
                              Number of actors in block k 
d(Bk) = Degree (or in/out-degree) of block k in the reduced sociogram excluding a reflexive 
degree 
 
This study uses a weight to clearly distinguish central from periphery positions.  The logic of this 
weight is that the more block k maintains structurally and/or regularly equivalent relationships 
with other blocks, the more central position block k occupies.  Specifically, the positions are 
determined by the mean and median of P(Bk).  If the mean value of P(Bk) is bigger than the 
median value of P(Bk), then;  
● Central position: P(Bk) > Mean  
● Central to intermediate position: Median < P(Bk) ≤ Mean  
● Intermediate position: Median ≈ P(Bk) (≈: around the value)  
● Periphery position: Median > P(Bk)  
● Isolate position: P(Bk) = 0 
And if the median value of P(Bk) is bigger than the mean value of P(Bk), then; 
● Central position: P(Bk) > Median  
● Central to intermediate position: Mean < P(Bk) ≤ Median  
● Intermediate position: Mean ≈ P(Bk) (≈: around the value)  
● Periphery position: Mean > P(Bk)  
● Isolate position: P(Bk) = 0 
A central position means that P(Bk) is a significantly large value comparing to other block P(Bk) 
values.  A periphery position denotes that P(Bk) is a significantly smaller value comparing to 
other block P(Bk).  An intermediate position denotes a P(Bk) value around the median (or mean) 
 
27 Block k’s degree centrality is total number of ties sent from (or received to) Block k excluding within block k ties. 
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value.  The limitation of the above three approaches to describe block positions is its inability to 
test statistical significance (Wasserman and Faust, 1992).   
 
 c.  Descriptions of overall blockmodels 
 
a) Four ideal types of blockmodel images with more than two positions  
One of the simplest and powerful ways to represent blockmodel is through the image 
matrix and/or a reduced sociogram where there are more than two positions in a blockmodel 
(Faust and Wasserman, 1992).  Faust and Wasserman (1992) illustrate five types of theoretically 
important structural patterns for the image matrix.   
 
Cohesive subgroups 
 
 
 BBj
1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 BBi
0 0 0 1 
Center-periphery system 
 BBj
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 BBi
1 0 0 0 
 
Centralized system 
 
 
 BBj
1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 BBi
1 0 0 0 
Hierarchy system 
 BBj
0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 BBi
0 0 0 0 
 
* Image matrices are adopted from Faust and Wasserman. 1992., p.40.  
 
Figure III-3) Examples of ideal images and reduced sociograms for blockmodels 
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This study applies four appropriate types (Figure III-3).  First, cohesive subgroups are a 
structural system in which blocks have only within ties and no between ties.  The image matrix 
of cohesive subgroups “will have oneblocks on the main diagonal” (Faust and Wasserman, 1992, 
p.39).  Second, a center-periphery structure is a structural system that consists of “a core 
position which is internally cohesive and … other positions connected to the core positions.  The 
peripheral positions may or may not be internally cohesive” (p.40).  Third, “a centralized system 
has all relational ties going toward (or away) from a single position.  All oneblocks would be in 
the same row” (p.41).  Fourth, a hierarchy system “would appear as asymmetric, positive, 
relational ties directed from each position to one position immediately ‘above’ it” (p.41). 
 
b) Strategically significant position and role: brokerage and boundary spanner 
The identification of strategically significant blocks is vital for this study.  The first type 
of strategically significant position is a broker position.  Brokerage is defined as a strategically 
significant position because the broker can take advantages of opportunities from diverse but 
non-redundant information, service referrals, resource or money sources (Burt, 1992).  
According to Burt (1992), the most strategically significant position in a network is that where 
one can maintain many non-redundant information ties.  Since redundant relationships (i.e., 
structural equivalent relations) could bring actors confusions or information overloads, it could 
eventually result in inefficiency of networks (Burt, 1992).  Therefore, broker positions with 
regular equivalent relations are strategically significant.    
 
Table III-6) Interpretations of broker roles by collaboration relationships 
Collaboration Networks Brokerage Role 
Information sharing 
Regular meeting 
Information intermediary 
Work referral Human service coordinator 
Resource sharing Resource flow coordinator 
Formal contract Money broker 
Collaborative 
relationship 
Joint program Service program coordinator 
  
The specific role of brokerage is different according to the collaboration relationships 
(Table III-6).  In information sharing and/or regular meeting relations, organizations usually 
exchange information or discuss problems at hands or current issues.  Thus, a broker in these two 
types of networks plays an information intermediary role.  Work referral flows are conditioned 
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by social service programs that the nonprofit currently undertakes.  For example, if organization 
A does not have a specific service program that client B wants, organization A usually sends 
client B to organization C that provides the service client B needs.  Thus, a broker nonprofit D in 
the work referral network plays a service coordinator role between two organizations, A and C.  
In the strategic collaboration, organizations are likely to choose their collaboration partners by a 
criterion of strategic fit between them and their counterpartners.  In the resource sharing network, 
a broker coordinates other organizations by helping them find best-fitted partners that maintain 
the resources the organizations want.  In the formal contract network, money flows through the 
network.  A broker in this network not only arbitrates money flows between organizations, but 
also plays a subcontractor role.  Likewise, organizations make joint program relationship when 
they find strategic fits in terms of social service program.  A broker in the joint program network 
will mediate between organizations to find organizations that have strategic fits.   
The second type of strategically significant position/role is a (sectoral) boundary spanner 
or boundary blurrier.  It applies only to networks composed of nonprofits and other sector 
organizations (businesses or public agencies).  This study presents two types of the sectoral 
boundary spanner.  The first type is a special type of brokerage that locates between nonprofit 
blocks and other sector blocks.  This special type of brokerage is strategically significant because 
these spanners mediate one sector organizations with other sector organizations through a gate 
role between two different sectors.  The second type of the boundary spanner is a block where 
nonprofits and other sector organizations coexist 28 .  The coexistence block is strategically 
significant because this block is the evidence of structural isomorphism between the sectors; that 
actors are assigned into the same block means that they have the same or similar patterns of 
relationships each other.   
3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the research schemes for actual analysis and provided an understanding 
of the quality of the data set used in this study.  On the basis of the design built in this chapter, 
                                                 
28 This study defines the “coexistence” block as: a block where organizations from two different sectors coexist.  
One sector organizations occupy more than 30% and less than 70% of all memberships, and vice versa.  
 55
the next four chapters will provide results from network analysis (Chapter 4, 5 and 6) and 
regression analysis (Chapter 7).   
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IV. DESCRIPTIONS OF COLLABORATION PATTERNS WITHIN THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is designed to present various features of collaborative relationships within the 
nonprofit sector organizations.  In order to investigate these relationships, analyses are conducted 
at the individual level and group level.  At the individual level, this study applies three different 
approaches: actor centrality, correlations between six collaborative relationships and distance 
analysis.  At the group level, two approaches are applied: network size analysis and robustness 
analysis.  Through diverse analyses, this chapter presents the following findings; 1) types of 
collaborative relationships determine the shape of network structure.  For example, the network 
structure of information sharing and joint programs is different, 2) in the less intensive 
collaboration relationships, such as the information sharing and work referral, network structure 
is cohesive and robust; however, the network structure in the intensive collaboration 
relationships, such as the formal contract and joint program, are localized and fragile, 3) while 
nonprofits that occupy a broker position play a strategically significant role in the intensive 
collaboration networks, broker nonprofits in the less intensive networks are strategically less 
significant, 4) when selecting new partners for regular meeting, nonprofits favor geographically 
neighborhood nonprofits; when seeking partners for joint program, nonprofits show no 
preference in regard to geographical distances in their choice of partners, and 5) the work referral 
network enables nonprofits to efficiently provide social services.    
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4.2 NETWORK PROPERTIES OF SIX RELATIONSHIPS 
4.2.1 Network size analysis 
Six different collaboration relationships show six different types of networks that are different in 
terms of size and structural properties.  Table IV-1 illustrates the network size of these six 
collaboration networks.  First, the number of nonprofits that participate in the networks decreases 
as the collaborative relationship intensifies.  In the least intensive collaborative relationship (i.e., 
information sharing), all 42 nonprofits are connected to each other.  In the most intensive form of 
collaborative relations, such as formal contract and joint program, the number of actors is less 
than half the number of actors in the information sharing network.  In the same line, the number 
of ties that connects nonprofits with each other declines as the collaborative relationship 
intensifies.  Second, the formal contract network is the most fragmented as it is composed of 
three disconnected components.  
 
Table IV-1) Descriptive statistics of collaborative relations 
 Information 
sharing 
network 
Work 
referrals 
network 
Regular 
meeting 
network 
Resource 
sharing 
network 
Formal 
contract 
network 
Joint 
program 
network 
N (actors)* 42 41 35 34 26 22 
Size (ties) 490 239 198 106 56 58 
Tie per actor 11.67 5.83 5.66 3.12 2.15 2.64 
Direction of ties No Yes No No No No 
Component 1 1 1 1 3 1 
* Isolates are excluded.  
4.2.2 Correlations among collaboration relationships 
This section examines correlations among the six collaborative relationships.  Since the 
relational data is measured as binominal (i.e., 1 or 0), conventional correlations, such as Pearson 
or Spearman correlation analysis, are not appropriate.  Thus, this study applies tetrachoric 
correlation, which is designed specific to binominal data correlation analysis (Lindeman, et al., 
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1980) 29 .  Through the correlation analysis, similarity and difference between the six 
collaborative relations are investigated.  
 
Table IV-2) Tetrachoric correlation coefficients and 95% confidence interval of correlation 
    Coefficient ASE* Lower CL** Upper CL** 
Work referrals 0.2849 0.0457 0.1953 0.3745
Regular meeting 0.1737 0.05 0.0757 0.2718
Resource sharing 0.1578 0.0512 0.0574 0.2581
Formal contract -0.1389 0.058 -0.2526 -0.0252
Information 
sharing 
   
  
  Joint program 0.157 0.0535 0.0522 0.2619
Regular meeting 0.3937 0.0455 0.3046 0.4828
Resource sharing 0.1627 0.0517 0.0613 0.2641
Formal contract 0.2257 0.0577 0.1126 0.3388
Work referral 
  
  Joint program -0.0519 0.0559 -0.1614 0.0575
Resource sharing 0.2606 0.0522 0.1583 0.3628
Formal contract 0.437 0.0526 0.334 0.5401
Regular meeting 
  
  Joint program 0.0966 0.0575 -0.0162 0.2094
Formal contract 0.4394 0.0531 0.3352 0.5435Resource 
sharing  Joint program 0.7296 0.0326 0.6657 0.7934
Formal contract Joint program 0.3065 0.0604 0.1881 0.4248
*Asymptotic standard error   ** Confidence level 
 
There are three interesting findings in the correlation analysis.  First, there are two 
negative relationships between information sharing and formal contract and between work 
referrals and joint program.  With a confidence interval of 95% confidence, the correlation 
coefficient between information sharing and formal contract is negative (Table IV-2).  Also, with 
confidence interval of 95%, the correlation between work referrals and joint program mostly 
ranges in the negative region.  Thus, it is safe to state that the direction of these two correlations 
is negative.  This negative direction indicates that information sharing / formal contract, and 
work referral / joint program are mutually exclusive relations, respectively.  For example, if 
nonprofit A shares information with nonprofit B, nonprofit A would not have formal contract 
relations with nonprofit B and vice versa.  The negative correlation between work referral and 
joint program30 indicates that when it comes to service delivery to clients, nonprofits maintain 
only one of two possible relationships with other nonprofits in order to prevent duplications of 
service delivery route.  In addition, we can assume that the work referral network is similar to a 
value chain system (Porter, 1985) because it shares three characteristics of a value chain system; 
                                                 
29 To calculate tetrachoric correlation, SAS program was used. 
30 These two relations directly concern service-delivery to clients 
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1) there is no transactional cost for sending or receiving clients, 2) there is goal congruence, 
which is the improvement of the quality of life in the community through delivering social 
services; and 3) nonprofits act as separated units to deliver services31.  On the basis of these 
findings, this study proposes a proposition; nonprofits make efficient service delivery through 
the social service chain system where nonprofits avert duplication of the same service delivery 
by other nonprofits.    
Second, correlations between regular meeting and two strategic collaborations (i.e., 
formal contract and joint program) are important because these correlations quantify the ability 
to resolve conflicts emerging from strategic collaboration.  In the strategic collaboration, 
conflicts should be recognized as “a necessary antecedent to collaboration” (Weiss and Hughes, 
2005, p.101).  Regular meetings are a buffering zone to resolving conflicts because they increase 
chances of discussing existing or potential conflicts.  While the correlation between formal 
contract and regular meeting is fairly large (0.44), the correlation between joint program and 
regular meeting is small, 0.1, and therefore it is hard to determine statistical significance (Table 
IV-2).  Thus, nonprofits that are connected with joint programs are likely to encounter serious 
problems when conflicts emerge during the joint program procedures because they lack formal 
ways to discuss problems.  In contrast, nonprofits that maintain formal contract with each other 
seem to have a relatively higher capacity to resolve existing conflicts or to recognize potential 
conflicts that would rise from formal contract relationships.    
Third, correlations among strategic collaborative relationships turn out to be medium to 
strong.  In particular, the correlation between resource sharing and joint program is strong (0.73).  
For example, once nonprofits are connected with resource sharing, they are likely to extend their 
strategic relationships to joint program relations.  On the contrary, informal collaborative 
relations (information sharing) and passive collaborative relations (work referral) are weakly or 
negatively associated with other collaborative relations.  These findings are interpreted as 
showing that nonprofits build trust through the intensive relationships by means of mutually 
verifying in their choice of collaboration partners - competence at the job and likeability (i.e., 
enjoyable to work with) (Casciaro, T. and M.S. Lobo. 2005).  This study proposes that while 
                                                 
31 The work referral network is the same format as the value chain system which will be shown in the chapter 7; 
work referral network is reduced by blockmodeling into input block, broking block (transformation processes in 
value chain), and service delivery block (outputs in the value chain system).  
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strategic collaborative relationships are helpful to build trust, less intensive types of collaboration 
(i.e., informal information sharing relationships) have little or no effect on building trusts.
4.3 NETWORK DESCRIPTIONS BY SOCIOGRAM AND ACTOR CENTRALITY 
4.3.1 Definition various centrality measurements  
Before going into descriptions of networks, it is necessary to explain the definitions and 
applications of centrality measurements used.  Since Freeman (1979) presented the formal 
concepts of three basic centralities – degree, closeness and betweenness, many complimentary 
centrality measurements have been developed in order to compensate for the weakness of these 
basic centrality measures.  Including these three basic measurements, this study applies three 
more centralities that are complimentary to the basic centrality measurements.   
Degree centrality is based on adjacency.  Degree centrality takes into account how many 
immediate ties (i.e., dyadic relations) an actor has.  Degree centrality is useful to see the 
prominence of an actor in a local neighborhood as well as in a global network.  Actors who have 
a high degree centrality are considered significant or powerful in the network under the 
assumption that the more ties an actor has, the more opportunities and alternatives the actor has 
on networks.  This actor is thus less dependent on any specific actor.   
Directed ties provide more information.  Out-degree centrality is the measurement of 
“how influential the actor may be” (Hanneman, 2001, p.43).  On the other hand, in-degree 
centrality is the measurement of how prestigious the actor may be.  An actor who has many in-
degree ties can be said to occupy a prestigious position because other actors want to be known by 
the actor. 
Degree centrality is limited in explaining the concept of power because power cannot be 
defined in terms of dyadic relations but relationships over dyadic relations (Degenne and Forse, 
2004, p141).  Thus, this study introduces Bonacich’s power as a complimentary measure to the 
degree centrality.  Bonacich power centrality is different from the degree centrality in that 
Bonacich power reflects “how many the connections the actors in the neighborhood had” 
(Hanneman, 2001, p.72).  According to Bonacich (1987), power comes from being connected to 
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less-connected neighborhoods because these neighborhoods are dependent on the actor: “The 
more connections the actors in your neighborhood have, the more central you are.  The fewer 
connections the actors in your neighborhood, the powerful you are” (Hanneman, 2001, p.79).  
The Bonacich power is sensitive to the parameter beta32, which has two dimensions - the degree 
and direction of absolute value.  When the absolute value of beta is large, its effects become 
global (i.e. the connections in the whole network), when it is small, the Bonacich power reflects 
the local effects (i.e. its neighborhood’s connections).  When parameter beta is negative, this 
weight works negatively on well-connected others and positively on less-connected others 
(Degenne and Forse, 2004), because power “arises when connections are made to those who are 
powerless” (Wasserman and Faust, 1996, p.209).  There is no rule of thumb in selecting the 
value of beta (Degenne and Forse, 2004).  However, because this value is theoretically 
responsive to the transitivity (Degenne and Forse, 2004), this study uses the percentage of 
transitivity in a network as beta value. The direction is negative because this study wants to 
assess the power of actors.   
Closeness centrality is a centrality measurement based on geodesic distances 33 .  
“Closeness centrality approaches emphasize the distance of an actor to all others in the network 
by focusing on the geodesic distance from each actor to all others” (Hanneman, 2001, p.65).  
Thus, closeness centrality is useful when it comes to the consideration of relationships with all 
other actors in the network.  Actors who have a high degree of closeness centrality are regarded 
as central under the assumption that “actors who are able to reach other actors at shorter path 
lengths, or who are more reachable by other actors at shorter path lengths have favored 
positions” (Hanneman, 2001, p.62).  Closeness centrality is often misled by local actors who 
have high closeness centrality in a limited small group but who are not prominent in the whole 
network (Hanneman, 2001).  Eigenvector centrality (i.e., Bonacich centrality) compensates for 
this weakness of closeness centrality by paying more attention to the global structure of network 
and less to the local structure.  Thus, eigenvector centrality represents an actor’s global 
reachability (i.e., global influence) to other actors.    
Betweenness centrality indicates an actor who is between two or more actors and “on 
whom other actors must depend to conduct exchanges” (Hanneman, 2001, p.70).  “Betweenness 
                                                 
32 The equation of Bonacich power is, Ci = ∑j(α + βCj)rij (for details, see Bonacich, 1987) 
33 For details of geodesic distance, see section 4-6 in this chapter.   
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centrality views an actor as being in a favored position to the extent that the actor falls on the 
geodesic paths between other pairs of actors in the network” (p.67).  Actors who have high 
degree of betweenness centrality are considered significant or powerful in a network under the 
assumption that the more dependent actors are on other actors to make connections, the more 
opportunities and alternatives the actor has.  A weakness of between centrality is its assumption 
of geodesic path.  For example, two actors who are connected with several paths may not use the 
geodesic path because these two actors do not like the between actor in the geodesic path.  
Rather, they may use other detour path connecting them, even though that path is longer than the 
geodesic path.  Flow centrality expands the betweenness centrality under the assumption that 
actors will use all pathways that connect them proportionally to the length of the pathways.   
Using centrality measurements, this study explores the structurally peculiar behaviors of 
actors in the collaboration networks.  Actors can be strategically significant when they have 
relatively low degree centrality but high closeness centrality simultaneously because these actors 
are efficient in dealing with collaboration relations.  An organization is efficient in the network 
when it can reach other actors in the shortest way (i.e., high closeness centrality) with relatively 
small amounts of cost (i.e., maintenance costs of collaborative relations; the more collaborative 
relations one has, the more resources one spends on maintaining them) (Ko, Lee and Park). 
There is another type of strategically significant actor in the network – a broker or 
mediator.  An actor plays a broker role if the rest of the actors in the network must pass through 
this actor to exchange information, resource or money with other actors in the network.  
However, a broker is not a dominant or powerful actor in the network but is high in betweenness 
and/or flow centrality.  In order to distinguish a broker that is strategically significant from a 
dominantly powerful actor who has high betweenness centrality as well as other types of 
centralities, this study borrows the concept of power behavior typology (Knoke, 1990).  Among 
other centrality measures, two Bonacich centralities explain power behaviors of actors.  As 
Knoke argues, “influence is a relational dimension of power because a communication must exist 
between influencer and influencee ….. Domination is clearly relational, because it involves one 
actor exchanging some valued resource for obedience by another actor” (Knoke, 1990, pp.3-4).  
While Bonacich power quantifies an actor’s dominance over other actors or dependence of 
certain actors on an actor, Bonacich centrality measures an actor’s global influences by his or her 
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reachability in the whole network structure34 (Degenne and Frose, 2004).  By locating these two 
indicators in two dimensions, Knoke (1990) refines four different types of power behaviors 
(Knoke, 1990; Degenne and Frose, 2004).    
 
Table IV-3) Four different types of power behavior (Power by influence matrix) 
  Influence (Bonacich centrality) 
  Absent*** Present** 
Present** Coercion Authority Domination 
(Bonacich power) Absent*** Power broking Persuasion 
* Table borrowed from Degenne and Frose. (2004), p.142. 
** Present: If an organization ranks within top 5 of either of Bonacich centrality 
*** Absent: If an organization ranks below top 5 of either of Bonacich centrality 
 
Among the four types of power behavior, this study focuses on the power broking 
dimension which is titled power broker35 .  Organizations that play a power broker role are 
neither influential in the whole network (i.e., low in Bonacich centrality) nor dominant in the 
local (i.e., low in Bonacich power).  Clearly, these organizations do not possess power but they 
behave as a broker or mediator because they have high betweenness or flow centrality36.  This 
typology is structurally extraordinary in the network because this type of actor is indispensable 
for exchanging information, resources, money, and so forth among network actors.       
4.3.2 Information sharing network 
This section presents visual images of nonprofit collaboration networks using a sociogram.  “A 
sociogram is a picture in which people (or more generally, any social units) are represented as 
points in two-dimensional space, and relationships among pairs of people are represented by 
lines linking the corresponding points” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pp.11-12).  A sociogram 
                                                 
34 The basic assumption here is that transmission of information and other types of collaborative relationship will 
alter or at least influence another actor’s behaviors.  Under this assumption, since an actor who has high eigenvector 
centrality can reach others in the most efficient (i.e., shortest) manner, this actor can be called an influential actor in 
the network. 
35 Definitions of other three types of power behaviors are; coercive in which actor is surrounded by organizations 
that are dependent on them, authority in which the actor is both influential across the whole network and dominant 
in the local network but exert dominant power to its local dependents under acceptances from dependents because of 
previously established beliefs that these organizations are influential in the network (Knoke, 1990), and persuasion 
in which the actor is globally influential but not coercive (Knoke, 1990).   
36 Within top 5 ranks of betweenness or flow centrality in the next section. 
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enables us to understand the overall figure of networks because the sociogram portrays precisely 
how a network looks.  Throughout this study, a dot (●) represents an organization and a line ( – ) 
represents a tie between organizations (for example, see Figure IV-9).  
 
● : actors 
           : ties 
Figure IV-1) Information sharing network sociogram 
 
Figure IV-1 depicts information sharing relationships among 42 nonprofits.  While some 
nonprofits that have many relationships with others are located in the center of the network (e.g., 
NHCO, NH and so forth), others that maintain relatively small number of relations are located on 
the periphery of the network (e.g., SOFP, LSS, and so forth).  Other nonprofits such as LLM, 
SVD or CLA are located between two central and periphery actors.   
 
Table IV-4) Top five actors of various centralities in the information sharing network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 SVYMCA SVYMCA SVYMCA SVYMCA SVYMCA SVYMCA 
2 NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO 
3 NH NH NH NH NH NH 
4 NHYMCC NHYMCC NHYMCC NHYMCC NHYMCC NHYMCC 
5 HI HI HI AVAC HI AVAC 
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Table IV-4 demonstrates the top 5 centrality actors in the information sharing network.  
SVYMCA is dominant over all six centrality measures.  Right behind SVYMCA, three 
nonprofits (NHCO, NH, and NHYMCC) are ranked as the second, third and fourth in all six 
centrality measures.  This indicates that the information network is considerably centralized in a 
few nonprofits.  For this reason, almost all information flows from, to and through these highly 
centralized nonprofits.  Finally, there is no strategically significant actor in the information 
sharing network but several dominant actors.  
4.3.3 Work referral network 
Figure IV-2 illustrates a visual picture of 41 nonprofits’ work referral relations.  Unlike other 
types of collaboration, work referral has directions (i.e., sender and receiver of work referrals).  
An arrow in the relational tie is a sign of directionality.   
 
● : actors 
          : ties 
Figure IV-2) Work referral network sociogram 
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Like the information sharing network, the work referral network is quite dense and shows 
a spider-web like shape.  By viewing Figure IV-2, we can roughly discern central, intermediary 
and peripheral actors.  For example, NH and NHCO occupy the center of the network and 
maintain many ties.  On the other hand, MFC, ODM, TKF and so forth are located in the edge of 
network.  Finally, SSVD, MCG, PT and so forth are located in between the center and edge.   
 
Table IV-5) Top five actors of various centralities in the work referral network 
Rank Out-degree In-degree Power 
Out-
Close In-Close 
Between-
ness 
Eigen-
vector 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NH NHCO NHCO NHCO NH NH NH NHCO 
2 NHCO NH NH NH NHCO NHCO NHCO NH 
3 CCN HI HI HI LSS AVAC HI UWAC 
4 NHYMCC NHYMCC NHYMCC NHYMCC AVAC HI NHYMCC NHYMCC 
5 AVAC AVAC AVAC MCG NHYMCC NHYMCC LSS HI 
 
It is clear that two nonprofits (NH and NHCO) are dominant in the work referral network 
(Table IV-5).  The second dominant organizations are HI, AVAC and NHYMCC.  Except HI, 
the ties of the four dominant nonprofits are reciprocal in terms of sending and receiving referrals 
because they are central in both out and in-degree centrality.  While CCN mostly sends many 
referrals, it is not central in out-degree centrality.  HI is central in terms of receiving referrals.  
From this simple analysis, we can identify various roles of nonprofits - receiver, sender and 
broker (service coordinator) - in the work referral network37.  Finally, it is difficult to find 
strategically significant actors in the work referral network.   
4.3.4 Regular meeting network 
Figure IV-3 illustrates the regular meeting network of 35 nonprofits.  First, this network is less 
dense than the previous two networks.  However, there is one region of dense relations.  Dense 
regions on the upper-left in Figure IV-3 indicate the North Hills Nonprofit Consortium.  
Including one other nonprofit (FF), the Consortium strongly intertwines members.  In terms of 
network structure, this network is composed of central actors – the Consortium members – and 
peripheral actors – other nonprofits.   
 
                                                 
37 The position and role analysis will be conducted in detail in Chapter 6. 
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 ● : actors 
           : ties 
Figure IV-3) Regular meeting network sociogram 
 
Table IV-6) Top five actors of various centralities in the regular meeting network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO 
2 NHYMCC NHYMCC NHYMCC NCM NHYMCC NCM 
3 NH NH NH NHYMCC NH NHYMCC 
4 NCM NCM NCM FF NCM FF 
5 FF FF FF NH SSVD NH 
 
As Table IV-6 indicates, top centrality actors are composed of the Consortium members 
except for one nonprofit (FF).  Among members of the Consortium, one nonprofit (NHCO) is 
dominant and others (NHYMCC, NH, and NCM) have the central position in the regular meeting 
network.  Although FF is not a member of the Consortium, it has strong relationships with 
members of the Consortium and other nonprofits in the network. Since the geographical 
coverage of FF (Forbes Fund) is not limited to the northern part of Allegheny County but all 
regions of the County, FF may be a broker between nonprofits in the other regions of Allegheny 
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County and the North Hills.  In sum, there are several dominant actors most of whom are 
members of the Consortium, but there is no strategically significant actor.   
4.3.5 Resource sharing network 
Figure IV-4 exhibits 34 nonprofits’ resource sharing relationships.  From the picture, three 
subgroups are roughly distinguished – two cohesive subgroups (one centered with NHCO 
located in upper right region of the network and the other centered with HI and NH located in 
lower right region) and one sparse subgroup which is a left side of the network (composed of 
NHYMCC, HFI, TKF, NCM, LLM and so forth).   
From the central-periphery perspective, this network is roughly composed of several 
central actors and many peripheries that are directly attached to central actors.  Centrality 
analysis supports results from the sociogram (Figure IV-4).   
 
 
● : actors 
           : ties 
Figure IV-4) Resource sharing network sociogram 
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Table IV-7) Top five actors of various centralities in the resource sharing network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO 
2 HI HI NH HI HI HI 
3 NH NH HI NH NH NH 
4 NHYMCC NHYMCC SMF NHYMCC SPUMC NHYMCC 
5 SPUMC SPUMC NHYMCC HFI SMF NCM 
 
Four nonprofits that are at the center of three subgroup – NHCO, HI, NH, and NHYMCC 
- rank within the top 5 in almost all types of centrality (Table IV-7).  Four nonprofits are central 
and dominant in the network because they rank in high positions in all centrality measures.  
Another feature of this network is that there are two nonprofits (SMF and SPUMC) which 
occupy strategically significant positions.  For example, SMF maintains only four relationships 
but these relations are connected to central actors in three different subgroups (NHCO, NH, HI 
and NHYMCC).  With relatively small costs to maintain collaboration relations38 (only four), 
SMF can efficiently39 find partners for resource sharing in the network because it can reach the 
rest of actors in the shortest way.  Finally, HFI which is not included in the power or influence 
centrality, ranks fifth in betweenness centrality.  This means that HFI occupies a strategically 
significant position in which it acts as resource flow coordinator (i.e., broker) between two 
subgroups.   
4.3.6 Formal contract network 
Figure IV-5 shows formal contract relationships among 26 nonprofits.  This network is 
noticeably sparser than the less intensive networks; the formal contract network does not show 
any sign of the spider-web shape40.  It is clear that there are three branches (subgroups) from a 
center (FF).  Another feature of the formal contract network is that this network is composed of 
three components, one main and two dyadic components.  Most of ties in the formal contract are 
                                                 
38 For example, compared to HI, SMF might spend one third (4/12) of costs to maintain formal contracts under the 
assumption that costs for maintaining one formal contract with an organization is the same as the cost of maintaining 
a formal contract with another organization 
39 An example of the advantage of this position is time-saving to search for appropriate counterpartners because the 
nonprofit can easily acquire information about other organizations in the network via its four central partners. 
40 Formal contract network is the sparsest network of 6 collaboration networks.   
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dyadic or triad (an 1:1, 1:2, or 1:1:1 relationship).  These evidences indicate that nonprofits 
prefer one or two formal contract partner(s) rather than multiple partners.   
 
● : actors 
          : ties
Figure IV-5) Formal contract network sociogram 
 
Table IV-8) Top five ranks of various centralities in the formal contract network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NHCO NHCO FF FF NHCO FF 
2 UWAC UWAC NHCO NHCO MFC NHCO 
3 FF HFI HFI HFI FF HFI 
4 HFI FF CA UWAC BLFP UWAC 
5 MFC NH SSVD SSVD LSS SSVD 
 
Two nonprofits (FF and NHCO) are conspicuous in Table IV-8.  FF is the most central in 
terms of betweenness and closeness while NHCO is the most central in degree and power 
centrality41.  FF is strategically significant in terms of two typologies of a significant actor.  First, 
from the efficiency point of view, FF occupies the number one position of closeness centrality 
                                                 
41 The reasons NHCO has the largest eigenvector centrality are; that subgroups that are dependent on NHCO are 
largest; and that it is directly connected FF.   
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but is relatively less important in degree centrality.  FF maintains formal contracts with three 
locally important nonprofits (NHCO, HFI, and SSVD).  With these three relations, FF can reach 
the rest of nonprofits in the network in the shortest way.  Second, as seen in Figure IV-5, FF is 
located at a center of the network and is number one in terms of betweenness centrality.  At the 
same time, it is relatively low in power and eigenvector centrality.  However, the meaning of 
high betweenness with low power and influence can be differently interpreted from other 
collaboration networks.  Rather than a broker, FF, as one of the most influential foundation for 
social service nonprofits, seems to be the originator of major formal contracts.  As stated above, 
FF maintains formal contract relations with three central actors in three branches of the network 
(again, NHCO, HFI, and SSVD).  In turn, these nonprofits may have sub-contracted to other 
nonprofits within their subgroups.  
There are two more nonprofits which occupy strategically significant position.  First, 
UWAC proves to be a strategically significant nonprofit in terms of its broker role.  Second, CA 
seems to be the most efficient in dealing with formal contract relations because it can reach all 
actors in the network in the shortest way (i.e., closeness centrality is high) with relatively small 
costs (only two relations with the most central actors, FF and NHCO).   
4.3.7 Joint program network 
Figure IV-6 represents 22 nonprofits’ joint program relationships.  The joint program network is 
a sparse network, similar to the formal contract network.  The most peculiar feature that 
differentiates it from other types of collaboration is that the network is composed of two hubs 
(HI and NHCO), each of which is exceptionally predominant over the other nonprofits that are 
adjacent to them42.  There are several paths between these two hubs including a direct path.  Two 
hubs’ relationships with their neighborhoods are different from each other.  While nonprofits 
adjacent to HI have mostly a dyadic relationship with HI, neighborhood nonprofits adjacent to 
NHCO have triad or multiple relationships with NHCO.  This difference comes from different 
philosophies for collaboration.  As indicated in the previous chapter, one of the core philosophies 
of NHCO is to provide social services by extending “collaborative relationships” with others.  
                                                 
42 These two nonprofits share about 40% of all relations in the joint program network. The rest of 20 nonprofits 
share about 60% of relations.   
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On the other hand, even though HI also prefers collaboration, it is cautious in making 
collaborative relationships (especially in the strategic collaboration) and selects partners only if 
they previously showed high performances43. 
 
● : actors 
          : ties 
Figure IV-6) Joint program network sociogram 
 
Table IV-9) Top five actors of various centralities in the joint program network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness 
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 HI HI HI HI NHCO HI 
2 NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO HI NHCO 
3 SPUMC SPUMC SPUMC SPUMC SPUMC SPUMC 
4 FF FF SMF AARP FF AARP 
5 AARP AARP FF CLA, HFI SMF FF 
 
HI and NHCO rank in the first and second position of all types of centrality (Table IV-9).  
Following them, SPUMC ranks third in all centralities.  However, centralities of the third actor 
are far less important than the first and second.  There is one organization that occupies a 
strategically significant position in the network.  SMF locates between two dominant nonprofits.  
                                                 
43 This is found from conversation with CEO of HI. 
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This nonprofit would be the most efficient in maintaining joint program relationships in the 
whole network because it can reach the rest of actors in the shortest way (i.e., high closeness 
centrality) with less costs (i.e., costs for maintaining only two relations).   
4.4 NETWORK CENTRALIZATION ANALYSIS 
In the previous section, descriptions of the collaboration networks were done mostly at the 
individual actor level.  Using network centralization index (hereafter NCI), this section presents 
information on whether the collaboration networks are structurally unequal or hierarchical at the 
group level.  Simply put, NCI is “the degree of inequality or variance in networks as a 
percentage of that of a perfect star network of the same size” (Hanneman, 2001, p.65).  As a 
group-level centrality measure, NCI has the property that “the larger it is, the more likely it is 
that a single actor is quite central, with the remaining actors considerably less central” 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994, p.176).  In other words, the smaller NCI, the more homogeneous 
actors are likely to be.  The formal definition of this index44 is;  
 
CA (Network centralization index) =        ∑gi=1[CA(n*) – CA(ni)] 
                                                              Max ∑gi=1[CA(n*) – CA(ni)]         (0 ≤ CA ≤ 1)  
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Figure IV-7) Patterns of NCI in less intensive collaborative relationships 
                                                 
44 Refer to Wasserman and Faust (1994), pp 175 -177 for details of this equation.   
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Figure IV-7 illustrates the information sharing and tactical collaboration networks’ NCI 
by three centrality measures.  These networks show a hierarchy structure in degree and closeness 
centrality.  First, high NCI in degree centrality implies that several central actors exclusively 
handle most of the collaborative relationship flows in the networks.  These actors are called a 
“hub”.  Second, hubs are central in terms of reachability to the rest of actors in the networks.  
Second, a broker is less important in the networks of less intensive collaboration because NCI of 
betweenness centralities are small (Figure IV-7).   
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Figure IV-8) Patterns of NCI in strategic collaborative relationships 
 
Patterns of strategic collaborations are completely different from less intensive 
collaborations (Figure IV-8).  Low NCI of the degree centrality implies that the strategic 
collaboration networks are a horizontal or localized structure rather than a hierarchical structure.  
In addition, NCIs of the betweenness centrality are the highest among three centralities in all 
three strategic collaboration networks.  This implies that the role of the broker is important in the 
strategic collaboration.  As a coordinator who mediates flows of money, resources and so forth, 
the network broker is indispensable in the strategic collaboration networks.   
NCIs of three centralities in the formal contract network are noticeably smaller than those 
of the resource sharing and joint program network.  As there is a 25% of NCI in degree centrality, 
there is no hub in this network.  Reachability among actor is also small.  This indicates that the 
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formal contract relationships are the most localized among all types of the collaborative 
relationships.   
In sum, the above two figures support findings in the previous section.  There exist 
strategically significant actors in the strategic collaboration networks but it is hard to witness 
these types of actors in the less intensive collaboration network.  In the strategic collaboration 
networks, the NCI of betweenness centrality is high, which means that the role of the broker is 
important in these networks whereas the role of the broker is not crucial in the less intensive 
collaboration networks because betweenness centrality NCI is low.         
4.5 NETWORK ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
Network robustness is one of the important properties of a network because it recognizes how 
robust (or fragile) the network is.  In the fast changing environment, it is very probable that an 
unpredictable event – such as sudden bankruptcy - can eliminate important actors from the 
network.  When these actors are removed, it is important to see if the network is still working.   
 
Figure IV-9) Information sharing network after removing two core actors 
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In order to see how robust a network is, this study removed two types of central actors in 
the network – core actors45 and 1st of betweenness centrality (See Appendix 7-2 for detailed 
results of elimination). 
First, the information sharing and work referral network are not influenced by elimination 
of important actors (Figure IV-9 and IV-10).  In the information network, when core nonprofits 
are eliminated, no isolation occurs and the main component remains completely connected 
among the rest of actors.  Only one actor becomes isolated in the work referral network with the 
elimination of core actors.  In sum, these two networks are very robust against the elimination of 
core actors in the network, which means the two networks are well connected among all 
members of the networks.  
 
Figure IV-10) Work referral network after removing two core actors 
 
After removing two core members, the regular meeting and resource sharing network are 
divided into two components and several isolated organizations.  The regular meeting network is 
divided into a main component and a small component composed of dyadic relationship (Figure 
IV-11).  The resource sharing network becomes a main component and a moderate size 
component composed of 8 actors (Figure IV-12).  Similar percentages of actors become isolated 
when core actors are eliminated in the two networks: 11.4% and 11.8%, respectively. 
                                                 
45 This study terms a core actor in network if it is involved in more than half of all possible cliques (a complete 
subgroup with the number of more than 3 actors).  For example, NHCO and SVYMCA participate in 59 different 
cliques out of 100 possible cliques in the information sharing network.  
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Figure IV-11) Regular meeting network after removing two core actors 
 
 
 
Figure IV-12) Resource sharing network after removing two core actors 
 
The formal contract network is fragile in terms of the betweenness centrality.  When the 
1st betweenness centrality actor (FF) is removed, the network is divided into three subgroups 
which lose connections between each other (Figure IV-13).  The joint program network also 
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proves to be fragile.  When two core actors are removed, about a half of actors (45.5%) becomes 
isolated (Figure IV-14).   
 
Figure IV-13) Formal contract network after removing 1st betweenness actor 
 
 
Figure IV-14) Joint program network after removing two core actors 
 
In sum, robustness (or frangibility) of the collaboration networks is summarized as; the 
two strategic collaboration networks are the most fragile, resource sharing and regular meeting 
are modest, and finally information sharing and work referral networks are quite robust.   
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4.6 DISTANCE ANALYSIS OF SIX RELATIONSHIPS 
In order to explore whether nonprofits are likely to collaborate with geographically close 
neighborhood nonprofits, this study applies two analyses – correlation and t-test.  The correlation 
analysis looks at correlations between geographical and geodesic distances of actors.  Geodesic 
means “a shortest path between two nodes” and “the geodesic distance or simply the distance 
between two nodes is defined as the length of a geodesic between them” (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994, p.110).  If nonprofits prefer geographically near neighborhoods for their collaboration 
partners, correlation coefficients between these two distances would be positively associated.  
Table IV-10 illustrates results of the correlation analysis.  
 
Table IV-10) Correlation between geodesic distances and geographical distances 
 N Correlation between geodesic distance and physical distance 
Information network 1722 -0.042 (0.726) 
Work referrals network 1640 -0.033 (0.676) 
Regular meeting network 1190 0.092 (0.533) 
Resource Sharing network 1122 -0.044 (0.575) 
Formal contract network 462 -0.057 (0.708) 
Joint program network 462 -0.142 (0.283) 
* Parenthesis is p-value. 
 
All correlation coefficients indicate nearly negligible negative relationships (except 
regular meeting) between geographical distances and collaborative relationship distances, but 
they are statistically insignificant.  However, even though statistically insignificant, there are two 
probable results to note.  First, geographical distances are negatively correlated with the strategic 
collaborative relations.  Most notably, the correlation coefficient of joint program is relatively 
high and its significance level (i.e., p-value) is relatively better than other measurements.  Second, 
only the direction of regular meeting correlation is positive (although it is nearly negligible).  
This result implies that in collaborative relationships that requires face-face meeting, nonprofit 
managers prefer collaboration partners that are located nearby geographically.  In order to 
confirm whether two notable findings are probable results, this study conducts t-test of 
differences in the means of linked and unlinked actors’ geographical distances.   
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Results of the t-test positively confirm the plausible propositions from the correlation 
analysis (Table IV-11).  First, average distances between nonprofits that are connected with joint 
program relations are 13.4 mile.  At a statistically significant level, these distances are farther 
than distances between nonprofits that are not linked.  Second, distances between nonprofits that 
regularly meet are smaller (8.8 mile) than distances between nonprofits that do not have regular 
meeting (10.3 mile) and this difference is statistically significant.   
 
Table IV-11) T-test of differences in means of linked and unlinked actors’ geographical distances 
Relations Group N Mean S.D. S.E of Mean t Sig.(2-tailed) 
Linked 490 10.651 7.37 0.333Information 
sharing Unlinked 1232 10.137 6.04 0.172  1.373 0.170
Linked 239 10.039 7.19 0.465Work Referrals Unlinked 1483 10.323 6.32 0.164 -0.632 0.528
Linked 198 8.805 6.71 0.477Regular meeting Unlinked 1524 10.475 6.39 0.164 -3.422 0.001*
Linked 106 9.913 8.51 0.827Resource sharing Unlinked 1616 10.308 6.29 0.156 -0.469 0.640
Linked 56 8.898 6.70 0.895Formal contract Unlinked 1666 10.330 6.43 0.158 -1.636 0.102
Linked 58 13.353 9.59 1.259
Joint program Unlinked 1664 10.178 6.26 0.154 2.505 0.015**
*significant at the level of 0.01  ** significant at the level of 0.05 
 
On the basis of these results, this study proposes two hypotheses; 
1) Nonprofits regard strategic fit in programs (i.e., programs with which both partners can 
make synergy effects or a program that one of partners has but the other needs) as more 
important factor than geographical distances when it comes to joint program relations.  
2) Nonprofits prefer neighborhood organizations to distance organizations when 
characteristics of relationships require face to face relationships.
4.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has explored collaboration patterns within the nonprofit sector through various 
descriptions of the collaboration networks.  Major findings in this chapter are;  
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● First, as the collaborative relationship intensifies, networks are sparser, more localized 
and more fragile.   
● Second, through the work referral network system, nonprofits deliver social service 
efficiently.   
● Third, there is no strategically significant actor in the less intensive collaboration 
networks, but there emerges strategically significant actors in the strategic collaboration.  These 
findings give birth to a hypothesis; while a network coordinator is indispensable and plays a 
strategically significant role in the strategic collaboration networks, it is not as important in terms 
of strategic significance in the less intensive types of collaborations.   
● Finally, nonprofits do not appear to care about geographical distances when they make 
collaborative relationships with other organizations.  Nonprofits prefer relatively long-distance 
partners to near-distance partners in joint program relations.  However, when face-face relations 
are an important factor in making collaborative relationships, nonprofits prefer partners which 
are located in their neighborhood.   
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V. DESCRIPTIONS OF COLLABORATION PATTERNS ACROSS THE SECTORS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, features of the collaboration networks within the nonprofits sector were 
discussed.  This chapter extends the scope of analysis by including the business and public sector.  
In order to compare cross-sector networks with within-sector networks, the same analyses 
conducted in Chapter 4 are performed.  From this analysis, this chapter concludes that; 1) when 
other sector organizations join collaboration networks, network structures change, especially in 
strategic collaboration networks, which become more localized and decentralized, 2) with the 
involvement of other sectors, a gate or bridge nonprofits emerges between the nonprofit and 
business/public sector, and 3) while businesses prefer popular nonprofits (i.e., high degree 
centrality nonprofits) as their strategic collaboration partners, pubic agencies do not show much 
preference for popular nonprofits.   
5.2 NETWORK PROPERTIES (SIZE ANALYSIS) 
Table V-1 and V-2 show that the total number of actors in both the business and public sector 
decrease as the collaboration relationships intensify.  When businesses are included in 
collaboration networks, the size of the network (i.e., the number of actor) is twice as large as the 
nonprofit-only network in the information sharing, resource sharing and joint program.  When 
businesses are introduced in the collaboration network, two strategic collaboration networks (i.e., 
resource sharing and formal contract) become more fragmented as shown in Table V-1.  In 
particular, formal contract relationships become more localized and less centralized when 
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businesses join the network; the diameter46 of the formal contract network increases from six to 
seven when businesses are introduced.     
 
Table V-1) Descriptive statistics of networks when businesses are included 
 Information 
sharing 
network 
Work 
referrals 
network 
Regular 
meeting 
network 
Resource 
sharing 
network 
Formal 
contract 
network 
Joint 
program 
network 
Total actors* 95 55 46 81 39 58 
NPO  42 41 35 36 27 23 
Business  53 14 11 45 12 35 
Ties 618 262 222 198 80 130 
Direction of ties No Yes No No No No 
Component 1 1 1 2 4 1 
* Isolates are excluded.  
 
Compared to the collaboration network composed of nonprofits and businesses (Table V-
1), nonprofits have relatively few collaborative relationships with public agencies, except for 
formal contract relations (Table V-2).  Another distinction with the inclusion of public agencies 
is that the involvement of public agencies causes the joint program network to be more localized 
or fragmented.  For example, the involvement of ten public agencies causes two small 
components to emerge.  Also, the diameter of joint program increases from four to six.  Thus, 
actors in the joint program network rely more on local relationships.  
 
Table V-2) Descriptive statistics of networks when public agencies are included 
 Information 
sharing 
Work 
referrals 
network 
Regular 
meeting 
network 
Resource 
sharing 
network 
Formal 
contract 
network 
Joint 
program 
network network 
Total actors* 60 54 37 38 39 35 
NPO  42 41 35 35 28 25 
Public agency 18 13 2 3 11 10 
Ties 536 268 202 116 88 80 
Direction of ties No Yes No No No No 
Component 1 1 1 1 3 3 
* Isolates are excluded.  
 
In sum, the above simple descriptive statistics suggest that there are effects of the 
business and public sectors’ inclusion in strategic collaboration networks; when other sector 
organizations join the strategic collaboration networks, the strategic collaboration networks 
                                                 
46 Diameter is the length of the largest geodesic distance between any pair of nodes in a connected network 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  
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become more localized.  In addition, the number of nonprofits that make strategic collaboration 
increases when two sectors are introduced in the strategic collaboration networks.  For example, 
when public agencies are introduced, the number of nonprofits that have joint programs increases 
by three (from 23 to 25). 
5.3 NETWORK DESCRIPTIONS BY SOCIOGRAM AND ACTOR CENTRALITY 
In this section, this study presents visual images of various collaboration networks when the 
business and public sector organizations are introduced into the nonprofit collaboration networks.  
In addition, this section describes characteristics of these networks using actor centralities.  
5.3.1 Business and Nonprofit sector 
Networks in this section are composed of organizations from the nonprofit and business sector.  
As shown in Figure V-1, ● represents businesses and ■ represents nonprofits.   
5.3.1.1 Information sharing network 
Figure V-1 represents the information sharing network among nonprofits and businesses.  
There are a total number of 95 organizations of which 53 are businesses.  The absolute number 
of businesses in the information sharing network is larger than that of nonprofits. While most of 
businesses are periphery, most of nonprofits locate inside the network.   
Information flows among nonprofits are quite dense.  However, information flows 
between nonprofits and businesses are sparse.  Most businesses are connected to nonprofits in a 
dyadic way but seven businesses have multiple connections with nonprofits for information 
sharing.  Unlike other businesses, one business (OPCA) has multiple (four) information channels 
to nonprofits (NH, NHCO, SPUMC and SVYMCA) that are central in the network.  This is 
evidence that businesses are becoming embedded in the nonprofit network.  Another distinctive 
feature in this network is that several of nonprofits, such as HI, CCN and NHYMCC, represent 
most of intersectoral relations.  This implies that certain organizations bridge the nonprofit and 
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business sector for information exchanges rather than all organizations bridging between the two 
sectors.    
 
● : Business 
■ : Nonprofit     
          : Ties 
Figure V-1) Information sharing network with business sociogram 
 
Table V-3) Top five actors of various centralities in the information sharing network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 HI NHYMCA HI HI SVYMCA HI 
2 SVYMCA FF SVYMCA NHYMCC NHCO CCN 
3 NHCO SVD NHCO CCN NH NHYMCC 
4 NHYMCC THF NH NHCO HI NH 
5 NH UWAC NHYMCC SVYMCA NHYMCC HEAETH 
 
With the inclusion of businesses, several changes in centrality measures occur in the 
information sharing network as compared to the previous chapter.  HI, which ranked in fifth in 
the network of nonprofits, becomes the first in centrality measures (especially in betweenness 
and flow centrality).  This is because HI has extraordinarily connections with businesses.  CCN 
becomes central in betweenness and flow centrality.  This is also because CCN has many 
relationships with businesses.  NHYMCC, another nonprofit which has many connections with 
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businesses, raises its ranks in the betweenness and flow centrality.  This implies that those 
nonprofits that have many connections with businesses play an information intermediary role 
between the business and nonprofit sector.  However, there is a difference in the structural 
property between CCN and the other two nonprofits (HI and NHYMCC).  While HI and 
NHYMCC are globally dominant actors in the information network because they are central in 
almost all types of centrality measures, CCN is only central in the betweenness centrality.  This 
implies that CCN is a strategically significant actor exclusively in the broker role.   
5.3.1.2 Work referral network 
 
● : Business 
■ : Nonprofit     
          : Ties 
Figure V-2) Work referral network with business sociogram 
 
Figure V-2 illustrates the work referral network when businesses participate.  All 
businesses are positioned at the edge of the network, in a dyadic connection with nonprofits 
(except one business, MB).  Most of businesses receive work referrals (79%) but only a few send 
referrals, which indicates that businesses play a service delivery role rather than a sending role.  
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While work referral relationships among nonprofits are reciprocal, most work referral 
relationships between nonprofits and businesses are not.   
 
Table V-4) Top five actors of various centralities in the work referral network47
Rank In-Degree 
centrality 
Out-
degree 
centrality 
Power 
centrality 
In-
closeness 
centrality 
Out-
closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness 
centrality 
Eigen-
vector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NH NHCO CCN ACBA SVYMCA NHCO NHCO NH 
2 NHCO NH LSS LCS NH NH NH NHCO 
3 CCN HI SVD VEC NHCO CCN CCN CCN 
4 NHYMCC CCN NHCO NHCO CCN MCG NHYMCC AARP 
5 AVAC NHYMCC HFI DLC NHYMCC NHYMCC HI MCG 
 
When businesses are introduced into the work referral network, small changes occur in 
the nonprofit work referral network.  First, CCN, with two more out-degrees directing to 
businesses, becomes central in the out-degree centrality.  CCN was a sender in the nonprofit 
work referral network, but it becomes a mediator as businesses are added.  Second, one nonprofit 
(MCG), which was not a central actor in the nonprofit work referral network, now plays a broker 
role between businesses and nonprofits.  Its broker role is possible through new work referral 
relations from two businesses.   
5.3.1.3 Regular meeting network 
Figure V-3 shows the regular meeting network when businesses are introduced.  A 
relatively small number of businesses have regular meetings with nonprofits, and their 
relationships are mostly one to one tie (except one business, MB).  Features of the regular 
meeting network among nonprofits remain the same.  For example, the North Hills Nonprofit 
Consortium is still central and dense (spider-web region of center- right in Figure V-3). 
                                                 
47 Here, the closeness centrality does not provide the correct measurement because the work referrals network is 
technically unconnected – some of actors have only in-degree or out-degree.  Thus, as an alternative measure for 
closeness, eigenvector (i.e., Bonacich influence centrality) measures the closeness centrality more appropriately. 
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 ● : Business 
■ : Nonprofit     
          : Ties 
Figure V-3) Regular meeting network with business sociogram 
 
Table V-5) Top five actors of various centralities in the regular meeting network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NHCO NCM NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO 
2 NH HEAETH NHYMCC NCM NHYMCC NCM 
3 NHYMCC HI NH NH NH NH 
4 NCM SMC NCM NHYMCC NCM HEARTH 
5 FF HFI SSVD HEARTH SSVD ELC 
 
Despite the introduction of businesses, the top five actors are almost identical to the 
regular meeting of nonprofits (refer to 4.3.4 section of the previous chapter).  However, there is a 
small change; one nonprofit (HEARTH) becomes more important in the betweenness centrality 
because it acquires two new connections from businesses.  Thus, it can be said that HEARTH 
becomes a strategically significant actor (as a broker between nonprofits and businesses) when 
business sector organizations join the network. 
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5.3.1.4 Resource sharing network 
Figure V-4 illustrates the resource sharing network with the inclusion of businesses.  For 
resource sharing, more than half of business connections are concentrated on two nonprofits (HI 
and NHCO).  It causes the network structure to change from a three-subgroup structure to a two-
hub structure which is similar to the joint program network.  Also, HI becomes conspicuous by 
being the number one in all centrality measures (Table V-6).  On the other hand, with the 
introduction of businesses, the resource sharing network becomes more localized as two small 
components emerge and most of resource sharing relationships between businesses and 
nonprofits are dyadic.   
 
● : Business 
■ : Nonprofit     
          : Ties 
Figure V-4) Resource sharing network with business sociogram 
 
The top ranking actors in centrality measures in the resource sharing do not change from 
the within sector network even though many businesses are introduced (Table V-6).  This is 
because most of businesses are attached to HI and NHCO, which were already central.  The four 
nonprofits that were identified as the center of three subgroups remain the most central in most 
of the centrality measures.  SMF is still efficient in dealing with resource sharing relations.   
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Table V-6) Top five actors of various centralities in the resource sharing network 
Rank Degree 
centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 HI HI HI HI HI HI 
2 NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO 
3 NH NHYMCC NH NH NH NH 
4 NHYMCC NH SMF NHYMCC SMF NHYMCC 
5 ELC,SPUMC ELC SPUMC HFI SPUMC ELC 
5.3.1.5 Formal contract network 
The involvement of businesses makes the formal contract network more localized 
because 1) one more small component emerges, 2) formal contract relationships with businesses 
(in main component) only attach to three nonprofits in a peripheral way and 3) thus the diameter 
of the network gets longer (from six to seven) (Figure V-5).  However, the addition of businesses 
does not bring dramatic change to formal contract network structure compared to the previous 
chapter because the three-subgroup structure remains.     
 
● : Business 
■ : Nonprofit     
          : Ties 
Figure V-5) Formal contract network with business sociogram 
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Table V-7) Top five actors of various centralities in the formal contract network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NHCO NHCO FF NHCO NHCO NHCO 
2 UWAC HEARTH NHCO FF MFC FF 
3 NH UWAC HFI HFI FF HFI 
4 HEARTH NH CA UWAC NH UWAC 
5 FF HFI NH NH BLFP NH 
 
Overall rankings in the six types of centrality remain the same as the formal contract 
network in the previous chapter.  However, there are a few changes.  NHCO becomes more 
dominant in terms of its centralities because it has four more formal contract relationships with 
businesses.  Likewise, HEARTH becomes very powerful because it has three new contracts 
relationships with businesses.  As in the formal contract network in the previous chapter, CA is 
still the most efficient organization in dealing with formal contracts in the network.  At the same 
time, FF becomes more efficient in the formal contract network.  FF also plays the same role – 
the origin of formal contracts – as in the nonprofit formal contract network.  
5.3.1.6 Joint program network 
Figure V-6 illustrates the joint program network when businesses join the network.  The 
number of business (35) is larger than that of nonprofit (23), which means that businesses are 
interested in social service provisions through joint program with nonprofits.  However, 
comparing to the nonprofit joint program, inclusion of businesses makes the two-hub network 
structure more apparent.  All businesses (except one) connect to two central nonprofits – HI and 
NHCO – in the joint program network.   
Of interest is that one nonprofit (NHYMCA), which was in isolation in the nonprofit joint 
program network, joins the network through a business (APH).  As a broker, APH is embedded 
in the joint program network.  In Table V-8, this fact is confirmed as well – APH ranks fifth in 
betweenness centrality.  Coupled with a similar finding in the information sharing network, this 
provides a hint that businesses are embedded in the social service networks, although not 
extensively.  
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 ● : Business 
■ : Nonprofit     
          : Ties 
Figure V-6) Joint program network with business sociogram 
 
Table V-8) Top five actors of various centralities in the joint program network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 HI HI HI HI HI HI 
2 NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO 
3 SPUMC SPUMC SPUMC SPUMC SPUMC SPUMC 
4 FF FF SMF AARP SMF BLFP 
5 HFI BLFP CLA BLFP, APH CLA AARP 
 
Table V-8 shows that the inclusion of businesses renders the two-hub structure of the 
joint program network more evidently (HI and NHCO are number one and two).  As explained in 
the joint program network in the previous chapter, two nonprofits (SMF and CLA) are expected 
to be efficient when it comes to dealing with joint program relations. 
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5.3.2 Public and Nonprofit sector 
This section presents visual illustrations of collaboration networks which are composed of the 
nonprofit and the public sector.  As shown in Figure V-13, ● represents a public agency and ■ 
represents a nonprofit.   
5.3.2.1 Information sharing network 
Figure V-7 visualizes the information network when public agencies are included.  Most 
public agencies are located in peripheral regions of the network except ACDHS.   
 
● : Public agency 
■ : Nonprofit           
          : Ties 
Figure V-7) Information sharing network with public sector sociogram 
 
There are several features in this network.  First, like the information sharing network 
with business, most of information exchanges with public agencies channel through a small 
number of nonprofits, such as AARP, SSVD and MCG.  These nonprofits play a broker or gate 
role between the rest of nonprofits and public agencies.  These three nonprofits do not overlap as 
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broker or gate nonprofits in the information network with businesses (i.e., CCN, HI, and 
NHYMCA in the section 5.3.1.1. in this chapter); Nonprofits that play a gate role with the 
business sector do not exchange information with the public sector organizations and vice versa.  
Second, ACDHS is embedded in the network because it shares information with multiple 
nonprofits (five) and through these multiple relations, it sends, receives, and intermediates 
information.  However, the overall structure of the network is similar to the information network 
composed of the nonprofit and business sector. 
 
Table V-9) Top five actors of various centralities in the information sharing network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 SVYMCA HI SVYMCA SVYMCA SVYMCA MCG 
2 NHCO CCN NHCO NHCO NHCO AARP 
3 NH TKF NH MCG NH SSVD 
4 NHYMCC NHYMCA NHYMCC AARP NHYMCC NHYMCC 
5 HI AVAC HI SSVD HI NHCO 
 
Compared to Table IV-1 in Chapter 4, the top ranking nonprofits in centrality measures 
(Table V-9) do not change significantly.  However, when comparing to the three information 
networks (i.e., the nonprofit, nonprofit plus business and nonprofit plus public agency networks), 
(locally) powerful actors (i.e., power centrality) are different.  This implies that local power in 
the information sharing network is very sensitive to inclusions of other sector organizations.  
5.3.2.2 Work referral network 
Figure V-8 illustrates flows of work referral among nonprofits and public agencies.  Most 
public agencies, except for two (ACDHS and CL), are positioned at the periphery of the network 
and their relationships are dyadic.  The Addition of public agencies brings changes in work 
referral flows.  All public agencies in the work referral network send work referrals, and less 
than half of them (46%) have reciprocal relationships with nonprofits.  In other words, public 
agencies play a sender role in work referrals.  Compared to the work referral network with 
businesses, we can see a clear difference between the two work referral networks; business 
mostly plays a receiver role and public agencies mostly play a sender role. 
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 ● : Public agency 
■ : Nonprofit           
          : Ties 
Figure V-8) Work referral network with public sector sociogram 
 
Unlike other public agencies, two public agencies (ACDHS and CL) become embedded 
in the work referral network.  ACDHS has connections with five nonprofits, of which four 
nonprofits (NH, NHYMCC, AVAC, and SSVD) are within the top five in centrality measures.  
CL has three relations with nonprofits, of which two nonprofits are in the top five (NH and 
NHCO).  This implies that these two public agencies are influential over the whole network 
because they are efficient in reaching the rest of nonprofits through a few relationships with the 
most central actors that position high in the eigenvector centrality. 
As shown in Table V-10, the top rank organizations are almost the same as the nonprofit 
work referral network.  The top five organizations in the in-degree centrality are the same 
regardless of involvement of other sectors.  Two dominant nonprofits (NH and NHCO) keep the 
number one and two positions, respectively, in most of the centralities regardless of inclusions of 
other sector organizations.  These two actors are expected to play a service coordinating role 
 96
because they have a good knowledge about various types of social programs48, and are located in 
central positions of degree, betweenness, and eigenvector centrality.  This coordination of work 
referral flows is expected to help nonprofits provide social services in a timely manner.  
  
Table V-10) Top five actors of various centralities in the work referral network49
Rank In-Degree 
centrality 
Out-
degree 
centrality 
Power 
centrality 
In-
closeness 
centrality 
Out-
closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness 
centrality 
Eigen-
vector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NH NHCO SSVD ACBA SVYMCA NHCO NHCO NH 
2 NHCO NH CCN NHCO NH NH NH NHCO 
3 CCN HI NHYMCC NH NHCO SSVD CCN AARP 
4 NHYMCC NHYMCC NHFB HI BOM CCN NHYMCC SSVD 
5 AVAC AVAC LSS MCG CCN NHYMCC HI MCG 
 
Another feature is that one nonprofit (SSVD), which was outside the top ranks of 
centrality, now has high ranks in power, betweenness and flow centralities. Three public 
agencies connect to SSVD for work referrals (Figure V-8).  With relatively many relations with 
public agencies, SSVD becomes not only locally powerful but also a strategically significant 
actor in terms of its broker position between public agencies and other nonprofits.   
5.3.2.3 Regular meeting network 
Figure V-9 shows the regular meeting network among nonprofits and businesses.  In this 
network, the inclusion of the public sector does not change the network structure because only 
two public agencies are attached in the marginal region of the network.   
 
                                                 
48 These two nonprofits also provide seven different types of social services in collaboration with other 
organizations.  Compared to the mean number of programs that all nonprofits provide in collaboration with other 
organizations (2.8), these two nonprofits have significantly more collaborative relations. 
49 Here, closeness centrality does not provide the correct measurement because the work referrals network is 
technically unconnected – some of actors have only in-degree or out-degree.  Thus, as an alternative measure for 
closeness, eigenvector (i.e., Bonacich influence centrality) measures the closeness centrality more appropriately.  
 97
 ● : Public agency 
■ : Nonprofit           
          : Ties 
Figure V-9) Regular meeting network with public sector sociogram 
 
Table V-11) Top five actors of various centralities in the regular meeting network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NHCO NCM NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO 
2 NHYMCC AVAC NHYMCC NHYMCC NHYMCC NCM 
3 NH MN NCM NCM NH NHYMCC 
4 NCM PT NH FF NCM FF 
5 FF NH FF NH SSVD NH 
 
Except for power centrality, other centrality measures are the same as in the nonprofit 
regular meeting network (Table V-11).  AVAC was not powerful in the nonprofit network but 
becomes the second most powerful due to its relationship with ACDHS.  As in the previous 
chapter, the North Hills Nonprofit Consortium members are dominant in this network, and there 
is no strategically significant actor.   
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5.3.2.4 Resource sharing network 
Because only three public agencies are added to the resource sharing network, the basic 
structure – the three-subgroup structure – remains the same (Figure V-10).   
 
● : Public agency 
■ : Nonprofit           
          : Ties 
Figure V-10) Resource sharing network with public sector sociogram 
 
Compared to the resource sharing network with businesses, the small number of public 
agency implies that nonprofits feel more comfortable sharing physical resources with businesses 
than with public agencies.  One nonprofit (SSVD), which were an isolate in the nonprofit 
resource sharing network, becomes linked to the network through a public agency (ACDHS).  
This implies that the public sector becomes embedded in the resource sharing network.  
The top ranking actors in the resource sharing network (Table V-12) remain the same as 
those in the nonprofit resource sharing network.  Four nonprofits (NHCO, HI, NHYMCC, and 
NH), which were at the center of three respective subgroups, are again dominant in most of the 
centrality measures. 
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Table V-12) Top five actors of various centralities in the resource sharing network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO NHCO 
2 HI HI NH HI HI HI 
3 NH NH HI NH NH NH 
4 NHYMCC NCM SMF NHYMCC SPUMC BLFP 
5 SPUMC SMC NHYMCC HFI SMF NHYMCC 
 
SMF and SPUMC still occupy a strategically significant position because they are 
efficient in dealing with resource sharing relations.  HFI is also still strategically significant in 
terms of its intermediary role between two subgroups.  However, there are slight changes in actor 
centrality with the inclusion of public agencies.  First, one nonprofit (SMC) has a new tie with a 
public agency that raises its local power.  Second, one nonprofit (BLFP) is higher in flow 
centrality when it connects to a public agency.  Thus, BLFP turns out to be strategically 
significant in terms of its broker role between a public agency and other nonprofits.   
5.3.2.5 Formal contract network 
As shown in Figure V-11, many public agencies have formal contracts with nonprofits.  
Most public agencies locate at the edge of the network, but two public agencies locate at the 
center of the network.  In particular, when public agencies are introduced, the formal contract 
network is structurally different from the network structure of the other two formal contract 
networks50, which were the apparent three-subgroup structure where FF was the only connection 
between the three subgroups.  The biggest structural change comes from inclusion of one public 
agency (ACDHS), as it connects to the three important actors in three subgroups (HFI, NHCO, 
and SSVD).  Specifically, two nonprofits (ACBA and YWCA), which were isolated components 
in the nonprofit formal contract network (Figure IV-5), join the main component through two 
public agencies (ACDHS and ACG).  AVAC links to the network through ACDHS and has 
formal contract with another public agency, ACDED.  Another structural change is a new, small 
component; One nonprofit (MCG) is the center of this new component and has three formal 
contracts with public agencies. 
 
                                                 
50 Refer to chapter 4 section 4.3.6 and this chapter section 5.3.1.5. 
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 ● : Nonprofit 
■ : Public agency     
          : Ties 
Figure V-11) Formal contract network with public sector sociogram 
 
ACDHS and FF are the most efficient and the most central in terms of their betweenness 
centrality (Table V-13).  These two organizations occupy both types of strategically significant 
position simultaneously.   
 
Table V-13) Top five actors of various centralities in the formal contract network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 NHCO NHCO ACDHS ACDHS NHCO NHCO 
2 SSVD SSVD FF NHCO FF HFI 
3 ACDHS UWAC NHCO HFI ACDHS SSVD 
4 HFI HFI HFI SSVD SSVD UWAC 
5 UWAC MCG SSVD FF MFC ACDHS 
 
ACDHS is strategically significant in terms of its betweenness (it is not central in the 
power centrality but central in the betweenness centrality) and its high reachability (efficiency to 
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reach others).  FF is also strategically significant in terms of its reachability and a broker role 
because it is relatively high in the betweenness centrality but is not powerful51.   
5.3.2.6 Joint program network 
The basic structure of the joint program – the two-subgroup structure – remains the same 
as the joint program network in Chapter 4 (Figure V-12).  However, the joint program network 
becomes more localized and sparser with the inclusion of public agencies because 1) two small 
components emerge and most of public agencies attach to the edge of the network with a dyadic 
relation to nonprofits, and 2) the number of ties per actor is smallest among the three joint 
program networks.  For example, the number of ties per actor is 3.1 and 2.2 when businesses and 
public agencies join the joint program network, respectively. 
 
● : Public agency 
■ : Nonprofit           
          : Ties 
Figure V-12) Joint program network with public sector sociogram 
 
                                                 
51 Detailed interpretation of these two strategically significant actors is the same as the formal contract network in 
the chapter 4. 
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Public agencies allow more nonprofits to participate in joint programs, as businesses did.  
The diameter of the network grows by one public agency (SVB) because one nonprofit 
(SVYMCA), which was in isolation in the nonprofit joint program network, links to the main 
component through SVB.  This is an indication of embeddedness of public agencies in the joint 
program network.   
 
Table V-14) Top five actors of various centralities in the joint program network 
Rank Degree centrality 
Power 
centrality 
Closeness 
centrality 
Between-
ness  
Eigenvector 
centrality 
Flow 
centrality 
1 HI, NHCO HI NHCO HI NHCO HI 
2  NHCO HI NHCO HI NHCO 
3 AARP AARP SPUMC AARP SPUMC AARP 
4 SPUMC FF SMF CLA FF CLA 
5 CLA CLA AARP SPUMC AARP SPUMC 
 
Just like the other two joint program networks discussed before, two nonprofits (HI and 
NHCO) are dominant in this network.  SMF is still strategically significant in terms of its high 
reachability (with low costs to maintain relations) in respect to other organizations in the network.  
In the main component, most of joint program relationships with public agencies exclusively 
concentrate on three nonprofits (NHCO, AARP, and CLA).  Therefore, these nonprofits are 
bridges between the nonprofit and public sector in the joint program relationships.  In particular, 
two nonprofits (AARP and CLA) are strategically significant as gate player.   
5.4 NETWORK CENTRALIZATION ANALYSIS 
In order to observe the collaboration network at the group level, this section analyzes network 
centralization.  As in the previous chapter, the NCI of three centralities are presented according 
to the intensity of collaborative relationships when the business and public sector join the 
collaboration networks.  First, as the collaborative relationships intensify, the network structure 
becomes less hierarchical or decentralized (except for the joint program) because degree and 
closeness centrality NCIs show declining patterns (Figure V-13 and 14).   
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Figure V-13) NCI by collaboration relationships in degree centrality 
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Figure V-14) NCI by collaboration relationships in closeness centrality 
 
Second, the inclusion of the two sectors causes structural changes to networks in terms of 
decreasing NCIs of degree and closeness centrality in the information and tactical collaboration 
networks (Figure V-13 and 14); the business and/or public sector make networks less 
hierarchical – more structurally equal among network actors in the less intensive collaboration 
networks.  This is because businesses or public agencies make connections with relatively less 
popular or less influential nonprofits when they choose their partners for information sharing or 
work referrals.  
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However, patterns are different in the strategic collaboration.  With the inclusion of 
public agencies, the network structures become decentralized because NCIs of the public sector 
decline, except for the formal contract closeness centrality NCI52 (Figure V-13 and 14).  On the 
contrary, the inclusion of businesses renders the structure more centralized because the NCIs 
increase.  This study develops this fact into a hypothesis; businesses are likely to make strategic 
collaboration with popular (i.e., high degree centrality) nonprofits while public agencies tend to 
make strategic collaboration relations with relatively less popular nonprofits.  In particular, the 
joint program network becomes more hierarchical with the inclusion of businesses53; businesses 
exclusively prefer popular nonprofits as their joint program partners.   
Third, Figure V-15 illustrates the NCI of the betweenness centrality.  There are clearly 
different patterns between the NCI of the degree and the NCI of the closeness centrality.  
Networks become more hierarchical as the collaboration relationships become more intensive, 
except for formal contract relationships.   
There are three interesting findings in Figure V-15.  First, when nonprofits share 
information with businesses, the information flows becomes more hierarchical or centralized in 
terms of the betweenness centrality (i.e., NCI of betweenness centrality in information sharing is 
remarkably high when businesses are involved).  About half the information in the network goes 
through a small number of gate or bridge role nonprofits that are located between the nonprofit 
and business sector.  This confirms the findings described in the section 5.3.1.1 which state that a 
small number of nonprofits play a gate (or broker) role between nonprofits and businesses in 
information exchanges.  Second, in the formal contract network, when public agencies are 
introduced into the network, NCI decreases 10% compared to the other two formal contract 
networks.  This is because of ACDHS, which has the strongest betweenness centrality54.  Third, 
two sectors (i.e., the business and public sector) show different patterns of making relationships 
in the joint program network.  While most businesses attach to two hub nonprofits, most public 
agencies do not make joint program relations with these hubs, rather working with the other 
nonprofits.   
 
                                                 
52 The high closeness centralilty NCI in the formal contract network is due to the fact that one public agency 
(ACDHS) occupies the number one position in the closeness centrality.   
53 When businesses are introduced, the degree centrality NCI increases almost by 20% (from 49% to 68%).  
54 In the other two formal contract networks, only one organization (FF) plays a dominant broker role.  But when 
ACDHS becomes another dominant broker in the network, the NCI of betweenness centrality decreases.  
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Figure V-15) NCI by collaboration relationships in betweenness centrality 
 
In sum, there are two main findings in this section; 1) the collaboration network localizes 
as the intensity of collaboration becomes stronger: NCI of degree and closeness centrality 
decrease along with collaboration intensity.  However, the role of the broker becomes more 
important as the networks are localized because cohesive subgroups do not have a direct 
connection to each other and therefore should depend on a broker to send or receive the strategic 
collaborations to and from other subgroups, and 2) the inclusion of other sector organizations 
brings structural changes to the collaboration networks.  Among others, it is worthwhile to 
mention changes in the information or tactical collaboration network and joint program network.  
In the information or tactical collaboration network, the collaboration networks become more 
horizontal or localized when two other sector organizations are introduced in.  In the joint 
program network, when businesses join the network, the network become more centralized in 
two hub nonprofits, but when pubic agencies are introduced, the network becomes more 
structurally equal or localized.   
5.5 SUMMARY 
The descriptive analyses in this chapter have demonstrated the general pictures of the 
collaboration networks when other sectors are introduced; the inclusion of other sector 
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organizations makes the collaboration networks less centralized or more localized in structure in 
most networks and more centralized in two networks (information and joint program networks 
with the inclusion of businesses).  For example, in the information sharing network, we 
witnessed the emergence of information intermediaries between two sectors.  In the work referral 
network, the inclusion of other sectors brings clear distinction in the three roles in referral flows 
– a sender, receiver, and broker.  The public sector and business sector have unique roles – a 
sender and receiver, respectively.   
At the individual actor level, there are hints of blurring boundaries: two cases of 
businesses’ embeddedness in the social service collaboration network and five cases of public 
agencies’ embeddedness in the collaboration networks.  Most notably, except in the joint 
program network, ACDHS plays an important role in blurring boundaries between the nonprofit 
and public sector.  Since these descriptive analyses do not reveal the systemic differences caused 
by other sector inclusion into the collaboration networks, a more sophisticated analysis is 
required to explore this in detail.  In the next chapter, the effects of other sector involvement on 
blurring boundaries will be analyzed in a systemic way, using a more sophisticated analytic 
technique, blockmodel.   
Finally, from the network centralization analysis, this study reveals how businesses or 
public agencies behave when they select collaboration partners.  Businesses prefer popular 
nonprofits more when they make strategic collaborative relationships with nonprofits, but public 
agencies do not.  However, public agencies prefer influential nonprofits in formal contracts.  
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VI. COLLABORATION PATTERNS IN BLURRING BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 
THE SECTORS: ON THE BASIS OF BY BLOCKMODELS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to describe and uncover hidden collaboration patterns from a macro 
perspective by reducing the complex networks in the previous chapters into simple blockmodels.  
Blockmodeling provides two pieces of empirical evidence for blurring boundaries between the 
nonprofit and business/public sector; 1) when either business or public organizations are 
introduced in the collaboration networks, new network structures replace the network structures 
which were composed exclusively of nonprofits.  However, structural changes resulting from the 
involvement of the business sector are different (but not always) from structural changes 
resulting from the public sector.  For instance, in formal contract network, when public agencies 
are involved, the centralized hierarchy structure replaces the cohesive subgroup structure.  
However, the cohesive subgroup structure remains the same when businesses are introduced.  2) 
Some nonprofits show similar patterns of collaboration relationships with businesses and with 
public agencies.   
Organizational attributes analysis of the strategically significant blocks in the nonprofit 
network uncovers three significant findings; 1) nonprofits with roughly a $1M budget size play a 
central and broker (but not always) role in all six types of networks.  2) The well-established (i.e., 
old and large) nonprofits prefer more formal types of strategic collaboration (i.e., formal contract 
or joint program) as compared to less formal collaboration (physical resource sharing).  3) 
Finally, strategically significant roles are uncovered according to types of collaboration networks.  
Details are fully explained in the following sections.   
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6.2 EVIDENCE FOR BLURRING BOUNDARIES 
This study establishes a principle that will judge whether analysis results explain the seamless 
economy.  The involvement of organizations from the business and public sectors in the 
nonprofit collaboration networks may cause network structures to change or to remain the same.  
This study focuses on changes in network structure because new structural patterns resulting 
from the synthesis of different collaboration patterns55 are expected to emerge in the region of 
blurring boundaries   
There are fundamentally different features between three sectors which cannot be the 
same across the sectors.  First, the sources of revenues are different.  Second, their respective 
bottom lines for operating organizations are different.  Nonprofits manage organizations on the 
basis of the non-distribution voluntary principle.  Businesses manage organizations on the basis 
of the redistribution principle and governments on the basis of break-even.  This study assumes 
that these fundamental differences cause distinctive patterns of collaboration when each sector 
organizations collaborate between within-sector organizations, respectively.  However, when it 
comes to the cross-sector collaboration with a shared goal, new collaboration patterns of the 
cross-sector collaboration replace patterns of within sector collaboration.  Eventually integration 
between sectors happens in the blurring regions.  The integration represents new network 
structures which are not the same as collaboration patterns of either sector.  For this reason, the 
boundaries between the sectors do not exist anymore.  If there is no or negligible change of 
network structure, this indicates that the inclusion of other sectors is a simple attachment to the 
existing structure, and it is not probable that there is integration between the sectors.  In this case, 
it is difficult to support the claim of blurring boundaries between the sectors.   
                                                 
55 This study assumes that collaboratin patterns of the nonprofit sector are different from the collaboration patterns 
of the other two sectors.   
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6.3  BLOCKMODELS OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR COLLABORATION 
NETWORKS  
6.3.1 Information sharing network blockmodel 
The best blockmodel of the information sharing network (42 nonprofits) is composed of five 
blocks (For detailed results of blockmodeling, see Appendix 9-1 blocked adjacency matrix).  
Two blocks consists of medium to small number of actors (block 1 and 5), and three other blocks 
consist of medium to large number of actors (Block 2, 3 and 4) (Table VI-1).  
 
Table VI-1) Block members of information sharing network 
Block   Member 
    1:     NH NHCO NHYMC SVYMC (4) 
    2:     BLFP GVP NWCCP ODM PNC PT SMC SMF SOFP (9) 
    3:     AARP ACBA CA NAMSC NHFB NSAS SSVD SVD THF UWAC YWCA (11) 
    4:     AVAC CCN CLA FF HEAET HFI HI LLM MCG NCM NHYMC SPUMC (12) 
    5:     BC ELC LSS MFC MN TKF (6) 
* Hereafter parenthesis in the block members table is the number of actor in the block 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-2) Typology for structural positions for information sharing relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.073 0.092 117.97 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.195 0.046 4.67 Broker Periphery 
Block 3 0.244 0.289 12.53 Primary Intermediate 
Block 4 0.268 0.476 24.24 Primary Central-intermediate 
Block 5 0.122 0 11.33 Broker (Transmitter) Intermediate 
* The median of P(Bk) is 12.53. And mean is 34.15.  
 
In the information sharing network, block 1 occupies the most important position in terms 
of two typologies.  Block 1 occupies both a primary56 and central position.  This indicates that it 
is an information coordinator role in the whole network.  Block 3, 4 and 5 are located in 
intermediate positions.  The intermediate position means that the contributions of these three 
blocks are significant in terms of their relationships with other blocks, but they do not place on 
                                                 
56 Usually, when a block is a cohesive subgroup (i.e., there is a within block tie), this block is identified as 
occupying  a primary position.  In other words, even though a block is not located at the center of a network, this 
block could be in a primary position.  In this case, the block is primary only in terms of within block relations.   
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the center of the network.  In particular, block 5 plays an information transmitter role between 
block 1 and 4.  Block 2 locates in the periphery of the network.  These interrelations between 
blocks are visually shown in Figure VI -1. 
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
Table VI-3) Permuted image matrix of information sharing network 
        1     4     3     5     2 
      ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
   1  1(SE) 1(SE) 1(SE) 1(RE) 1(SE) 
   4  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
   3  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0 
   5  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0 
   2  1(SE) 0     0     0     0 
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The image matrix in Table VI-3 represents a central-periphery system.  Other feature is 
that three blocks (block 1, 3, and 4) are cohesive subgroups.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 : block  
                     : Structural equivalent relation                                  : Regular equivalent relation  
                   : Reflexive structural equivalent relation                    : Reflexive regular equivalent relation 
 
 
Figure VI-1) Reduced sociogram of information sharing network 
 
The structure of the information sharing network is that of a cohesive network because 1) 
three blocks are internally cohesive and 2) four blocks are connected with structural equivalent 
relationships; as seen in Figure VI-1, block 1 has structural equivalent relationships with block 2, 
3 and 4.  Since there is information redundancy in the structural equivalent relationships, most 
information flows in this network are redundant.  Because of information redundancy, the 
   ● 1: One block 
     - (SE): Structural Equivalent block (Within block density >0.75) 
     - (RE): Regular Equivalent block (Within block density > overall network density plus at least 
row/column functional block) 
● 0: Zero block
 111
information sharing network is not efficient.  However, once new information enters into the 
network, the diffusion of new information is expected to be fast because the information network 
is very cohesive.  
A sender, broker, and receiver of information are identified from power centrality 
(Appendix 9-2).  Block 1 is a broker because it is dependent on block 3 (i.e., receives 
information from block 3), but block 4 and 5 are dependent on block 1 (i.e., block 1 sends 
information to block 4 and 5).  The power centrality of block 1 is almost equal to that of block 2, 
which means that the two blocks are reciprocal in information exchanges.  Block 3 is a sender.  
Block 4 and 5 are receivers for three reasons; they are dependent on block 1 and 3 for 
information, block 3 mostly sends information to block 1 and 4, and block 1 and 4 are dependent 
on block 3 for information.   
6.3.2 Work referral network blockmodel 
The best blockmodel of the work referral network (41 nonprofits) is composed of five blocks 
(Table VI-4).  Two blocks consists of a medium to small number of actors (1 and 4), and three 
other blocks consist of medium to large number of actors (2, 3 and 5).  
 
Table VI-4) Block members of work referral network 
Block    Members  
    1:      ACBA BC HFI MN TKF (5) 
    2:      AVAC CCN MCG NH NHCO NHYMCC SPUMC SVD SVYMCA (9) 
    3:      HEARTH HI LLM NCM NHFB NSAS SMC SSVD UWAC (9) 
    4:      ELC GVP NHYMCA NWCCP PT SMF (6) 
    5:      AARP BLFP CA CLA LSS MFC NAMSC ODM PNC SOFP THF YWCA (12) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-5) Typology for structural positions for work referral relations 
 (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within choice/ 
Between choice 
Choice received/ 
Choice sent 
In-degree 
P(Bk) 
Out-degree 
P(Bk) 
Block 1 0.1 0.167 2.167 2.40 0 
Block 2 0.2 0.244 0.794 24.00 44.00 
Block 3 0.2 0.267 1.289 10.22 3.67 
Block 4 0.125 0.077 0.769 3.00 8.00 
Block 5 0.275 0.065 1.419 3.50 2.42 
* In-degree P(BBk): Median is 3.5 and mean is 8.62.  ** Out-degree P(BkB ): Median is 3.67 and mean is 11.62. 
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Position 
 Typology I Typology II Typology III (in) Typology III (out) 
Block 1 Primary Receiver Periphery Isolate 
Block 2 Primary Carrier (Sender) Central Central 
Block 3 Primary Carrier (Receiver) Central Intermediate 
Block 4 Broker Carrier (Sender) Intermediate Central -intermediate 
Block 5 Broker Carrier (Receiver) Intermediate Periphery 
 
Table VI-5 illustrates which blocks occupy what kinds of positions.  First, block 2 and 3 
are a primary and central block.  They receive and send referrals within and across blocks.  
However, they are slightly different in terms of their role.  While block 2 sends more referrals 
(0.8 in ratio of received and sent), block 2 receives more referrals than it sends (1.3).  Block 1 is 
an isolate in terms of out-degree and plays a receiver role.  Block 4 is a broker and sends more 
than receives.  Block 5 is a receiver and is located in the periphery of the network.   
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodels 
 
Table VI-6) Permutated image matrix of work referral network 
         2     3     4     5     1 
       ----- ----- ----- ----- -----  
    2  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE)  
    3  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0 
    4  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0 
    5  1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
    1  0     0     0     0     0       
 
Permuted image matrix table (Table VI-6) looks similar to a central-periphery system. 
However, this network should be carefully examined in order to find out the hidden patterns of 
network.   
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Figure VI-2) Reduced sociogram of work referral network 
 
As described in Table VI-5, the work referral blockmodel is roughly composed of two 
senders and three receivers of referrals.  Two sender blocks (2 and 4) are likely to be well known 
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or easily accessible nonprofits that many clients in need visit.  Thus, these two blocks are 
expected to play an entrance role in the network.  Block 2 also plays a strategically significant 
role in the network, as a service coordinator; block 2 not only is a carrier of service referrals but 
also is composed of high betweenness centrality nonprofits (See Appendix 9-7).  In addition, as 
shown in the above picture, this block has relationships with all four other blocks.  These 
indicate that most work referrals are concentrated in this block and, in turn, block 2 resends work 
referrals to nonprofits that have programs related to specific needs of clients.  On the other hand, 
block 1, 3, and 5 play a service delivery role because they receive more referrals from block 2 or 
4 than they send.   
In sum, through blockmodeling, a hidden pattern of the work referral flows emerge.  The 
work referral network is composed of three types of nonprofits - a sender, service coordinator, 
and receiver.  On the basis of the direction of work flows, it is appropriate to interpret the work 
referral network as a hierarchical structure rather than a simple central-periphery system.  
6.3.3 Regular meeting blockmodel 
Through blockmodeling, this study identifies five blocks from the regular meeting network 
which is composed of 35 nonprofits.  Two blocks (1 and 2) are relatively large and two blocks (3 
and 5) are medium size.  Block 4 consists of only two nonprofits.   
 
Table VI-7) Block members of regular meeting network 
Block    Members (35): 
    1:      CA CLA ELC GVP LLM MCG NAMSC NWCCP SOFP SPUMC THF UWAC (12) 
    2:      CCN FF NCM NH NHCO NHYMCA NHYMCC NSAS SSVD (9) 
    3:      HFI HI MFC SVD YWCA (5) 
    4:      LSS PT (2) 
    5:      AVAC BLFP HEARTH MN NHFB SMC SMF (7) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
Block 1 is located on the periphery of the network, which confirms the fact that 
nonprofits in this block showed less inclination to collaborate (CRI is 0.98) (See Appendix 9-12).  
As a primary and central position occupant, block 2 coordinates flows of information or relevant 
issues of importance in the network because nonprofits in this block showed high betweenness 
centrality (See Appendix 9-12).   
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Table VI-8) Typology for structural positions for regular meeting relations 
Position 
 
(gk-1)/ 
(g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie 
P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.3235 0 1.75 Broker Periphery 
Block 2 0.2353 0.517 19.33 Primary Central 
Block 3 0.1176 0 10.40 Broker Central 
Block 4 0.0294 0 0 Sycophant Isolate 
Block 5 0.1765 0 8.29 Broker Intermediate-central 
* The median of P(Bk) is 8.29. And mean is 7.95.  
 
Block 3 and 5 occupy a local broker position which is obvious in Figure VI-3.  Finally, 
block 4 is of marginal inclusion in this network because it is isolated from other blocks.   
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodels 
 
Table VI-9) Permuted image matrix of regular meeting network 
                 2     3     5     1     4 
        ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
     2  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0  
     3  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0     0 
     5  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0 
     1  1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
     4  0     0     0     0     0 
   
Image matrix in Table VI-9 shows that structure of this network is a central-periphery 
system with one isolate block (block 4).  Figure VI-3 illustrates the central-periphery system.   
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Figure VI-3) Reduced sociogram of regular meeting network 
 
Block 2 is located at the center of the network and is a very cohesive subgroup (i.e., 
structural equivalence within a block).  Most of nonprofits in this block are members of the 
North Hills Nonprofit Consortium.  This documents that this Consortium coordinates issues or 
problems of North Hills nonprofits.  When problems or issues arise from nonprofits in the 
network, these problems arrive immediately at the Consortium through the direct relations.  
Afterwards, these issues are discussed within block 2 and the results of this discussion are in turn 
 115
diffused to adjacent blocks.  Finally, since block 4 is isolated from this network, nonprofits in 
this block do not enjoy the advantages of this coordinating structure.  
In sum, the structure of the regular meeting network enables nonprofits in this network to 
coordinate and solve their problems in an efficient way.  At the center of the network there is a 
well-established consortium which plays a strategically significant role.   
6.3.4 Resource sharing network blockmodel 
The resource sharing network is reduced through blockmodeling to four blocks.  The size of two 
blocks (2 and 4) is medium to large and that of the other two (1 and 3) is medium to small.    
 
Table VI-10) Block members of resource sharing network 
Block    Members (34) 
    1:      ELC HI LSS NH NHCO NHFB SPUMC (7) 
    2:      ACBA CA CCN FF GVP HEARTH MN NAMSC NWCCP PT THF (11) 
    3:      AVAC CLA NCM SMC TKF UWAC (6) 
    4:      AARP BLFP HFI LLM MFC NHYMCC NSAS SMF SOFP SVD (10) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-11) Typology for structural positions for resource sharing relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.1818 0.4444 8.57 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.3030 0 1.09 Broker Periphery 
Block 3 0.1515 0 1.83 Broker Periphery 
Block 4 0.2727 0.1379 5.00 Broker Central 
* The median of P(Bk) is 3.42. And mean is 4.12.  
 
Block 1 occupies a central position in the network and plays a primary role (i.e. 
coordinating resource flows) in the network.  Block 4 also occupies a central position but this 
block plays a local broker role between block 1 and 3.  Block 2 and 3 are located at the edge of 
the network.   
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodels 
It is difficult to describe the exact type of network structure from the image matrix in 
Table VI-12.  The structural type could be a central-periphery system in terms of three blocks 
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(block 1, 2, and 4), or be a hierarchy system.  Thus, this study calls it as a mixture of central-
periphery and hierarchy system. 
 
Table VI-12) Permuted image matrix of resource sharing network 
        1     4     2     3 
      ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
  4  1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 
  2  1(RE) 0     0     0 
  3  0     1(RE) 0     0 
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Figure VI-4) Reduced sociogram of resource sharing network 
 
Block 1 is not only located in the central position but also is the most powerful in terms 
of resource flows, which means that other blocks are dependent on nonprofits in block 1 for 
physical resource sharing (See Appendix 9-17 for power centrality).  One should be careful in 
interpreting these dependency relations because the power in this block does not mean that 
nonprofits in block 1 have extra physical resources to give57.  Rather, these nonprofits would be 
willing to share their physical resources with other nonprofits because they like collaborating 
with other nonprofits or are less selfish in terms of sharing physical resources.  Thus, this study 
suggests that the power centrality in the physical resource sharing network should be interpreted 
as related to their organizations’ willingness (or unselfishness) to share.   
The power relationships between block 1 and 4 could be interpreted in two ways.  First, 
of course, block 1 and 4 share physical resources each other.  Second, block 4 may have extra 
resources to provide to other nonprofits because this block is the biggest in terms of size ($3.8M).  
Block 4 asks block 1 to find nonprofits that want to share physical resources which it owns.  In 
this relationship, block 1 plays a resource flow coordinator role at the center of the network.  
Block 4 also plays a local broker role between block 1 and 3.  When block 4 does not have 
specific physical resources that block 3 wants, block 4 may send referrals to block 1 for block 1 
having asked about sharing physical resources.   
                                                 
57 Size of the block 1 ranks in the third ($1.2M) among four blocks. 
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In sum, this study uncovers a hidden pattern in the resource sharing network; physical 
resource flows are not dependent on wealthiness of resources but rather on their willingness to 
work together with other nonprofits.   
6.3.5 Formal contract network blockmodel 
The formal contract network, which is composed of 22 nonprofits (the main component), is 
reduced to 3 blocks as seen in Table VI-13.  This reduction enables us to uncover hidden patterns 
of formal contract relations.  The size of three blocks is large, medium, and small for block 3, 2 
and 1 respectively.   
 
Table VI-13) Block members of formal contract network 
Block    Members (22) 
    1:      HFI SVYMCA TKF (3) 
    2:      BLFP CA FF HI LSS MFC NHCO SPUMC (8) 
    3:      AARP HEAETH NH NHYMCA NHYMCC NSAS SMC SMF SSVD SVD UWAC (11) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-14) Typology for structural positions for formal contract relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.095 0.667 0 Primary Isolate 
Block 2 0.333 0.833 0 Primary Isolate 
Block 3 0.476 0.818 0 Primary Isolate 
 
The three blocks are all primary and isolate (P(Bk) of all three blocks are zero).  This 
means that nonprofits in each block primarily interact within the block and that the three blocks 
do not have external relationships between blocks.   
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodels 
 
Table VI-15) Image matrix of formal contract network 
       1     2     3 
     ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(RE) 0     0  
  2  0     1(RE) 0  
  3  0     0     1(RE) 
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The image matrix in Table VI-15 clearly illustrates that the structure of this network is a 
cohesive subgroups system.  The three blocks only have within ties and do not have any external 
relationship with other blocks.   
 
 
21 3 
 
Figure VI-5) Reduced sociogram of formal contract network 
 
Figure VI-5 is a visual presentation of the formal contract blockmodel.  It is simple to 
understand but intuitively interesting.  Formal contract relationships are completely localized and 
this localization is determined by the organizational characteristics; large nonprofits with high 
organizational capability collaborate between themselves; medium sized, younger nonprofits 
work together between themselves; and small-medium size nonprofits that have high interests in 
business methods collaborate between themselves (See Appendix 9-22).  The power centrality 
also confirms the independent relationship among the three blocks.  The respective power 
centralities of the three blocks are relatively high, which means they are independent of other 
blocks.  
6.3.6 Joint program network blockmodel 
Blockmodeling makes the joint program network, which is composed of 22 nonprofits, simpler 
to examine.  The joint program blockmodel is composed of five blocks – one large block (4) and 
four small blocks (1, 2, 3 and 5). 
 
Table VI-16) Block members of joint program network 
Block    Members (22) 
    1:      FF HI NHCO (3) 
    2:      AARP SPUMC (2) 
    3:      BLFP CLA ELC HFI (4) 
    4:      AVAC CCN MFC MN NH NWCCP PT SMF SSVD SVD UWAC (11) 
    5:      NHYMCC YWCA (2) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
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The blockmodel of the joint program network is composed of three types of positions.  
First, block 1 occupies a central position and plays a primary role (coordinating the whole 
network).  Block 2 and 3 are located in an intermediate position.  The remaining blocks, block 4 
and 5, are at the periphery of the network.   
 
Table VI-17) Typology for structural positions for joint program relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.095 0.155 22 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.048 0.250 6 Primary Central-intermediate 
Block 3 0.143 0.444 1.25 Primary Intermediate 
Block 4 0.476 0 1.18 Broker Periphery 
Block 5 0.048 0 1 Broker Periphery 
* The median of P(Bk) is 1.25. And mean is 6.29.  
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodels 
 
Table VI-18) Image matrix of joint program network 
               1     2     3     4     5 
        ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
     1  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
     2  1(RE) 1(SE) 0     0     1(RE) 
     3  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0     0 
     4  1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
     5  0     1(RE) 0     0     0 
 
The structure of the image matrix in Table IV-18 is a variation of the central-periphery 
system, entitled as a central-intermediate-periphery system in this study.  It contains a central 
block (1), two intermediate blocks (2 and 3) and two periphery blocks (4 and 5).  Three blocks 
are cohesive subgroups (1, 2, and 3).  The below Figure VI-6 visually illustrates the network 
structure.  
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Figure VI-6) Reduced sociogram of joint program network 
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In Figure VI-6, two hub nonprofits in the joint program network (i.e., NHCO and HI) are 
included in the central block 1.  Block 4 is directly connected to the central block in a peripheral 
way; as seen in the chapter 4 (refer to Figure IV-6), half of the actors in the network (11) are 
included in block 4 and are attached to the central actors in a peripheral way.  Since the 
nonprofits in block 4 are small in size (See the Appendix 9-26), they want joint program with the 
distinguished (or central) actors in the network.  On the other hand, the other periphery block (5) 
consists of large size nonprofits.  Unlike nonprofits in block 4, they seem not to care about 
having direct relationships of joint program with the central nonprofits that already have many 
joint programs with small nonprofits (i.e., block 4).  However, they are indirectly connected to 
the central block.  As an intermediate position occupant, block 2 plays a broker role between the 
central and peripheral blocks.  Two intermediate blocks (2 and 3) are composed of small number 
of nonprofits but are cohesive within their own blocks.  For this reason, when compared with a 
periphery block 4, block 2 and 3 are more independent from the central block than block 4.   
6.3.7 Organizational characteristics of the central block in the networks 
The individual analysis of validation of the blockmodel using organizational attributes does not 
provide theoretically significant results, though those analyses will be valuable information to 
practitioners.  Thus, this study provides a summary of the analysis results, which show some 
interesting findings (See Appendix 9 for individual analysis results of validation of a blockmodel 
using organizational attributes). 
First, well-established (i.e., old and/or large size) nonprofits show low likelihood to share 
physical resources such as personnel or offices (See Appendix 9-17).  It seems that well-
established nonprofits do not need to collaborate with other nonprofits for physical resource 
sharing relationships because they already have enough physical capacity (i.e., personnel or 
offices) within their own organizations.  Rather these large nonprofits are more active in other 
types of strategic collaborations (formal contract and joint program) (See Appendix9-17, 22 and 
26).   
Second, Table VI-19 summarizes organizational attributes of the central blocks (i.e., the 
whole network broker or coordinator role) in the six collaboration networks in order to see 
whether there are similar organizational characteristics in the strategically significant blocks 
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across the six types of the collaboration networks.  Organizational characteristics of strategically 
significant blocks are fairly similar each other.  Size (expenditure), years in operations and 
collaboration relation index are especially similar across five different blocks.  Nonprofits that 
not only occupy the central position in the networks but also play a strategically significant role 
(i.e., a coordinator in the whole network) are generally of medium to small size (about $1.2M 
budget) and relatively younger than other nonprofits. 
 
Table VI-19) Summary of organizational attributes of strategically significant blocks 
 N 
Revenue from 
commercial 
activity 
Revenue 
from 
government 
Expendi-
ture Years 
Collaborati
on relation 
index 
Average of total actors 42 18.41% 12.89% $3.37M 46 66.4 
Average of 6 blocks  15.65% (8.44) 
8.36% 
(7.42) 
$1.18M 
(0.21) 
34.6 
(12.58) 
133.8 
(34.49) 
Information sharing 4 19.5% 3.75% $1.3M 42.8 167.5 
Work referral 9 11% 17.83% $1.1M 40.8 110 
Regular meeting 9 30.71% 17.91% $0.9M 49 118 
Resource sharing 7 7% 4% $1.46M 36.7 121 
Formal contract58 8 11.7% 2% $1.3M 19.75 100.5 
Joint program 3 14% 4.67% $1M 18.67 186 
 
On the basis of this evidence, this study proposes that; nonprofits that are of medium-size 
(around $1M) and young are not only the most passionate in collaborations for providing 
services, but also play strategically significant roles, such as coordinating flows of information, 
work referrals, resources, money and so forth. 
6.4 BLOCKMODELS OF THE NONPROFIT AND BUSINESS SECTOR 
COLLABORATION NETWORK 
6.4.1 Information sharing network blockmodel  
When businesses are introduced in the information sharing network, the number of network 
members increases to 95 and the best grouping turns out to be 6 blocks.  Block 3 is exceptionally 
                                                 
58 Because there is no strategically significant block in the formal contract network, a block that is the most active in 
collaborations (block 2) are supplemented.  
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large compared to other blocks and most members of this block come from the business sector.  
Block 2 is composed of medium to large (20) organizations.  Block 1 and 4 are composed of 
medium to small organizations.  Block 5 and 6 are composed of a small number of organizations.  
 
Table VI-20) Block members of information sharing network 
Block    Members (95) 
    1:      CCN HEAETH HI MCG NH NHCO NHYMCC SVYMCA (8) 
    2:      AVAC CA CLA FF GVP HFI LLM LSS MN NAMSC NCM NHYMCA NSAS PT SMF 
SPUMC SSVD THF UWAC YWCA (20) 
    3:      AM AP APH AUC BFR BM BPL BTCO BTR DLC DTS ELS FBSDS FCO FG FHLBP FI GL 
GRE HB HP JHC MB MCJ MEE MF MMI MNB NWCCP OP PB PH PMS PTC RH RR SC SE 
SH SNS SOFP SP SSLT ST THHC UCM (46) 
    4:      BC BLFP CB DB FB NCB NHFB OPCA PNC SMC TKF WSB (12) 
    5:      AARP ACBA ELC MFC ODM SVD (6) 
    6:      ASC SGH SN (3) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-21) Typology for structural positions for information sharing relations 
Position 
  
(gk-1) 
/(g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.075 0.203 98.00 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.202 0.466 12.40 Primary Central-intermediate 
Block 3 0.479 0 1.15 Broker Periphery 
Block 4 0.117 0 3.92 Broker Periphery 
Block 5 0.053 0 18.50 Broker Central-intermediate 
Block 6 0.021 0 1.00 Broker Periphery 
* The median of P(Bk) is 8.16. And mean is 22.49.  
 
The information sharing network blockmodel is composed of two central and primary 
blocks (1 and 2), three periphery blocks (3, 4, and 6) and one central-intermediate and broker 
block (5) (Table VI-21).  In particular, block 1 is classified as both central and primary block in 
the information network.  This structure is clearly seen in the below Figure VI-7.   
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
The image matrix in Table VI-22 does not exactly represent any type of the ideal image 
matrix.  However, the overall shape of the matrix is similar to a central-periphery structure.  
Specifically, the structural type can be described as a central (1), intermediary (2 and 5) and 
periphery (3, 4 and 6) system. 
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Table VI-22) Image matrix of information sharing network 
       1     2     3     4     5     6 
           ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
  2  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 0 
  3  1(RE) 0     0     0     0     0 
  4  1(RE) 0     0     0     0     0 
  5  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0     1(RE) 
  6  0     0     0     0     1(RE) 0 
 
In Figure VI-7, a legend for the collaboration networks with nonprofits and businesses is 
represented.  There are five types of blocks – nonprofit block, nonprofit dominant block, 
business block, business dominant block and coexistence block.  Definitions of each block are 
presented in the below box.  Four types of equivalent relationships are presented – structural 
equivalence within and between blocks, and regular equivalence within and between blocks.   
 
3
4
6
1
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              : NPO block                                     : NPO dominant block  
 
 
              (All members are NPO)                   (NPO occupies more than 70%) 
             : Business block                                : Business dominant block  
 
 
             (All members are business)              (Business occupies more than 70%) 
             : NPO and business coexistence block  
               (either sector occupies more than 30% and less than 70%) 
 
                : Structural equivalent relation                   : Regular equivalent relation  
 
             : Reflexive structural equivalent relation            : Reflexive regular equivalent relation 
                  
 
Figure VI-7) Reduced sociogram of information sharing network 
 
The most visible feature in the above picture is that nonprofits and businesses are 
separately grouped in terms of their relational patterns.  Specifically, while most of businesses 
are locating at the periphery of the network, most of nonprofits are located in central or central-
intermediary positions.  As seen in Figure VI-7, nonprofits are exclusively clustered together 
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within 1, 2, and 5 blocks, whereas businesses are within 3 and 6 blocks.  Block 4 is a mixture of 
the two sectors, which is a part of the evidence of blurring boundaries.   
Compared to the nonprofit information sharing blockmodel of the previous section, the 
network structure in this section changes in three ways.  First, the type of equivalence between 
blocks changes from structural to regular equivalent relationships.  This means that with the 
inclusion of businesses, information redundancy considerably decreases.  This also indicates that 
the inclusion of businesses in the information network makes nonprofits more efficient in 
exchanging information.  Second, strategically significant blocks play a gate role between the 
two sectors as the business sector is introduced.  Block 1 and 5 plays this role.  Third is a clear 
distinction between central and peripheral actors.  The nonprofit information sharing network is 
cohesively connected among all blocks, but, the information sharing network in this section 
shows a central vs. peripheral structure.   
Information flows can be deduced from power centrality (See Appendix 9-30).  Block 1, 
which is central and a broker in the whole network, is dependent on its neighborhood blocks for 
information.  In other words, adjacent blocks (2, 3, 4, and 5) provide block 1 with information, 
which means that block 1 is a place where various information is collected.  Within members of 
block 1, information is evenly shared because they are structurally equivalent within the block.  
In turn, block 1 plays an information intermediary role, which means that block 1 is likely to 
resend information that is collected from its adjacent blocks.  When these information flows 
continues, information is efficiently diffused, and eventually shared goals are likely to emerge 
through the coordinating role of block 1.   
Two business blocks play different roles in terms of information flows.  Block 3 usually 
sends its information to block 1, but block 6 mainly receives information from block 5 because 
block 6 is dependent on block 5 for information.  Businesses are heterogeneous in terms of their 
roles in the information sharing network.  
In sum, from the blockmodeling of the information sharing network, this study uncovers 
that when businesses are introduced, the network becomes more efficient in terms of information 
sharing as well as the coordination of information flows.     
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6.4.2 Work referral network blockmodel 
In the work referral network, five distinctive blocks are identified through blockmodeling (Table 
VI-23).  There are three medium-large blocks (2, 3, and 4), one medium size block (5), and one 
small size block (1).   
 
Table VI-23) Block members of work referral network 
Block    Members (55) 
    1:      CCN NH NHCO NHYMCC SPUMC (5) 
    2:      AUC CA CLA ELC FG GRE IICR MFC ODM PH PNC SOFP THF YWCA (14) 
    3:      ACBA BC DLC FI HFI LCS MN OPCA PB SC TKF VEC WSB (13) 
    4:      AVAC BLFP HEAETH HI LLM LSS MCG NAMSC NCM NHYMCA NSAS SMC SVD 
UWAC (14) 
    5:      AARP GVP MB NHFB NWCCP PT SMF SSVD SVYMCA (9) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
Table VI-24 illustrates the positions and roles of the five blocks.  Block 1 occupies a 
primary and central position in terms of sending work referrals.  This block sends more work 
referrals than it receives (ratio of received and sent is 0.76 and out-degree P(Bk) is almost twice 
the in-degree).  Block 5 plays a broker role and sends more referrals than it receives.   
 
Table VI-24) Typology for structural positions for work referral relations 
 (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within choice/ 
Between choice 
Choice received/ 
Choice sent 
In-degree 
P(Bk) 
Out-degree 
P(Bk) 
Block 1 0.074 0.155 0.755 39.60 74.40 
Block 2 0.241 0.046 1.546 2.36 1.50 
Block 3 0.222 0.100 1.800 1.31 0 
Block 4 0.241 0.415 1.195 9.14 3.43 
Block 5 0.148 0.053 0.763 3.00 8.00 
* In-degree P(BBk): Median is 3 and mean is 11.08.  ** Out-degree P(Bk): Median is 3.43 and mean is 17.47. 
Position  
Typology I Typology II Typology III (in) Typology III (out) 
Block 1 Primary Carrier (sender) Central Central 
Block 2 Broker Carrier (receiver) Periphery Periphery 
Block 3 Broker Receiver Periphery Isolate 
Block 4 Primary Carrier (receiver) Central-intermediate Intermediate 
Block 5 Broker Carrier (sender) Intermediate Central-intermediate 
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Block 4 has in a primary position in the network.  Unlike block 1, this block is primary in 
terms of receiving referrals.  Block 3 occupies a receiver position at the periphery of the network.  
Finally, block 2 is a receiver at the edge of the network.   
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
The permuted image matrix in Table VI-25 is the same as the image matrix of the 
nonprofit work referral blockmodel (Table VI-6).  However, this study regards these two as 
different structures because there are pieces of evidence of structural changes when businesses 
are introduced in the work referral network. 
 
Table VI-25) Permuted image matrix of work referral network 
          1     4     5     2     3 
        ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
     1  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 
     4  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0 
     5  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0 
     2  1(RE) 0     0     0     0  
     3  0     0     0     0     0  
   
First, nonprofits and businesses show their distinctive roles; nonprofits play a sender and 
service coordinator role and businesses play a receiver or service delivery role.  Second, in block 
2, both sector organizations have the same pattern of relationships, which means that boundaries 
between the two sectors are blurring in the work referral network (See Appendix 9-34).  
 
       (a)                        (b)  
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Figure VI-8) Reduced sociogram of work referral network 
 
Specifically, block 1 occupies a strategically significant position because it is a service 
coordinator in the whole network.  In addition, two business blocks (2 and 3) are exclusively 
connected to this block.  This means that block 1 is a strategically important block in terms of its 
gate role between the two sectors.  Two blocks, which include many businesses (2 and 3), mostly 
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play a receiver role at the periphery.  In this sense, businesses are called social service delivery 
agents in the work referral network.  Nonprofit block 4 mainly receives referrals but still retains 
relatively high betweenness centrality compared to business blocks (See Appendix 9-34).  This 
indicates that the role of block 4 is not limited to service delivery but also exchanging referrals 
with many organizations.  (b) in Figure VI-8 is a simplified form of blockmodel (a). Through this 
picture, it is clearer that there are role differences between two sectors.   
In sum, even though the network structure looks the same regardless of the inclusion of 
businesses, it does not mean that businesses do not have an impact on the network structure.  
Rather, they are embedded into the work referral network as 1) players who occupy a particular 
position (i.e., work referral receivers, thus service delivery agent) and 2) players with the same 
(at least similar) relational patterns with nonprofits in block 2.  
6.4.3 Regular meeting network blockmodel 
With the inclusion of 11 businesses, the size of the regular meeting network grows.  This 
network is reduced into 4 blocks through blockmodeling.  Three blocks are of medium-large size 
(1, 2, and 3) and the other one is of small size (4).   
 
Table VI-26) Block members of regular meeting network 
Block    Members (46) 
    1:      CCN FF HEAETH HI NCM NH NHCO NHYMCA NHYMCC SSVD YWCA (11) 
    2:      AUC CA CG DLC FG GVP KG MCG NAMSC NWCCP OPCA PB SMF SOFP SPUMC ST 
THF UWAC WSB (19) 
    3:      AVAC BLFP CLA HFI LLM MB MFC MN NHFB NSAS SMC SVD (12) 
    4:      ELC LSS PT SGH (4) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-27) Typology for structural positions for regular meeting relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.222 0.649 9.45 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.400 0 1.42 Broker Periphery 
Block 3 0.244 0.400 4 Primary Central-intermediate 
Block 4 0.067 0.571 0 Broker Isolate 
* The median of P(Bk) is 2.71. And mean is 3.71.  
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The four blocks occupy different positions in the network.  Block 1 occupies a central 
and primary position in the network.  This block is expected to play a primary role in mediating 
problems or issues in the network.  Block 2 is connected to block 1 in a peripheral way.  This 
means that block 2 is dependent on block 1.  Since block 3 occupies a central-intermediate 
position, block 3 is less dependent on block 1 than is block 2.  Finally, block 4 is an isolate. 
   
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
Table VI-28) Image matrix of regular meeting 
       1     2     3     4 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
  2  1(RE) 0     0     0 
  3  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0 
  4  0     0     0     1(RE) 
 
This study interprets the structural type of image matrix in Table VI-28 as a mixture of 
central-periphery and cohesive subgroups.  When the isolated block is not considered, block 1 is 
central and its neighborhood blocks (block 2 and 3) are periphery.  At the same time, three 
blocks are internally cohesive.  Figure VI-9 illustrates this network structure.   
 
 
1 3
2
4
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VI-9) Reduced sociogram of regular meeting 
 
The nonprofits in block 1 are members of the North Hills Nonprofit Consortium and are 
strongly interrelated with each other (i.e., structural equivalence within a block).  Regular 
meeting relationships among the Consortium are so strong that the inclusion of business does not 
affect their dominance in the network.  However, compared to the nonprofit regular meeting 
network, the regular meeting network becomes localized as block 3 reduces dependency on the 
central block through their within block meeting and block 4 has its own regular meeting within 
the block.  Organizations in block 4 are not likely to care about the global issues in this 
community but make decision for local (i.e., within block) problems or issues independently 
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from the central block 1 because block 4 does not connect with any other block.  Thus, conflicts 
between block 4 and the rest of blocks could arise.   
Two coexistence blocks (2 and 4) indicates that nonprofits and businesses are well 
embedded in the regular meeting network (See Appendix 9-34); both sector organizations not 
only show the same patterns of relationships, but also cohesively interact within block (block 4).  
6.4.4 Resource sharing network blockmodel 
With the inclusion of 45 businesses, the size of the resource sharing network grows more than 
double.  The network is reduced to five blocks via blockmodeling.  As shown in Table VI-29, 
there is one exceptionally large size block (block 4) and two medium blocks (3 and 5).  Block 2 
is relatively small.  Block 1 is very small, as there are only two nonprofits.   
 
Table VI-29) Block members of resource sharing network 
Block    Members (76) 
    1:      HI NHCO (2) 
    2:      ELC LSS NHFB NSAS SGH SOFP SPUMC (7) 
    3:      AVAC BLFP CA CCN DB HFI MFC NCM NH NHYMCC SMF SVD (12) 
    4:      ACBA AM AP AUMA BM BPL BTCO BTR CG DLC DTS ELS FB FCO FF FHLBP GL GVP 
HB JHC KG LE MCJ MEE MF MMI MN MNB NWCCP PMS PT PTC RH SE SH SNS SP 
SSLT THF THHC UCM (41) 
    5:      AARP BFR CB CLA FG HEAETH LLM ME NAMSC NCB RR SMC TKF UWAC (14) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-30) Typology for structural positions for resource sharing relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.013 0.032 91.50 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.080 0.636 1.14 Primary Intermediate 
Block 3 0.147 0.367 5.17 Primary Intermediate-central 
Block 4 0.533 0 1 Broker Periphery 
Block 5 0.173 0.118 1.07 Broker Intermediate 
* The median of P(Bk) is 1.14. And mean is 19.98.  
 
Position analysis identifies three types of block positions.  Block 1 occupies a central 
position and plays a primary role in terms of coordinating resource flows in the whole network.  
Two blocks, block 2 and 3, occupy an intermediate position and play a primary role.  Unlike 
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block 1, these blocks do not play a network coordinator role.  Block 2 is primary in terms of 
within block cohesiveness and direct connection with the central block.  Block 3 is primary in 
terms of its intermediate role between block 1 and 5 and within block cohesiveness (Figure VI-
11).  Block 4 is at the periphery of the network.  Finally, block 5 is not periphery but 
intermediate, even though it does not have a direct relationship with the center. 
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
Table VI-31) Image matrix or resource sharing network 
          1     2     3     4     5 
        ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
     1  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
     2  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0  
     3  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0     1(RE) 
     4  1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
     5  0     0     1(RE) 0     0 
 
The structure of the image matrix in Table VI-31 is similar to the image matrix of the 
nonprofit resource sharing network in Table VI-12; a mixture of central-periphery and hierarchy 
system.  However, there is one difference between two image matrices; the above image matrix 
includes 3 cohesive subgroups. 
 
 
1
2 5
4 
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VI-10) Reduced sociogram of resource sharing network 
 
Block 1 is a cohesive subgroup comprised of two hub nonprofits (i.e., HI and NHCO).  
Business-dominant block 4 is attached to the central block 1, and two nonprofit-dominant 
peripheral blocks (2 and 3) are connected to block 1.  In this connection, the direction of resource 
flows can be inferred from the power centrality (See Appendix 9-43).  Block 4 is exclusively 
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dependent on block 1 for resource sharing relations.  The dependency of block 4 on block 1 for 
resource sharing relation should be interpreted based on an assumption; businesses are more 
willing to provide physical resources rather than receive them.  Thus, physical resources flow 
from businesses to two hub nonprofits.  On the other hand, block 2 and 3 are dependent on block 
1 for resource sharing.  These blocks depend on the central block not because the central block 
has extra physical resources to share but because the central block can link nonprofits in block 2 
and 3 with businesses in block 4.  Thus, the role of central block 1 is important because it 
coordinates resource flows between businesses and other nonprofit blocks.  Power centrality 
between block 3 and 5 indicates that these blocks are interdependent in sharing physical 
resources.  Another feature of Figure VI-10 is that three cohesive subgroups emerge through the 
inclusion of businesses, which means that organizations cohesively interact within blocks.    
Finally, there are two pieces of evidence of blurring boundaries between nonprofits and 
businesses in the resource sharing network.  First, nonprofits and businesses in block 5 show 
same or similar relational patterns.  Second, most businesses are embedded in the network with a 
help from the central block 1 as block 1 not only links two sectors but also plays a resource flow 
coordinating role.   
6.4.5 Formal contract network blockmodel 
Table VI-32 illustrates the results of blockmodeling of the formal contract network when 
businesses are introduced.  The size of four blocks is similar - medium size.   
 
Table VI-32) Block members of formal contract network 
Block     Members (31) 
    1:       AARP BLFP CA FF MFC NH NHCO SMF (8) 
    2:       AUC CG CPH DLC FG HI KG LSS SPUMC (9) 
    3:       CB HEAETH NHYMCA NHYMCC NSAS PB UWAC WSB (8) 
    4:       HFI SMC SSVD SVD SVYMCA TKF (6) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
Block 1 occupies a primary and central position but is only primary and central in terms 
of its relationship with block 2 because the two other blocks are isolated from block 1 and 2.  
Block 3 and 4 are primary in terms of within block relationships; these blocks are internally 
cohesive blocks but do not have an inter-block relation.  
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Table VI-33) Typology for structural positions for formal contract relations 
Position  (gk-1)/(g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.2333 0.5806 1.63 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.2667 0 1.22 Broker Central 
Block 3 0.2333 0.9412 0 Primary Isolate 
Block 4 0.1667 0.7273 0 Primary Isolate 
* The median of P(Bk) is 0.61. And mean is 0.71.  
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
Table VI-34) Image matrix of formal contract network 
       1     2     3     4 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0 
  2  1(RE) 0     0     0 
  3  0     0     1(RE) 0 
  4  0     0     0     1(RE) 
 
The image matrix in Table VI-34 illustrates a cohesive subgroup structure; three blocks 
(1, 3, and 4) are independently cohesive within their own block.  This structure is obvious when 
it is visually presented in Figure VI-11.   
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Figure VI-11) Reduced sociogram of formal contract network 
 
The structure of the formal contract network with the inclusion of businesses is almost 
the same as the nonprofit formal contract network (Figure VI-11 and VI-5).  The power 
centrality presents two interesting findings; 1) respective independency of three cohesive 
subgroups and 2) money flows between businesses block 2 and nonprofit block 1.  Block 1 has 
high power centrality over block 2, which means that businesses in block 2 are dependent on 
nonprofits in block 1 for their formal contract relations (See Appendix 9-47).  This dependency 
can be interpreted in two ways; 1) money from the business sector flows into nonprofits in block 
1, and 2) as subcontractor from the public sector, money flows from nonprofits (block 1) to 
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businesses (block 2).  Nonprofits in block 1 and 4 make formal contract relationships with 
nonprofits within their own block.  Nonprofits and businesses in block 3 prefer making formal 
contracts with organizations within its own block.  Block 3 is important because businesses and 
nonprofits are not only cohesively interwoven with each other within the block, but rather 
maintain the same patterns of relationships. 
In sum, when businesses are involved in the formal contract network there is no 
fundamental change in network structure.  Nonetheless, we can find pieces of evidence that 
indicates blurring boundaries (i.e., the coexistence block 3). 
6.4.6 Joint program network blockmodel 
With the inclusion of businesses, the joint program network grows because many businesses (35) 
participate in the joint program network for delivering social services.  However, a blockmodel 
in this section is simpler than the nonprofit joint program network blockmodel in the previous 
section; blockmodeling reduces the network with 58 actors into 3 blocks.  Block 1 is a very small 
block as it is composed of members of two hub nonprofits in the network.  Block 2 is 
exceptionally large.  Block 3 is of medium size.   
 
Table VI-35) Block members of joint program network 
Block      Members (58) 
    1:         HI NHCO (2) 
    2:         AM AP APH AVAC BM BPL BTCO BTR CB CCN CG DLC DTS ELS FCO FHLBP GL HB 
JHC KG MEE MF MFC MMI MN MNB NCB NH NHYMCA NWCCP PMS PT PTC RH SE 
SH SMF SNS SP SSLT SVD THHC UCM UWAC WSB (45) 
    3:         AARP BLFP CLA ELC FF HFI KDS NHYMCC SPUMC SSVD YWCA (11) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-36) Typology for structural positions for joint program relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.018 0.036 54 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.772 0.043 1 Broker Intermediate-periphery 
Block 3 0.175 0.667 0.82 Primary Periphery 
* The median of P(Bk) is 1. And mean is 18.61.  
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Block 1 occupies a central position and plays a primary role – coordinating the whole 
network.  Block 2 and 3 are periphery in the network.  This position analysis indicates that the 
involvement of businesses makes the two-hub structure more obvious. 
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
 
 
Table VI-37) Image matrix of joint program network 
         1     2     3 
       ----- ----- ----- 
    1  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 
    2  1(RE) 0     0 
    3  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 
 
The structure of the image matrix in Table VI-37 is a centralized system with two 
cohesive subgroups.  Figure VI-12 visually illustrates this structure.  
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Figure VI-12) Reduced sociogram of joint program network 
 
The joint program network in Figure VI-12 is a simple structure; a central and primary 
position occupant (block 1) and its peripheral organizations.  Two primary and central nonprofits 
(HI and NHCO) in the nonprofit joint program network remain in the same position when 
businesses are introduced.  This indicates that most businesses exclusively make relations with 
these two nonprofits.  The primary role of this block is not only to perform joint programs with 
businesses and other nonprofits but also intermediate between other nonprofits and businesses 
between block 2 and 3.   
Another feature is that as businesses join the network, nonprofits become cohesive 
among nonprofits.  Block 3 in Figure VI-12 is composed of three blocks in Figure VI-6 (block 2, 
3, and 5).  These three blocks were separated in the nonprofit joint program network but, as 
businesses are introduced, they become one cohesive block (block 3 in Figure VI-6).  
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In sum, there is a change in the network structure compared to the joint program network 
blockmodel in Figure VI-6; the two-hub structure becomes more obvious.  Through this change, 
nonprofits become more cohesive within the sector.      
6.4.7 Organizational characteristics of blocks in the networks 
There is an interesting finding from the analysis of the validation of blocks by organizational 
attributes.  In the formal contract network, unlike other types of collaboration network 
blockmodels, CRIs of the business-dominant block (2) and the coexistence block (3) are quite 
high (See Appendix 9-47).  This indicates that businesses are strongly interested in formal 
contracts with nonprofits.  From this fact, this study induces that businesses prefer formal 
contract relationships with nonprofits to other types of collaboration.  It is intuitively 
understandable because businesses naturally favor more professional type of relationships based 
on formal contracts. 
6.5 BLOCKMODELS OF THE NONPROFIT AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
COLLABORATION NETWORK  
6.5.1 Information sharing network blockmodel 
Table VI-38) Block members of information sharing network 
Block    Members (60) 
    1:      BLFP FF NSAS PT SPUMC SVYMCA THF (7) 
    2:      AARP AVAC CA CLA HI NHYMCA SSVD UWAC (8) 
    3:      ACPL BOM CL EOWA LMP NEA ODM PACA USDE (9) 
    4:      APR ACBA ACDHS ACG CMS GPR PADH PANA PCG PSD PSG (11) 
    5:      BC ELC GVP HFI LSS MFC MN NAMSC NCM NHFB NWCCP PNC SMC SMF SOFP TKF 
YWCA (17) 
    6:      CCN HEAETH LLM MCG NH NHCO NHYMCC SVD (8) 
 
As public agencies participate in the information sharing network, the network grows in 
terms of the number of actor and information flows.  Through blockmodeling, this study 
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identifies six blocks of members that show similar patterns of relationships (Table VI-38).  One 
block (5) is of medium-large size.  The rest of blocks are of medium-small size.   
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
 
Table VI-39) Typology for structural positions for information sharing relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.102 0.167 34.29 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.119 0.199 52.5 Primary Central 
Block 3 0.136 0 1.33 Broker Periphery 
Block 4 0.170 0 1.73 Broker Periphery 
Block 5 0.271 0.018 19.41 Broker Intermediate-central 
Block 6 0.119 0.205 66 Primary Central 
* The median of P(Bk) is 26.85. And mean is 29.21.  
 
As shown in Table VI-39, block 2 and 6 occupy a central and primary position.  Besides 
these two blocks, block 1 also is a primary and central actor in the network.  However, as P(Bk) 
indicates, block 1 (34) has secondary position compared to block 2 (53) and 6 (66).  Block 5 is 
identified as a broker with an intermediate-central position.  These four blocks are nonprofit 
blocks and are all structurally cohesive with each other (Figure VI-13).  On the other hand, two 
public blocks, block 3 and 4, are located at the periphery of the network.  
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
Table VI-40) Permuted image matrix of information sharing network 
        2     6     1     5     4     3 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  2  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0  
  6  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0     1(RE)  
  1  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0 
  5  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0 
  4  1(RE) 0     0     0     0     0   
  3  0     1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
   
The image matrix in Table VI-40 shows similar patterns to a central-periphery system in 
the ideal type of image matrix.  Specifically, the structure is a central (2 and 6 blocks) – 
intermediate (1 and 5 blocks) – periphery (3 and 4 blocks) system.  There is no structural 
equivalent relationship, which means that information flows in this network are not redundant 
and thus efficient.   
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The legend in Figure VI-13 describes five different types of blocks and four different 
types of relationships for the reduced sociogram in this section.  The definitions of them are 
explained in the box below.  
 
 
              : NPO block                                     : NPO dominant block  
 
 
             (All members are NPO)                   (NPO occupies more than 70%) 
             : Public agency block                       : Public agency dominant block  
 
 
           (All members are public agency)         (Public agency occupies more than 70%) 
             : NPO and public agency coexistence block  
               (either sector occupies more than 30% and less than 70%) 
 
                : Structural equivalent relation                   : Regular equivalent relation  
 
             : Reflexive structural equivalent relation            : Reflexive regular equivalent relation 
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Figure VI-13) Reduced sociogram of information sharing network 
 
Compared to the information sharing blockmodel with the inclusion of businesses, the 
blockmodel in this section represents two different structural patterns.  First, there is no nonprofit 
that has the same patterns of information sharing relations as public agencies (i.e., no coexistence 
block).  Second, two peripheral public agency blocks are simply attached to the nonprofit blocks, 
which are very cohesively connected each other (Figure VI-13).  Among them, three blocks (1, 2 
and 6) occupy central positions in the network and block 5 coordinates information among these 
three central blocks in the center.  These cohesive relationships among nonprofit blocks are 
similar to the cohesive relationship in the nonprofit information sharing blockmodel.  These 
results designate that the involvement of the public sector in the information sharing network 
makes marginal or no impact on the network structure.  However, as in the information sharing 
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network with the introduction of the business sector, nonprofits that play a gate role between two 
sectors emerge.   
In terms of power relationships, block 4 is dependent on block 2 and block 6 is dependent 
on block 3 (See Appendix 9-55).  Two public sector blocks are different in terms of their roles in 
information flows.  While block 4 receives information from nonprofits, block 3 sends 
information to nonprofits.  Power centralities are similar among the three central and primary 
blocks, which means they are quite independent or interdependent.  Block 5 is relatively low in 
power centrality, which indicates that block 5 may play an information coordinating role among 
nonprofit blocks because relatively more information is concentrated in this block.  
In sum, there are marginal structural changes in the information sharing network because 
public agencies simply attach to the existing network structure.  Just like when businesses are 
involved, public agencies are divided into two types of block - a receiver and sender of 
information.  
6.5.2 Work referral network blockmodel 
Table VI-41 represents blockmodel members of six distinctive blocks from the work referral 
network which is composed of nonprofits and public agencies.  Two blocks (1 and 3) are small 
size and four other blocks (2, 4. 5 and 6) are medium size.   
 
Table VI-41) Block members of work referral network 
Block    Members (54) 
    1:      CCN NH NHCO (3) 
    2:      ACG BOM FR HFI MN NEA PACA PCG PSD PSG SVB TKF (12) 
    3:      CLA HI MCG NHYMCC SSVD (5) 
    4:      AARP GVP NCM NHFB NHYMCA NWCCP SMC SMF YWCA (9) 
    5:      ACDHS AVAC ELC HEAETH LLM NSAS PT SPUMC SVD SVYMCA (10) 
    6:      ACBA ACHA BC BLFP CA CL LMP LSS MFC NAMSC ODM PNC SOFP THF UWAC (15) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
Block 1 and 3 occupy a primary and central position in the network.  But their roles are 
different.  While block 1 sends and receives referrals in a similar proportion, block 3 mostly 
receives rather than sends referrals.  In addition, members in block 1 have exceptionally high 
betweenness centrality (See Appendix 9-60).  Thus, the position of block 1 is at the center of the 
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network, and block 1 plays a service coordinating role in the network.  On the other hand, block 
3 is primary in terms of a service delivery.  Block 4 transmits work referrals as an intermediary 
or broker.  Block 2 and 5 are a sender of work referrals from the periphery of the network.  Block 
6 is located in the periphery of the network, mostly playing a receiver role because it receives 
more referrals than sends. 
 
Table VI-42) Typology for structural positions for work referral relations 
 (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within choice/ 
Between choice 
Choice received/ 
Choice sent 
In-degree 
P(Bk) 
Out-degree 
P(Bk) 
Block 1 0.038 0.075 0.825 80 98.67 
Block 2 0.208 0 0.786 0 1.167 
Block 3 0.076 0.171 1.543 38.4 5.8 
Block 4 0.151 0 1.121 8.22 7.33 
Block 5 0.170 0.164 0.699 3.90 18.3 
Block 6 0.264 0.031 1.500 3.13 2.07 
* In-degree P(BBk): Median is 6.06 and mean is 22.28. ** Out-degree P(Bk): Median 6.57 is and mean is 22.22. 
 
Position  
Typology I Typology II Typology III (in) Typology III (out) 
Block 1 Primary Carrier Central Central 
Block 2 Broker Carrier (sender) Isolate Periphery 
Block 3 Primary Carrier (receiver) Central Periphery 
Block 4 Broker Carrier Intermediate Intermediate 
Block 5 Broker Carrier (sender) Periphery Central-intermediate 
Block 6 Broker Carrier Periphery Periphery 
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
Table VI-43) Permuted image matrix of work referral network 
          1     3     4     5     6     2 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(SE) 1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
  3  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
  4  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
  5  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0 
  6  1(RE) 0     0     0     0     0    
  2  0     1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
 
The structure of the work referral network with the inclusion of public agencies is 
different from the previous two work referral networks.  The image matrix in Table VI-43 looks 
similar to a central-periphery system, but it is hard to tell the exact type of structure with the 
image matrix.  When using the reduced sociogram in Figure VI-14, the structure becomes clearer.   
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Figure VI-14) Reduced sociogram of work referral network 
 
Figure VI-14 (a) shows work referral flows.  On the top of the picture a), there are two 
sender blocks (2 and 5).  In the middle, there are two coordinator blocks (4 and 1).  At the 
bottom, there are two receivers (3 and 6).  Among blocks, block 1 occupies a strategically 
significant position because it not only maintains many relations with other organizations for 
work referrals but also has high capability in the coordination of flows of social services (the 
betweenness centrality is the highest among six blocks).  Block 3 is also important in the 
network because most of work referrals from the public sector arrive at this block.  This 
exclusive relationship with public agencies indicates that nonprofits in block 3 seem to have a 
good reputation for high-quality performances or durable relationships with the public sector.   
The picture (b) illustrates the abstracted version of the picture (a).  When the above 
abstracted version (b) is combined with the abstracted version of nonprofit and business work 
referral reduced graph, we can clearly see the patterns of work referral flows among three sectors.  
This study calls this as a social service system and Figure VI-15 visually represents the system.  
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Figure VI-15) Work referral flow system among three sectors 
 141
 
In this system, there are three types of actor roles and/or positions – a referral sender, 
service coordinators, and service provider.  Public agencies or some nonprofits send work 
referrals to nonprofits, which in turn coordinates these referrals and direct referrals to businesses 
or other nonprofits59 that are specialized in service delivery.  In sum, nonprofits play all three 
roles but businesses and public agencies play only one role - receiver and sender, respectively.   
6.5.3 Regular meeting network blockmodel 
The regular meeting network with the inclusion of public agencies is best reduced into 5 blocks 
(Table VI-44).  Three blocks are of medium size (1, 3 and 4) and one block is of small size (6).  
Block 5 is composed of one nonprofit whose patterns of relations are quite different from any 
other organizations in the network.  Since this block is nearly negligible, it will not be considered 
as an independent block in this section.  
 
Table VI-44) Block members of work regular meeting network 
Block    Members (37) 
    1:      CCN FF HEAETH NCM NH NHCO NHYMCA NHYMCC SSVD (9) 
    2:      CLA HI LLM NSAS PT SMF (6) 
    3:      ACDHS AVAC BLFP HFI MFC MN NHFB SMC SVD YWCA (10) 
    4:      CA DAO ELC GVP MCG NAMSC NWCCP SOFP SPUMC THF UWAC (11) 
    5:      LSS (1) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-45) Typology for structural positions for regular meeting relations 
Position 
 (gk-1)/(g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.229 0.569 17.67 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.143 0.348 2.50 Primary Intermediate 
Block 3 0.257 0.378 2.30 Primary Intermediate 
Block 4 0.286 0 1.55 Broker Periphery 
* The median of P(Bk) is 2.4. And mean is 6.  
 
                                                 
59 Of course, there could be a direct referral sending from the public sector to the business sector, but this 
relationship is not the topic in this study.  Moreover, even if this relationship exists, the unique role of the business 
and public sector remain the same.   
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Block 1 occupies a primary and central position in the network.  Following block 1, block 
2 and block 3 occupy intermediate positions in the network and are also primary when it comes 
to discussing current problems or issues within the block.  Finally, block 4 is located at the 
periphery of the network and is dependent on the central block (block 1).   
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
Table VI-46) Image matrix of regular meeting network60
        1     2     3     4  
     ----- ----- ----- -----  
  1  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE)  
  2  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0  
  3  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0  
  4  1(RE) 0     0     0  
 
 
Basically, the structure of the image matrix in Table VI-46 is a central-periphery system.  
However, there are three cohesive subgroups as well.  Thus, this study names this network as a 
central-periphery with cohesive subgroup structure.  This structure looks similar to the network 
structure in the regular meeting blockmodel image matrix when businesses are included.  
However, there is one significant difference between two network structures; in this blockmodel, 
there is no isolate – all organizations can reach any other organization in the network.  
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Figure VI-16) Reduced sociogram of regular meeting network 
 
Just like the previous two regular meeting networks, the North Hills Nonprofit 
Consortium members (block 1 in Figure VI-16) are dominant in the network.  However, there is 
a marginal structural change from the nonprofit regular meeting network.  Dependency of 
adjacent blocks on the central block declines because two peripheral blocks (2 and 3) have 
within block relationships.    
                                                 
60  Since block 5 is composed of only one outlier organization, this study excludes it from the image matrix and the 
reduced sociogram.  
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In sum, the involvement of two sectors in the nonprofit regular meeting network causes 
small structural changes.  The effects of the involvement of public agencies are similar to those 
of the inclusion of businesses because the network structure becomes localized as there is 
coordination by the same central block actors (i.e., the North Hills Nonprofit Consortium).  
However, the major difference is that while the inclusion of businesses brings one internally 
cohesive isolate block, the involvement of public agencies makes all organizations (i.e., all 
blocks) completely connected, except one outlier nonprofit block.   
6.5.4 Resource sharing network blockmodel 
Only three public agencies participate in the resource sharing network.  Table VI-47 illustrates 
the result of blockmodeling when public agencies are introduced.  There are three medium-large 
blocks (2 and 3), two medium-small blocks (4 and 5), and one small block (1).   
 
Table VI-47) Block members of resource sharing network 
Block    Members (38): 
    1:      HI NH NHCO (3) 
    2:      ACBA CA CCN FF GVP HEAETH MN NAMSC NWCCP PT THF (11) 
    3:      AARP ACDHS BLFP ELC HFI LLM NHYMCC SMC SOFP SPUMC (10) 
    4:      CLA FR NCM NSAS SMI SSVD TKF UWAC (8) 
    5:      AVAC LSS MFC NHFB SMF SVD (6) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-48) Typology for structural positions for resource sharing relations 
Position  (gk-1)/(g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.054 0.158 32.00 Primary Central 
Block 2 0.270 0 1.09 Broker Periphery 
Block 3 0.243 0.061 9.30 Broker Intermediate-central 
Block 4 0.189 0 1.38 Broker Periphery 
Block 5 0.135 0.091 6.67 Broker Intermediate 
* The median of P(Bk) is 6.67. And mean is 10.08.  
 
Block 1 occupies a central position and plays a primary role – coordinating resource 
flows in the network.  Block 3 and 5 play an intermediate role in the network.  Finally, block 2 
and 4 are located at the edge of the network.   
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Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
 
Table VI-49) Permuted image matrix of resource sharing network 
          1     3     5     2     4 
        ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
     1  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
     3  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0     1(RE)   
     5  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0 
     2  1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
     4  0     1(RE) 0     0     0 
 
It is hard to distinguish an exact type of network structure from the image matrix in Table 
VI-49.  However, on the basis of position analysis, this study identifies the structure of this 
network as a central-intermediary-periphery system.  Figure VI-17 visually illustrates the 
network structure.  When public agencies join the resource sharing network, there are two 
changes in the network structure; 1) the resource sharing network becomes more cohesive as 
compared to the nonprofit resource sharing network (Figure VI-4), and 2) the structural type 
changes from a mixture of central-periphery and hierarchy to a central-intermediate-periphery 
system.  
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Figure VI-17) Reduced sociogram of resource sharing network 
 
Through power centrality, resource flows can be induced (See Appendix 9-69).  Since 
block 1 is the most powerful in this network, adjacent blocks (2, 3, and 5) are dependent on 
block 1 for resource sharing.  Practically, the three nonprofits in block 1 are not expected to have 
enough physical resources to share with organizations in block 2, 3, and 5.  Rather, this block 
plays a coordinating role that links nonprofits that need to share physical resources with other 
organizations that are looking to share resources.  Block 3 is also dependent on block 4 for 
resource sharing.   
In sum, when other sector organizations are introduced in the resource sharing network, 
the network structure changes.  First, when businesses are involved, the network structure 
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becomes a two-hub network structure.  In addition, the hierarchy structure becomes more 
apparent and the central block’s coordinating role becomes more important.  Second, with the 
inclusion of public agencies, the network structure changes to a central-intermediate-periphery 
system.  The cohesiveness of the network also changes.  When businesses are included, within 
block cohesive subgroups emerge, but when public agencies are introduced, the inter-block 
cohesiveness becomes stronger.   
6.5.5 Formal contract network blockmodel 
Blockmodeling reduces 25 nonprofits and 8 public agencies in the formal contract network into 
five distinctive blocks (Table VI-50).  Two blocks (1 and 4) are medium size and three blocks (2, 
3 and 5) are small size.  
 
Table VI-50) Block members of formal contract network 
Block    Members (33) 
    1:      ACDED ACDHS ACHA CA FF HUD PCG PSG SPUMC (9) 
    2:      HI NH SMC SVYMCA TKF UWAC (6) 
    3:      AVAC HFI NHCO SSVD YWCA (5) 
    4:      AARP HEAETH NHYMCA NHYMCC NSAS SMF SVB SVD (8) 
    5:      ACBA ACG BLFP LSS MFC (5) 
 
Descriptions of block positions 
 
Table VI-51) Typology for structural positions for formal contract relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.250 0.118 1.67 Broker Intermediate 
Block 2 0.156 0 5 Broker Intermediate-central 
Block 3 0.125 0 15.60 Broker Central 
Block 4 0.219 0.182 1.13 Broker Periphery 
Block 5 0.125 0.546 1 Primary Periphery 
* The median of P(Bk) is 1.67. And mean is 4.88.  
 
Although block 3 occupies a central position, it does not play a primary.  Rather it plays a 
broker role in the network because this block is not a cohesive subgroup.  This block is both a 
local and whole network broker.  Block 1 and 2 are located in an intermediate position.  They are 
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intermediate because contributions of these two blocks are significant but the blocks are not 
placed at the center of the network.  In particular, block 2 plays a local broker role between 
central block 3 and periphery block 4.  Block 4 and 5 occupy a periphery position in the network.  
Block 5 is a cohesive subgroup. 
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
Table VI-52) Permuted image matrix of formal contract network 
          1     3     2     4     5 
        ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
     1  0     1(RE) 0     0     0 
     3  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0     1(RE) 
     2  0     1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0 
     4  0     0     1(RE) 0     0 
     5  0     1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 
 
There is a hint of a hierarchy structure in the permuted image matrix in Table VI-52.  The 
hierarchy structure becomes obvious in Figure VI-18.   
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Figure VI-18) Reduced sociogram of formal contract network 
 
Block 3 is exceptionally powerful (See Appendix 9-74), which means that most of 
organizations in this network depends on this block for formal contract relations.  Block 1 and 2 
are not weak in terms of the power centrality but are dependent on their relationship with block 3 
because the power centrality of block 3 is so predominantly strong.  From these dependency 
relationships, we can infer money flows.  First, public agency-dominant block 1 is dependent on 
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block 3 for formal contract relationships.  This indicates that public agencies grant money 
through formal contracts to block 3.  In turn, nonprofits in block 3 would subcontract or make 
another contract with other nonprofits in block 2 or 5.  In turn, nonprofits in block 2 play the 
same role as block 1 with block 4.  Thus, flows of (government) money begin from the top of 
Figure VI-18, channel through a coordinating blocks, and finally arrive at periphery blocks.  In 
addition, a reflexive tie in block 5 indicates that nonprofits in block 5 make formal contract with 
a public agency in block 5.    
Compared to the two formal contract networks in the previous sections, the network 
structure in Figure VI-18 is totally different from the structures, which were a cohesive subgroup 
structure.  As discussed in the earlier section, while businesses prefer formal contracts in their 
collaborative relationships with nonprofits, their involvement does not bring much structural 
change.  However, as seen above, public agencies cause a fundamental change in the formal 
contract network, shifting the network from a cohesive subgroup structure to a hierarchy system.  
On the basis of results from three formal contract blockmodels, this study proposes a hypothesis 
that organizational homophily (for example, homophily of organizational culture, previous trust-
building, organizational capacity, size and so forth) plays as a significant factor in making formal 
contracts among nonprofits or between nonprofits and businesses.  However, organizational 
homophily is the second or third consideration when nonprofits and public agencies make formal 
contracts.   
6.5.6 Joint program network blockmodel 
The joint program network with the involvement of public agencies is best reduced into five 
blocks through blockmodeling.  Block 5 is of medium-large size.  Block 2 is of medium size and 
the rest of three blocks (1, 3 and 4) are of small size.  
 
Table VI-53) Block members of work referrals network 
Block    Members (31) 
    1:      ELC FR NHYMCC SVYMCA (4) 
    2:      AVAC BOM CCN GPR MN PANA PSD SSVD (8) 
    3:      AARP CLA FF HI NHCO (5) 
    4:      BLFP SPUMC SVB (3) 
    5:      APR ACDHS HFI MFC NH NWCCP PT SMF SVD UWAC YWCA (11) 
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Descriptions of block positions 
The joint program blockmodel is composed of two types of positions – central and 
periphery.  Block 3 occupies a central position and plays a primary (i.e., network coordination) 
role.  As public agencies join the network, the size of the central and primary block becomes 
bigger (5 nonprofits) as compared to the nonprofit joint program network (3 nonprofits) or the 
joint program network with businesses (2 nonprofits).  This relates to structural changes from the 
reduced dominance of the two hub nonprofits.  While businesses make most of their connections 
with the two hub nonprofits, public agencies have joint program relationships with other 
nonprofits besides the two hubs; only 25% (2/8) of ties from public agencies are with the two 
hub nonprofits, while 75% (6/8) of ties from public agencies are with the other nonprofits.  Block 
4 also occupies a central position and plays a broker role.  Block 1, 2 and 5 are identified as 
periphery position occupants.   
 
Table VI-54) Typology for structural positions for joint program relations 
Position  (gk-1)/ (g-1) 
Within tie/ 
Between tie P(Bk) Typology I Typology III 
Block 1 0.1 0 1.25 Broker Intermediate-periphery 
Block 2 0.2333 0 1.125 Broker Periphery 
Block 3 0.1333 0.1429 18 Primary Central 
Block 4 0.0667 0 6.67 Broker Central 
Block 5 0.3333 0 1.27 Broker Intermediate-periphery 
* The median of P(Bk) is 1.27. And mean is 5.66.  
 
Descriptions of overall blockmodel 
 
Table VI-55) Permuted image matrix of joint program network 
           3     5     2     4     1 
         ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
      3  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0  
      5  1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
      2  1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
      4  1(RE) 0     0     0     1(RE) 
      1  0     0     0     1(RE) 0 
   
The image matrix in Table VI-55 is almost the same as that of the nonprofit joint program 
image matrix (Table VI-18).  However, there are two differences in structures.  First, as 
discussed above, the network structure is a central-periphery system, not a central-intermediate-
periphery system, which is the network structure of the joint program network comprised of 
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nonprofits.  Second, peripheral blocks are more dependent on the central block because 
peripheral blocks (1, 2 and 5) are not internally cohesive.  Only central block 3 is a cohesive 
subgroup.  Therefore, even though the image matrix is the same or at least similar, interpretation 
of the network structure should be different.  For this reason, the sociogram should be drawn 
differently.  Figure VI-19 illustrates the joint program network when public agencies are 
introduced (compare this figure with Figure VI-6).  
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Figure VI-19) Reduced sociogram of joint program network 
 
Block 4 plays a local broker role between a central block 3 and a periphery block 161.  
Block 3 is strategically significant in this network because it coordinates or mediates the joint 
program relationship of all organizations in this network.   
In sum, the effects of public agencies’ involvement are different from those of 
businesses’ involvement.  While the latter makes the network simpler and brings a slight change 
in the network structure, the former causes more changes in the network structure, which 
indicates that public agencies are embedded in the joint program network.  Finally, the 
phenomenon of the seamless economy is again evidenced through the same or similar 
collaboration patterns of nonprofits and public agencies; the coexistence of block 2 and 4 provide 
evidence for blurring boundaries between the nonprofit and public sector.  
                                                 
61 Though block 4 is visually below block 3, this is because it plays a broker role, not because it occupies an 
intermediate or periphery position in the network. 
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6.6 SUMMARY: COMPARISONS OF BLOCKMODELS 
This chapter has described the reduced model of collaboration networks in three separated 
sections. This final section summarizes analysis results of blockmodeling from a comparative 
perspective; comparing structural properties of ‘blockmodels composed of nonprofits’ with 
‘blockmodels when other sectors are introduced.’  The comparisons provide more evidence of 
blurring boundaries.  In order to examine whether the involvement of other sectors has impacts 
on blurring boundaries, this study first summarizes the structural changes when two sectors are 
introduced in the nonprofit collaboration networks (Table VI-56).  Then, this study applies 
another comparison using cohesiveness of within block and whole blockmodel (Table VI-57 and 
58).  It is expected that multiple approaches can clarify the effects of the involvement of the 
business and public sectors more clearly.   
 
Table VI-56) Summary of changes in network structure 
 42 NPOs NPO and business (1) 
NPO and 
government (2) 
Structural 
change 
No 
change 
Information 
sharing 
network 
Central-periphery  
Central-
intermediary-
periphery system 
Central-periphery (1) (2) 
Work 
referrals 
network 
Mixture of a 
centralized and 
hierarchy 
Mixture of a 
centralized and 
hierarchy 
Mixture of a 
centralized and 
hierarchy 
 (1), (2) 
Regular 
meeting 
network 
Central-periphery 
with one isolate 
Mixture of central-
periphery and 
cohesive subgroup 
Central-periphery (1) (2) 
Resource 
sharing 
network 
Central-periphery  
Mixture of central-
periphery and 
hierarchy  
Central-
intermediary-
periphery 
(1), (2)  
Formal 
contract 
network 
Cohesive subgroup Cohesive subgroup Hierarchy (2) (1) 
Joint 
program 
network 
Central-
intermediate-
periphery  
Centralized system Central-periphery (1), (2)  
 
Table VI-56 examines if there is evidence of blurring boundaries caused by the 
introduction of the business or public sector.  From a structural perspective, two types of less 
intensive collaboration network show that there are negligible changes in the network structure 
when the business and public sectors are introduced; the central-periphery structure in the 
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information sharing network and the sender-broker-receiver structure in the work referral 
network remain.  However, the information sharing network is structurally changed when 
businesses participate; the network changes from a central-periphery to central-intermediary-
periphery system.  Although the work referral network does not change structurally, the network 
shows a division of labor when two sectors are involved in the work referral network. The public 
(and nonprofit) sector is a sender, the nonprofit sector is a service coordinator and the business 
(and nonprofit) sector is a service deliverer.  This system is not the traditional hierarchical 
command and order system but rather a voluntarily organized system composed of voluntary 
participation and coordination of organizations by several nonprofits.  In the previous two 
chapters, this system is called the social service system or value chain system and is evidenced to 
be efficient in delivering social services.  In the regular meeting network, when businesses are 
involved, the network structure changes from a central-periphery to a mixture of central-
periphery and cohesive subgroup system.  When public agencies are involved, the network 
structures of the strategic collaboration networks change from a mixture of central-periphery and 
hierarchy to a central-intermediary-periphery system in the resource sharing network, from a 
cohesive subgroup system to a hierarchy system in the formal contract network, and from a 
central-intermediate-periphery system to a central-periphery system in the joint program network.   
In sum, while the impact of the introduction of the business sector is conspicuous in the 
less intensive networks (i.e., information sharing and regular meeting network), the impact of the 
public sector is obvious in the strategic collaboration networks.  This indicates that blurring 
effects are noticeable in 1) the less intensive collaboration networks when the business sector 
participates and 2) in the strategic collaboration networks when the public sector participates.   
The blurring boundaries between the sectors can also be examined by looking at the local 
and whole blockmodel cohesiveness of blockmodels.  Local cohesiveness is measured by the 
number of cohesive subgroups in a blockmodel.  When actors in a block cohesively are 
connected within their subgroup, this block is locally, within a subgroup, cohesive.  Whole 
blockmodel cohesiveness is measured by blockmodel density62.  Blockmodel density is useful in 
understanding how blocks in a blockmodel are well (or poorly) connected.  The high density of a 
blockmodel indicates that blocks in the blockmodel are strongly connected to each other.  In this 
                                                 
62 Blockmodel density is ‘the proportion of all inter-block ties that could be present that actually are.’  This is also 
expressed in terms of an equation;   dB = g/[n*(n-1)], where g = ties that are present, n = the number of block.   B
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sense, the degree of block density shows how cohesively blocks interact across the whole 
network.  Table VI-57 and 58 illustrate changes of local and the whole blockmodel cohesiveness 
according to the involvement of two sectors.   
 
Table VI-57) Comparison of local cohesiveness (cohesive subgroup) 
Number of cohesive subgroup 
 NPO %* NPO and business  %* 
NPO and 
government  %* 
Information 
sharing network 3 60% 2 33.3% 3 50% 
Work referrals 
network 2 40% 2 40% 2 33.3% 
Regular meeting 
network 1 20% 3 75% 3 75% 
Resource 
sharing network 1 25% 3 60% 1 20% 
Formal contract 
network 3 100% 3 75% 1 20% 
Joint program 
network 3 60% 2 66.7% 1 20% 
* %:  the number of cohesive subgroup block divided by the total number of block times 100 
 
Table VI-58) Comparison of the whole blockmodel cohesiveness (blockmodel density) 
Blockmodel density  42 NPOs NPO and business NPO and government  
Information 
sharing network 60% 40% 53.3% 
Work referrals 
network 40% 40% 40% 
Regular meeting 
network 40% 33.3% 58.3% 
Resource 
sharing network 50% 40% 50% 
Formal contract 
network 0% 16.7% 40% 
Joint program 
network 40% 67.7% 40% 
 
Four networks reveal significant changes of local and whole network cohesiveness.  First, 
when public agencies are introduced in the regular meeting network, both local and whole 
network cohesiveness increases.  The same pattern happens when businesses join the joint 
program network.  Increases of both local and whole network cohesiveness indicate 
connectedness of within subgroups.  Simultaneously, inter-blocks become stronger.  These 
simultaneous increases of two types of cohesiveness are expected to bring synergistic effects to 
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network connectedness.  The synergistic effects in turn will result in network solidarity.  Second, 
when public agencies are introduced in the formal contract network, local cohesiveness 
significantly declines but whole network cohesiveness considerably increases.  When actors in 
the same block do not have connections, they depend on actors outside their block for their 
relationships.  For this reason, centralization of the network happens when within block 
cohesiveness decreases and inter-block relations increase.  In this case, as seen in the formal 
contract network, the network structure changes to a hierarchy or centralized system.  Third, 
when businesses are introduced in the regular meeting and resource sharing network, local 
cohesiveness significantly increases but whole network cohesiveness decreases.  When local 
cohesiveness increases and whole blockmodel cohesiveness decreases simultaneously, the 
network becomes more localized.  This is because within block relationships become more 
cohesive and inter-block relationships become less connected.  Fourth, when businesses 
participate in the information sharing network, both types of cohesiveness notably decrease.  
When both types of cohesiveness decrease, the actors in the network become more fragmentized, 
which is intuitively understandable.   
In sum, more than half of the nonprofit collaboration networks prove to be structurally 
changed when business and public sector organizations are introduced.  This implies that 
structural integration happens when other sectors join the nonprofit network, which is empirical 
evidence for blurring boundary.    
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VII. COLLABORATION PATTERNS BY ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous three chapters dealt with nonprofit collaboration patterns within the nonprofit 
sector and across the business and public sectors from the perspective of network analysis.  
While network analysis is very useful in uncovering collaboration patterns through the external 
features (i.e., relations) of organizations, it has limitations in investigating the impact on internal 
characteristics of organization.  In order to be counter this weakness in network analysis, this 
chapter conducts two types of regression analysis; multiple regression and logistic regression.  
There are two major findings resulting from this analysis.  First, nonprofits that run social 
enterprise and/or have diverse revenue sources are highly likely to collaborate with others.  
Large size nonprofits that have high organizational capability show low likelihood of 
collaborating with other nonprofits.  Second, nonprofits that prefer businesses as strategic 
collaboration partners and nonprofits that prefer public agencies as strategic collaboration 
partners show contradictory characteristics.  Nonprofits that favor businesses as their strategic 
collaboration partners are relatively younger, have diverse programs, and are more likely to 
make high commercial revenues; nonprofits that choose public agencies are relatively old, have a 
small number of programs, and are negatively associated with commercial activities.   
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section describes the statistical distribution of the organizational attributes of the 33 
nonprofit organizations which responded to the survey.  If the purpose of this study were to 
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prove or test any hypothesis or theory, it would not be appropriate to interpret results from 
statistical analysis with 33 cases.  However, this study explores or predicts plausible 
collaboration patterns through relationships among variables through statistical methods.  One 
should be extremely cautious in interpreting results in this chapter because results may be biased 
due to small sample size (even though statistical significance is high).   
 
Table VII-1) Descriptive statistics of attribute variables 
  N Scale Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Strategic collaboration with 
Business 33 Dummy 0 1 .36 .489 
Strategic collaboration with 
Government 33 Dummy 0 1 .36 .489 
Collaboration Relationship 
Index 33 Ratio 6 307 66.42 58.055 
Proportion of board member 
from business 29 Ratio(%) 0 100 43.61 36.94032 
Proportion of revenue source 
from government 31 Ratio(%) 0 95 12.89 25.94207 
Proportion of revenue source 
from commercial activity 31 Ratio(%) 0 95 18.41 27.89273 
Total annual expenditure 32 Ratio($) 2,000.00 53,987,589.0 3,366,523.09 10,618,918.95 
Proportion of administrative 
expenditure 31 Ratio(%) 0 62.60 18.40 16.64572 
Years in operation 33 Ratio 1 151 46.61 44.73669 
Revenue diversity 31 Ratio 1 7 4.23 1.82043 
Program diversity 32 Ratio 1 13 5.03 3.69380 
Government revenue dummy 31 Dummy 0 1 .355 .48637 
social enterprise revenue 
dummy 31 Dummy 0 1 .161 .37388 
 
 Most of responded surveys provided many kinds of organizational data.  However, some 
organizations did not answer certain types of questions because they did not have the exact 
information for these questions63.  This study uses a total of 13 variables for two regression 
analyses64 (Table VII-1).  Among them, there are four dummy variables and the other variables 
are ratio-scale variables.  Two dummy variables (government revenue and social enterprise 
revenue) are used in multiple regression and the other two (strategic collaboration with business 
and strategic collaboration with government) are used in logistic regression.  Nine ratio-scale 
                                                 
63 For example, an associate director of one nonprofit emailed the author that she could not provide information 
regarding budgets because the nonprofit is a branch of a nation-wide nonprofit, and she does not have the 
information about the budget geographically limited to Pittsburgh region (she told the author that she only has 
Pennsylvania state level information). 
64 The definitions of variables will be presented in the next two sections. 
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variables are used in both regression models.  Table VII-2 represents correlations between nine 
organizational attributes, of which scale is ratio-level.   
 The correlation analysis illustrates a couple of interesting findings.  First, a nonprofit that 
is active in collaboration has relatively diverse revenue sources, as well as various programs.  As 
the proportion of board members affiliated with the business sector increases, the nonprofit may 
be more active in collaboration65.  It cannot be said that other organizational attributes have any 
association with nonprofits’ efforts to make collaboration because they are not strongly 
statistically significant. 
Second, the more money a nonprofit receives from the public sector, the more programs 
and revenue sources it has.  In particular, nonprofits’ dependency on government for revenue 
source and the size of budget (total annual expenditure) are strongly correlated with each other 
(the correlation coefficient is about 0.7 at 0.01 significant level).  This implies that increased 
funds from governments increase nonprofit size.  These two variables are not included in the 
same regression model because of multicollinearity problem.   
Third, nonprofits that are more oriented to commercial activities for their revenue 
generation show different patterns.  According to Table VII-2, these nonprofits spend more on 
administrative expenditures than other nonprofits that have relatively less commercial activities.  
Besides, as nonprofits become more interested in business methods, they are likely to reduce 
their revenue from public agencies.  Also, the older a nonprofit is, the more commercial activities 
it has.  Following sections will provide more refined statistical analysis to explore the effects of 
organizational attributes on the behavior of nonprofits when they collaborate within and across 
the sectors. 
 
65 P-value of correlation coefficient between these two variables is 0.13, which indicates that there may be some 
correlations between the two variables, even though statistically insignificant.  Likewise, this study assumes that 
there may be correlations if the p-value is under 0.2 because a p-value of 0.2 means that the possibility of correlation 
between variable A and B is more than 80%.   
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Table VII-2) Pearson correlation between organizational attributes 
  
Collaboration 
Relationship 
Index 
Proportion of 
board member 
from business 
Revenue from 
commercial 
activity 
Total annual 
expenditure 
Proportion of 
administrative 
expenditure 
Years in 
operation 
Revenue 
diversity 
Program 
diversity 
Proportion of 
revenue from 
government 
1 .288 -.076 -.025 -.119 -.143 .507(**) .308(***) .053 
. .130 .686 .893 .524 .428 .004 .087 .776 
Collaboration 
Relationship 
Index 33 29 31 32 31 33 31 32 31 
.288 1 .079 .308 -.255 .345(***) .470(*) .245 .307 
.130 . .694 .110 .199 .066 .013 .208 .119 
Proportion of 
board member 
from business 29 29 27 28 27 29 27 28 27 
-.076 .079 1 -.035 .357(***) .398(*) .141 -.290 -.239 
.686 .694 . .853 .052 .027 .450 .120 .194 
Proportion of 
revenue from 
commercial 
activity 31 27 31 31 30 31 31 30 31 
-.025 .308 -.035 1 -.064 .485(**) .246 .111 .673(**) 
.893 .110 .853 . .732 .005 .183 .553 .000 
Total annual 
expenditure 
 32 28 31 32 31 32 31 31 31 
-.119 -.255 .357(***) -.064 1 .088 .126 .046 -.022 
.524 .199 .052 .732 . .636 .508 .811 .907 
Proportion of 
administrative 
expenditure 31 27 30 31 31 31 30 30 30 
-.143 .345(***) .398(*) .485(**) .088 1 .262 .171 .214 
.428 .066 .027 .005 .636 . .155 .351 .248 
Years in 
operation 
 33 29 31 32 31 33 31 32 31 
.507(**) .470(*) .141 .246 .126 .262 1 .251 .332(***) 
.004 .013 .450 .183 .508 .155 . .181 .068 
Revenue 
diversity 
 
 31 27 31 31 30 31 31 30 31 
.308(***) .245 -.290 .111 .046 .171 .251 1 .321(***) 
.087 .208 .120 .553 .811 .351 .181 . .084 
Program 
diversity 
 
 32 28 30 31 30 32 30 32 30 
.053 .307 -.239 .673(**) -.022 .214 .332(***) .321(***) 1 
.776 .119 .194 .000 .907 .248 .068 .084 . 
Proportion of 
revenue  from 
government 31 27 31 31 30 31 31 30 31 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).  **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
 
7.3 MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL 
Though the simple descriptive statistics in the previous section revealed some interesting 
findings, they are not complete.  For more thorough examination, this chapter conducts 
regression analysis.   
7.3.1 Model description 
The objective of the multiple regression model is to explore the following questions; what kind 
of organizational factors affect nonprofit collaborative behaviors?  How much can independent 
variables - nonprofit entrepreneurial efforts, nonprofit dependency on government, size, and so 
forth - explain nonprofit exertion to collaborate with other nonprofits?  In order to answer the 
questions, this study builds a multiple regression model.   
The dependent variable is CRI (collaborative relationships index).  The bigger the 
dependent variable is, the stronger the nonprofit maintains collaborative relationships with other 
organizations.  Thus, the dependent variable represents a ‘tendency to collaborate with others.’  
There are six independent variables.    
● GR (Government revenue dummy): if a nonprofit generates revenues from government.   
If it does, the nonprofit is assigned a value of one, if not, zero.   
● SE (Social enterprise revenue dummy): if a nonprofit generates revenues from social 
enterprise.  If it does, the nonprofit is assigned a value of one, if not, zero. 
● RD (Revenue diversity): how many sources a nonprofit has for generating its revenues.  
Revenue diversity ranges from zero to eleven.   
● PD (Program diversity):  how many social service programs a nonprofit provides.  The 
range of program diversity is from zero to thirteen. 
● TAE : total annual expenditure in the most recent fiscal year.  
● YEAR: the number of years since the nonprofit was founded. 
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7.3.2 Model specification 
In order to specify the most suitable multiple regression model, this study conducts three 
analyses.  First, this study attempts to identify if there are interaction effects between the two 
dummy variables.  The two variables do not have interactive effects because two profiles do not 
cross each other (See Appendix 10-1).  The two variables have mutually exclusive effect on CRI. 
Second, this study tries to identify interaction effects between dummy variables and other 
independent variables.  The social enterprise revenue dummy variable does not have any 
interactive effect with the other four ratio-scale independent variables (See Appendix 10-2 and 3).  
However, government revenue dummy variable seems to have interactive effects with revenue 
diversity (See Appendix 10-4 and 5).  For this reason, if revenue diversity is not controlled, the 
effect of the two-way interaction will bias the multiple regression results.  This study treated this 
problem by adding one more variable, which is an interactive term (revenue diversity × 
government revenue dummy).   
Finally, this study checked for multicollinearity among the four ratio scale independent 
variables using correlation tables (refer to Table VII-2).  Overall, most of the independent 
variables do not strongly associate with each other because the correlation coefficients between 
them are relatively small.   
7.3.3 Analysis results 
First, in order to document overall impacts66 of organizational characteristics on collaboration 
efforts, this study presents results of multiple regression analysis without specifying a 
statistically best-fit model.  For the whole model significance, this multiple regression model is 
significant at 0.01 level (See Appendix 10-7).  And the model’s ability to explain the variance of 
the dependent variable is quite good (R-square is 0.63).   
 
 
 
                                                 
66 This study calls this “overall patterns of collaboration” because the dependent variable in the this section, CRI, 
covers from the least intensive type of collaboration to the most intensive type of collaboration.   
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Table VII-3) Regression coefficients of multiple regression model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients   
  B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. 
(Constant) -11.158 24.713  -.452 .656 
SE** 65.396 26.595 .376 2.459 .022 
RD* 19.108 6.439 .586 2.968 .007 
YEAR -.362 .218 -.276 -1.659 .111 
TAE -8.192E-07 .000 -.149 -.839 .411 
PD*** 4.354 2.285 .269 1.906 .070 
GR -90.610 72.443 -.738 -1.251 .224 
Interaction term: GR times RD 11.415 13.234 .549 .863 .398 
* significant at 0.01 level  ** significant at 0.05 level  *** significant at 0.1 level 
 
Table VII-3 illustrates regression results.  For the convenience of presenting regression 
results, this study rebuilds the results into an equation below.   
 
● Whole model of multiple regression 
Y = – 11.158 + 65.396SE + 19.108RD – 0.362YEAR – 0.000000819TAE 
 + 4.354PD – 90.61GR + 11.415INT 
 
Three variables - social enterprise, revenue diversity, and program diversity - are found to be 
statistically significant.  First, social enterprise is positively associated with the dependent 
variable, which means that nonprofits that generate revenue from social enterprise have strong 
collaboration relationships with other nonprofits.  On the other hand, when nonprofits receive 
money from government, their tendency to collaborate with others appears to decrease.  Second, 
nonprofits that have diverse sources and/or that provide various programs have stronger 
collaborative relations with other nonprofits.  However, year67 is negatively associated with CRI.  
This implies that as nonprofits age, they become self-sufficient and their tendency to collaborate 
                                                 
67 P-value of the regression coefficient is 0.11, which indicates that this variable is able to explain a certain portion 
of the dependent variable, even though it is slightly statistically insignificant.  In the following section, this study 
assumes that a regression coefficient has ability to explain the dependent variable if the p-value is under 0.2.   
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with other nonprofits reduces.  Finally, it is difficult to tell if the two variables (TAE and INT) 
are able to explain the dependent variable.   
In order to present more probable hypotheses, this study specifies a statistically best-fit 
regression model.  For a method to specify model, this study applies a stepwise regression 
approach.  Compared to the above regression model, the specified model is statistically more 
significant because the p-value of the F-test slightly improves (0.008 to 0.000).  However, the 
ability to explain the variances of the dependent variable reduces slightly, from 0.63 to 0.52.  
This decrease is due to the omission of four independent variables.  Considering that four out of 
seven variables are removed, the decrease span of 0.1 is comparatively small.  Therefore, 
although R-square decreases to 0.52, this value is still enough to explain the variance of the 
dependent variable.   
 
Table VII-4) Regression coefficients of the best-fit model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Collinearity Statistics   
  B Std. Error Beta 
t Sig. 
Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -7.623 20.364  -.374 .711   
RD* 17.070 4.589 .523 3.719 .001 .930 1.076 
SE* 88.685 25.617 .509 3.462 .002 .850 1.176 
TAE** -1.964E-06 .000 -.357 -2.384 .025 .821 1.218 
* significant at 0.01 level.  ** significant at 0.05 level.  
 
Table VII-4 represents the best-fit model and is rephrased into the equation form below.  
Since the tolerances of the three variables are high, it can be said that there is only a negligible 
amount of multicollinearity in the best-fit model.   
 
● Best-fit model 
Y = -7.623 + 88.685SE + 17.07RD – 0.000001964TAE 
 
Before completing interpretations of the above model, this study conducted a post-
examination of the regression model (i.e., residual analysis) to see if the model violated 
assumptions of regression model.  The best-fit multiple regression model does not violate basic 
assumptions of regression because 1) residuals are normally distributed, which is confirmed by 
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residual analysis.  A residual histogram is normally distributed and patterns of residuals in the p-
p plot are located along the diagonal (See Appendix 10-10 and 11).  And 2) the model appears to 
keep the heteroscedasticity assumption because it is difficult to detect certain patterns of 
residuals in the scatterplots (See Appendix 10-12 to 15).  Because the best-fit model is quite 
robust in terms of statistical properties, this study can propose hypotheses from this model.   
As shown in the whole regression model, revenue diversity and social enterprise 
variables have a significant ability to explain the dependent variable - the strength of the 
collaboration.  For example, if a nonprofit generates revenues from social enterprise activity, this 
nonprofit maintains stronger collaborative relationships (i.e., 89 CRI points more) than other 
nonprofits that do not.  In addition, the size of nonprofits (i.e., total expenditure) is negatively 
associated with the strength of collaboration.  This indicates that if the size increases by $1M, the 
strength of collaboration would decrease by about 20 points in the CRI.  One should be careful in 
interpreting these results.  Considering results from blockmodeling (refer to Chapter 6 section 
6.3.7), it would be reasonable to state that this negative association does not apply to nonprofits 
whose size is below $1M.  On the basis of these results, this study suggests three hypotheses.   
1) A nonprofit which is active or interested in entrepreneurial management is likely to 
make significantly stronger collaborative relationships with other nonprofits.   
2) A nonprofit which has diverse revenue sources is likely to make significantly stronger 
collaborative relationships with other nonprofits.   
3) As the size of a nonprofit increases, the tendency to provide social services in 
collaboration with other nonprofits reduces significantly. 
7.4 LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
The previous section explored nonprofit within sector collaboration patterns by looking at the 
impacts of organizational characteristics on nonprofits CRI.  In this section, this study focuses on 
the cross-sector collaboration patterns of strategic collaboration.  By doing this, the study tries to 
answer the following question; what kinds of nonprofits’ characteristics affect choice of 
businesses or public agencies with which to partner.  Specifically, this study explores the effects 
of the same organizational factors that were discussed in the previous section but in the context 
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of strategic collaboration with either of the business or public sector.  For example, commercial 
activity of nonprofits could be positively related to strategic collaborative relationships with 
businesses, but the same factor would inversely affect or have no association with strategic 
collaboration with the public sector.  In sum, the two purposes in this section are: 1) to identify 
which organizational attributes contribute to the choice of strategic collaboration with the 
business or public sector, and 2) to compare directions (i.e. positive or negative) of attributes on 
the choice of strategic collaboration with the two different sectors.   
Logistic regression is well suited to these purposes.  Logistic regression is not only 
designed to deal with binary dependent variable (the choice of businesses or public agencies for 
strategic collaboration partners), but also allows interpretation and explanation of the coefficients 
of various independent variables on the basis of a logistic cumulative probability curve.  A 
logistic cumulative probability curve approximates a normal curve but its tails are flatter than a 
normal curve68 (Gujarati, 1995).  The below Equation 1 is a logistic distribution function.  Using 
odds ratio and natural log, a logistic regression model can be drawn as in an Equation 2.   
 
P(Y) = (1 + e-Yi)-1 -------------- Equation 1 
Where, Yi = β0 + ∑ βiXi 
Li = ln(Pi/1-Pi) = Yi = β0 + ∑ βiXi -------------- Equation 2 
 
This study proposes two logistic models because it explores patterns of nonprofit 
collaboration with two different sectors.  Each model has a different dependent variable but the 
same independent variables.  These models are described in the below Table VII-5.  The two 
dependent variables are if a nonprofit has a strategic collaboration with businesses and if a 
nonprofit has a strategic collaboration with public agencies.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 Thus, logistic regression does not make any assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance for 
the independent variables.   
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Table VII-5) Variables in two logistic regression models 
 
Dependent variable 
 ● Model 1: YB = 1 if strategic collaborative relationships with business, 0 otherwise B
● Model 2: YP = 1 if strategic collaborative relationships with public sector, 0 otherwise 
 
Independent variables 
● BUSBOARD: Proportion of board member from business. 
● GOVREVEN: Proportion of revenue source from government 
● COMREVEN: Proportion of revenue source from commercial activity 
● REVDIVER: Revenue diversity 
● PROGDIVE: Program diversity 
● YEAR: Years in operation 
● ADMNEXP: Proportion of administrative expenditure in the total expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two models share the same seven independent variables as shown in Table VII-5.  There 
are two variables concerned with the business-oriented behaviors of nonprofits (BUSBOARD 
and COMREVEN).  These variables are expected to be positively associated with the dependent 
variable in the Model 1, but negatively associated in Model 2.  On the other hand, the 
GOVREVEN variable describes a nonprofits preference for the public sector.  It is expected to 
be positively associated with the dependent variable in Model 2, but negatively associated in 
Model 1.  Three variables (ADMNEXP, REVDIVER, and PROGDIVE) represent managerial 
capacity of nonprofits.  The direction of these variables is not clear a priori.   Finally, a variable 
for the size (total expenditure) is not included in the model because it is too strongly correlated 
with the GOVREVEN variable (refer to the section 7.2).  Instead, this study includes the YEAR 
variable because it is strongly correlated with expenditure variable but does not show any 
correlations with the GOVREVEN variable.       
 
Model 1: YB = strategic collaborative relations with business 
Table VII-6 illustrates analysis results when YB is one or a nonprofit has strategic 
collaborative relationships with business.  This table includes two analysis results; the whole 
model and best-fit model.  The whole model takes into account all seven independent variables, 
regardless of their statistical significances.  The whole model attempts to describe general 
inclinations of various organizational characteristics.  The best-fit model enables one to produce 
plausible hypotheses because the model is more reliable (i.e., it is statistically significant).  
B
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Table VII-6) Variables in the first logistic regression model 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
BUSBOARD .032 .027 1.395 1 .238 1.032 
COMREVEN .106 .061 3.029 1 .082 1.112 
ADMNEXP -.196 .110 3.167 1 .075 .822 
YEAR -.047 .032 2.203 1 .138 .954 
REVDIVER -.310 .411 .570 1 .450 .733 
PROGDIVE .765 .415 3.398 1 .065 2.149 
GOVREVEN -.006 .039 .026 1 .872 .994 
Whole model 
Constant -.252 2.047 .015 1 .902 .777 
COMREVEN* .108 .053 4.152 1 .042 1.114 
ADMNEXP* -.166 .078 4.583 1 .032 .847 
YEAR -.036 .022 2.673 1 .102 .964 
PROGDIVE* .622 .280 4.926 1 .026 1.863 
Best-fit model 
Constant -.725 1.207 .361 1 .548 .484 
* significant at 0.05 level. 
 
● Whole model 
YB = – 0.252 – 0.31REVDIVER + 0.756PROGDIVE + 0.106COMREVEN B
+ 0.032BUSBOARD – 0.047YEAR – 0.196ADMNEXP – 0.006GOVREVEN  
 
As expected, the two variables that represent business-oriented behaviors of nonprofits 
(revenue from commercial activities and proportion of board members from the business sector) 
are positively associated with strategic collaboration with businesses.  The direction of the 
BUSBOARD variable confirms the preceding research by Wellman (1988).  Board members’ 
affiliation with the business sector provides managers in the nonprofit sector with more chances 
or easy access to a number of trusted business firms, with which nonprofits can make strategic 
collaborative relationships. According to Wellman (1988), these links through board members 
enable nonprofits to acquire inside information about activities of business firms.  Thus, 
nonprofits with more information about the business sector are more likely to have strategic 
collaborations with the business sector.  A nonprofit’s dependence on government for revenue is 
negatively correlated with this dependent variable.  However, we cannot tell that this is correct 
because the coefficient is statistically insignificant.  In order to generate more probable 
propositions, this study conducts model specification, which is a backward stepwise approach.  It 
is necessary to check -2 log-likelihood statistic when building a model through backward 
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stepwise because -2 log-likelihood statistic can be used for assessing the significance of logistic 
regression model.  -2 log-likelihood improves from 17.898 to 19.863 when three variables are 
removed.   
 
● Best fit model69
YB = – 0.725 + 0.662PROGDIVE + 0.108COMREVEN – 0.036YEAR – 0.166ADMNEXP B
 
From the above best-fit model, this study induces the two results.  First, a nonprofit’s 
choice of businesses as a strategic collaboration partner is positively associated with commercial 
activity and program diversity.  Second, the dependent variable is negatively associated with 
years in operation and administrative expenditures.  On the basis of these results, this study 
proposes the following hypotheses;  
1) Nonprofits which provide diverse programs show a significantly higher likelihood of 
making strategic collaboration with businesses. 
2) Nonprofits that operate more commercial activities for their revenue generation show a 
significantly higher likelihood of making strategic collaboration with businesses.  
3) The younger nonprofits are, the more active they are in making strategic collaborations 
with businesses.  The reason for this tendency will be discussed in Model 2.   
4) Strategic collaboration with businesses is likely to bring positive consequences to 
nonprofits in terms of efficient operation of the organization because there is a significantly 
lower likelihood of administrative expenditure.   
 
Model 2: YP = strategic collaborative relations with public sector 
Table VII-7 represents results of the second model – when nonprofits have strategic 
collaboration with public agencies.   
 
 
 
                                                 
69 In the best-fit model, one regression coefficient (YEAR) is a little over the statistical significance level.  This 
study interprets this coefficient as a plausible effect on the dependent variable because 1) this study is not designed 
to test statistical significance, 2) the significance level is close to the 0.1, and 3) increases in significance of the 
model are very marginal when these variables are removed (See the Appendix).  Thus, it is not unrealistic to assume 
that this variable has impacts on the dependent variable.    
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Table VII-7) Variables in the second logistic regression model 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
BUSBOARD -.008 .017 .241 1 .624 .992 
COMREVEN -.043 .042 1.062 1 .303 .958 
ADMNEXP -.010 .036 .074 1 .785 .990 
YEAR .035 .022 2.490 1 .115 1.036 
REVDIVER .678 .431 2.471 1 .116 1.970 
PROGDIVE -.373 .227 2.698 1 .100 .689 
GOVREVEN .029 .030 .929 1 .335 1.030 
Whole model 
Constant -2.306 1.876 1.512 1 .219 .100 
COMREVEN -.055 .035 2.488 1 .115 .947 
YEAR* .036 .020 3.286 1 .070 1.037 
REVDIVER* .700 .402 3.029 1 .082 2.015 
PROGDIVE* -.350 .192 3.311 1 .069 .705 
Best-fit model 
Constant -2.595 1.71 2.307 1 .129 .075 
* significant at 0.1 level. 
 
● Whole model 
YP = – 2.306 + 0.678REVDIVER – 0.373PROGDIVE – 0.043COMREVEN 
– 0.008BUSBOARD + 0.035YEAR – 0.01ADMNEXP  
 
As shown in the whole model equation above, when nonprofits make strategic collaboration with 
public agencies, they may generate more revenue from government sources.  Though the 
statistical significance is not that high (p-value is 0.33), it is not negligible when one considers its 
substantial significance – for example, formal contracts with governments usually mean revenue 
flows from governments to nonprofits.  On the other hand, business-oriented behaviors are 
negatively associated with a nonprofit’s choice of public agencies as strategic collaboration 
partners.  However, we cannot tell whether the BUSBOARD variable has any ability to explain 
the dependent variable because it is not statistical significance.  Other variables related to 
organizational management reveal interesting results.  Revenue diversity and years in operation 
are positively associated with nonprofit choice of public agencies for strategic collaboration 
partners.  Program diversity and administrative expenditure turn out to be negatively associated 
with the dependent variable.  The effects of administrative expenditure cannot be reported as a 
plausible result because its statistical significance is too low.  In order to produce plausible 
hypotheses, this study conducts model specification.  The below equation illustrates the result.   
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● Best fit model70
YP = – 2.595 + 0.7REVDIVER – 0.35PROGDIVE – 0.055COMREVE + 0.036YEAR 
 
-2 log-likelihood, which is a statistic for assessing goodness of fit in logistic regression 
model, shows slight increases (from 23.86 to 24.91) when three variables are eliminated.  From 
this model, this study suggests the following four hypotheses; 
1) Nonprofits which maintain diverse sources of revenues are highly likely to make 
strategic collaboration with public agencies. 
2) There is a significantly lower likelihood of commercial activities when nonprofits have 
strategic collaboration with public agencies.  
3) The well established nonprofits, in terms of its years in operation, show a significantly 
higher tendency to make strategic collaboration with public agencies.  This result implies that 
nonprofits that maintained relationships with government before the government’s shrink periods 
of social service expenditures (i.e., 1980’s) still maintain relationships with governments based 
on the trust built in their long-term relationships.  On the contrary, nonprofits which established 
within about 30 years have not depended much on governments because 1) when they launched 
nonprofits, competition for government funds was already severe and 2) they did not have 
enough time to build trust with government.  Therefore, these nonprofits took another direction 
for sustaining an organization – adopting business-skills and social enterprises for their revenue 
generation.   
4) When nonprofits provide various types of programs, they show a significantly lower 
likelihood of making strategic collaboration with public agencies.  When the government offers 
grants or contracts with nonprofits, government usually requires the nonprofit to provide a 
specific type of social service rather than offering money for unspecified programs.   
When we compare the two best-fit models, there emerges an interesting finding: the two 
models share three independent variables (program diversity, commercial activity and years in 
operation) and each of their directions is opposite.  Since the same organizational characteristics 
work oppositely when nonprofits try to make strategic collaboration with the different sectors, 
                                                 
70 In the best fit model, one regression coefficient (COMREVEN) is slightly over the statistical significance level.  
This study interpret this coefficient as having plausible effects on the dependent variable because 1) this study is not 
designed to test statistical significance, 2) the significance level is close to the 0.1, and 3) increases of significance in 
the model are very marginal when these variables are removed (See the Appendix).  Thus, it is not unrealistic to 
assume this variable has impacts on the dependent variable.   
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nonprofits should be careful when they consider strategic collaboration partners.  When 
nonprofits plan to make strategic collaboration across sectors, managers in those nonprofits 
should begin by assessing their organization.  If the organization is relatively young, provides 
many programs, and uses business skills for revenue generation, the nonprofit is better choosing 
businesses as a strategic collaboration partner.  When a nonprofit retains diverse sources of 
revenue and organizational characteristics are contrary to the above case, the nonprofit should 
select public agencies as strategic collaboration partners.   
7.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has explored how organizational attributes contribute to a nonprofit’s collaboration 
patterns through the use of statistical analytic methods.  This chapter uncovered several 
distinctive collaboration patterns of nonprofits.   
First, nonprofits which strive to enhance their organizational capacities through the 
adoption of business skills (i.e., social enterprise) and the diversification of their revenue sources 
are significantly more likely to collaborate with other organizations.  Second, when nonprofits 
make strategic collaboration across the sectors, organizational characteristics turn out to be 
different according to sector collaboration.  Nonprofits that prefer businesses as their strategic 
collaboration partners over public agencies will have organizational characteristics such as a high 
proportion of revenue from commercial activities, delivery of diverse social service programs, 
relatively younger years in operation, and efficiency in the administration.  On the contrary, 
nonprofits that prefer public agencies as their strategic collaboration partners will have 
organizational characteristics such as a detachment from business-oriented behaviors, diverse 
revenue sources, a small number of service programs and more years in operations.   
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VIII. POLICY IMPLICATION AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last decades, the nonprofit, business and public sectors have endeavored to establish a 
new governance system (Salamon, 2002) whose phenomenon is expressed as a seamless 
economy or blurring boundaries.  By uncovering hidden patterns of collaboration between the 
sectors, this study has revealed evidence that progresses toward the seamless economy.  This 
chapter summarizes the theoretical contributions of this study.  On the basis of the findings, 
policy implications are drawn.  Finally, suggestions for future study are explicated based on the 
theoretical and methodological limitations of this study.   
8.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study contributes to the general understanding of patterns of collaboration and distinctive 
features of collaborations involving the business or public sector in the nonprofit collaboration 
networks.  In the body of the report, many characteristics of collaboration patterns are uncovered 
and many hypotheses are proposed on the basis of these findings.  Some of the findings are 
relevant only to the context of interorganizational relationships in North Hills Community in 
Allegheny County while others are able to be extended to broader theoretical significance.  
Below are the key findings that are central to the theoretical contribution of this study to the 
body of the existing literature.   
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8.2.1 Patterns of collaboration networks 
This study emphasized that the collaboration is not a static but rather a dynamic concept that 
embraces diverse aspects of collaborative efforts according to the intensity of collaboration.  The 
empirical analyses of collaboration networks showed that different patterns of relationships 
surface according to the intensity of the collaborative relationships.  Network structures of less 
intensive collaboration networks, such as the information sharing and work referral network, 
showed dense and robust network structure.  On the other hand, strategic collaboration networks, 
such as the formal contract and joint program network. showed sparse and fragile network 
structures.  Strategically significant actors (i.e., a network coordinator who occupies a broker 
position) are crucial in strategic collaboration network because if they are removed from the 
network, the network becomes separated into several components and/or many isolated actors.   
Geographical proximity plays a significant role in nonprofit behavior in making 
collaboration with other nonprofits.  While nonprofits prefer neighborhood nonprofits as their 
face-face meeting partners, they do not consider the geographical distances when it comes to 
collaborative relationships that require professional aspects, such as the joint program.   
Finally, businesses favor popular or influential nonprofits as their strategic collaboration 
partners while public agencies do not show any preference for popular nonprofits.  Rather, public 
agencies choose less popular nonprofits as their collaboration partners in the joint program 
network.   
8.2.2 Evidence for the seamless economy 
The most significant finding in this study is the empirical evidence of blurring boundaries or the 
phenomenon of “the seamless economy”.  This was shown through the analysis of collaboration 
patterns between the sectors from the comparative perspective – comparison of ‘within the 
nonprofits sector collaboration patterns’ and ‘cross sector collaboration patterns’.  The visual 
presentations of actual network structures (sociograms in Chapter 4 and 5) as well as the reduced 
network structures (reduced sociograms in Chapter 6) provide valuable evidence to witness 
structural changes.  Specifically, the phenomenon of blurring boundaries is documented in two 
ways.  First, more than half of the collaboration networks are structurally changed when 
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businesses or public agencies are introduced into the nonprofit collaboration networks.  The 
structural changes indicate that the phenomenon of blurring boundaries occurs because the lack 
of change in the network structure would mean that the involvement of businesses (or public 
agencies) was negligible to the existing structure.  However, this study shows that, for example, 
when public agencies are introduced in the formal contract network, network structure 
dramatically changed from the cohesive subgroup structure to the hierarchy structure.   
Second, this study showed that nonprofits and other sector organizations maintain similar 
or same patterns of collaborative relationships (i.e., coexistence blocks).  However, as discussed 
in Chapter 6 and 7, structural changes caused by the business and public sector are different; the 
impact of businesses on the network structure is more conspicuous in the less intensive 
collaboration networks and the influence of public agencies is more prominent in the strategic 
collaboration networks.   
8.2.3 Social service system: a new governance system 
This study uncovered characteristics of this new governance system through the analysis of the 
flow of work referrals between three sectors.  A unique social service system surfaces when 
structural patterns of three sectors were combined.  The most important property of this system is 
service integration.  Each sector’s organizations are interdependent of each other in achieving 
one purpose – enhancing the quality of life in the community by efficient delivery of social 
services.  Since human problems are quite complex, it is difficult for one organization to satisfy 
clients whose problems are complex and diverse.  Accordingly, in a community-based human 
service system, it is not possible for a single agency to fulfill complex demands of human 
services, because human services consist of multiple arrays of services (Provan and Milward, 
1991, 1995).  Structured around human problems within a community, “service integration has 
emerged as communities have attempted to respond to social problems that are beyond any 
jurisdiction or organization” (Argranoff, 1991, p.538).  In addition, service integration 
throughout a collaboration system (i.e., a social service system or the work referral collaboration 
network) is positively related to the effectiveness of service delivery to clients (Milward and 
Provan, 1998).   
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In this system, each sector has a unique role in social service provision.  Public agencies 
and some nonprofits send work referrals (i.e., clients) to other nonprofits.  These nonprofits in 
turn play a service coordinating role.  These nonprofits coordinate referrals and resend them to 
business sector organizations or other nonprofits that have the appropriate program.  This system 
is similar to a division of labor system in its appearance but is different in its context in that this 
system delivers social services in collaboration with others on the basis of voluntarism, not the 
command and order. 
8.2.4 The importance of strategically significant roles/positions 
This study empirically documented that there are not only various types of strategically 
significant roles in the collaboration networks, but that these roles work differently according to 
the different types of networks and sectoral differences.   
This study witnessed strategically significant organizations both at the individual (e.g., 
efficient actors who can reach all the other actors in a shortest way with less costs and brokers in 
Chapter 4 and 5) and group level (i.e., a broker block or a gate role block in Chapter 6).  
Specifically, broker roles are different according to the type of collaboration networks, such as 
information intermediaries in the information sharing network, service coordinators in the work 
referral network, conflicts mediators in the regular meeting network, resource brokers in the 
resource sharing network, and money broker (redistributors) in the formal contract network.  The 
role of strategically significant actors is more important in the strategic collaboration than in the 
less intensive collaboration networks. The inclusion of other sector organizations makes 
strategically significant actors more important in terms of flows or exchanges of information, 
work referrals, resources, money, and so forth.    
In addition, when other sector organizations are introduced, a new type of strategically 
significant role surfaces, that of a gate or bridge role between two sectors.  There are several 
nonprofits that maintain especially strong relationships with the business or public sector.  
Interestingly, nonprofits that maintain many relationships exclusively with businesses do not 
have relationships with pubic agencies and vice versa.  This indicates that there exists a gate role 
nonprofit that specializes the collaborative relationships with the business sector and the public 
sector. 
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8.2.5 Cohesiveness: a parameter to check structural changes 
By analyzing two types of cohesiveness, this study found how nonprofit collaboration networks 
structurally change when other sector organizations are introduced (Chapter 6).  On the basis of 
these findings, this study proposes a general model of structural changes in a network when new 
actors are introduced or eliminated from the network.  Two types of cohesiveness, local 
cohesiveness (i.e., within a subgroup cohesiveness) and global cohesiveness (i.e., cohesiveness 
between subgroups) are used to develop the model.   
As shown in Table VIII-1, this study suggests four types of possible structural changes in 
a network based on changes of network actor memberships.  
 
Table VIII-1) Typology of structural changes by the local and global cohesiveness 
Local network cohesiveness 
 
Increase Decrease 
Increase Solidarity network Centralization network Global network 
cohesiveness Decrease Localization network Fragmentization network 
 
When both types of cohesiveness increases through the involvement of new actors and/or 
the exclusion of existing actors, the network becomes more united and harmonious as within and 
outside subgroup heterogeneity declines.  This study calls this a solidarity network.  This is 
empirically shown when public agencies join the regular meeting network.  On the contrary, 
when both types of cohesiveness decrease simultaneously, the network becomes more 
fragmented as both connections (within a subgroup and across subgroups) become sparse.  This 
study calls this type of structural change a fragmentization network.  This case is empirically 
shown when businesses join the information sharing network.    
When global cohesiveness increases and local cohesiveness decreases with the inclusion 
of new actors and/or the elimination of existing actors, the network becomes more centralized.   
When connections between actors in a subgroup decrease, the homogeneity among actors within 
the subgroup weakens.  At the same time, external homogeneity becomes strong as actors in the 
subgroup make connections with other actors outside their subgroups.  These external 
connections usually concentrate in one or two powerful /popular subgroup actors.  This study 
labels this type of structural change a centralized network.  This structural change is empirically 
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witnessed when public agencies join the formal contract network and the network structure 
becomes centralized or hierarchical.  Finally, when global cohesiveness decreases and local 
cohesiveness increases, the network becomes more localized as homogeneity within a subgroup 
strengthens while inter-subgroup homogeneity weakens.  This study names this type of structural 
change a localization network.  This structural change is evidenced when businesses are 
introduced in the resource sharing and regular meeting networks.  
8.2.6 Impacts of organizational attributes on collaboration 
If the study of collaboration focused only on exploring structures of a network, it would be 
difficult to grasp the whole picture of the collaboration patterns of nonprofits because the internal 
characteristics of organizations also influence behaviors in collaboration.  Through three 
approaches, this study uncovers the following three findings.   
First, nonprofits whose size is around $1 million are the most active in delivering social 
services in collaboration with other organizations.  When the size of a nonprofit drops below $1 
M or enlarges over $1M, its tendency to collaborate with others declines.  This is also confirmed 
in the multiple regression model.     
Second, when nonprofits have within sector collaborations, nonprofits with revenues 
from social enterprise and various streams of sources show significantly higher likelihood of 
providing social services in collaboration with other nonprofits.   
Third, when it comes to the strategic collaboration with other sectors, organizational 
characteristics of nonprofits work in different ways.  Nonprofits that have strategic 
collaborations with the business sector are positively associated with organizational attributes 
such as revenue from commercial activities, program diversity and administrative efficiency, and 
also negatively associated with years in operation.  It is intuitively understandable that nonprofits 
that generate revenues from commercial activities prefer businesses as their strategic 
collaboration partners.   
On the contrary, nonprofits that prefer public agencies as their strategic collaboration 
partners are not only negatively associated with revenue from commercial activities, revenue 
diversity and program diversity, but rather are positively associated with years in operation.   
Nonprofits that make strategic collaboration with public agencies not only generate most of their 
 176
revenue from public agencies, but also have maintained a long-term relationship with the public 
agencies.  This long-term relationship is likely to be concentrated in a specific social service 
program; nonprofits deliver a specific type of social program which the public agency explicitly 
designates.  In sum, this contradictory result indicates that organizational properties of nonprofits 
are totally different when joining strategic collaborations with businesses and public agencies. 
8.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
On the basis of the theoretical findings above, this study proposes six policy implications which 
will be useful to practitioners.   
8.3.1 Strategic importance of the collaboration network  
On the basis of analysis results, this study argues that the collaboration network is an incubator 
for building entrepreneurship because participating in collaboration networks can make 
nonprofits enhance organizational capability with resources at hand.  This is done by creatively 
combining resources at hand with resources from other organizations.  When wisely used, the 
collaboration network enables nonprofits to make strategic decisions in selecting their partners 
and eventually achieve high performance with resources at hand.   
Commonly, nonprofits are regarded as a place where those in need can acquire help.  In 
order to do this, nonprofits should redirect their attention on the management of external 
relationships with different types of organizations (i.e., collaboration).  In order to make the most 
out of collaboration networks, nonprofits should prepare before plunging into collaboration.  
First, nonprofits should recognize exactly what they currently have, what they do not have, and 
what they want to improve.  On the basis of this recognition, nonprofits should make an effort to 
appreciate what kind of partners will meet their strategic fit.  Nonprofits should search for 
partners which are suitable to them.  At this point, the collaboration network is useful because it 
provides a map with which nonprofits can find where they fit and who are the significant actors 
in their network.  Once nonprofits are connected to strategically significant actors in the network, 
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they can reduce time and energy in searching for the right partner.  This is especially important 
for small nonprofits because they do not have enough resources to search for their strategic fit by 
themselves.  In sum, the collaboration network will help nonprofits enhance entrepreneurship by 
guiding them to select partners who have strategic fit and fulfill necessary resources without 
sacrificing their core mission. 
8.3.2 Catalyst for cross-sector collaboration  
The collaboration network is important in that it catalyzes nonprofits to make the cross-sector 
collaboration.  For example, when nonprofits with little experience with cross-sector 
collaboration want to make connections with other sector organizations, it would be reasonable 
to search for gate role playing nonprofits.  By contacting gate nonprofits, nonprofits can save 
time and money because gate nonprofits have diverse and extensive connections with businesses 
or public agencies.  This study also suggests that when nonprofits consider cross-sector strategic 
collaborations, they should remember that while the business sector organizations favor central 
or popular nonprofits as their strategic collaboration partners, the public sector agencies prefer 
rather less popular nonprofits.   
Finally, the collaboration network analysis provides another piece of information.  Since 
organizational characteristics work differently when it comes to strategic collaboration with 
either the public or business sector, nonprofits can predict which sector is more suitable to their 
organizations on the basis of organizational attributes.  For instance, if a nonprofit has a high 
proportion of revenue sources from commercial activities, delivers diverse social service 
programs and is efficient in the administration, it is advisable to select business sector 
organizations as strategic collaboration partners.     
8.3.3 The role of the nonprofit sector 
This study found that the collaboration network is a place where the new governance system is 
developed and realized.  In the new governance system, blurring boundaries are a fundamental 
feature and the seamless economy can be realized and facilitated through the strategically 
significant role of nonprofits.  Another feature of the new governance system is that nonprofit, 
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business and public sector organizations voluntarily participate in collaboration networks based 
upon their needs.  For example, some businesses (public agencies) participate in networks 
because they want information from the nonprofit sector, while others want to provide 
information to nonprofits.  Since participation in collaboration networks is voluntary, the 
intermediary role of the nonprofits is very important.  The nonprofit sector is central and 
important in this new system because nonprofits not only play an intermediary role between the 
sectors to stimulate fluent exchanges of various valuable resources, such as information, work 
referrals, physical resources or money, but also redistribute these resources in a timely manner.  
For example, this study showed that the coordinating role of the nonprofits sector is very 
important in the work referral network.  Nonprofit managers should keep in mind that when 
businesses or public agencies are introduced, the information sharing among them are more 
efficient because the information redundancy declines.  In this sense, the information 
intermediaries in the cross-sector information sharing networks are expected to have high social 
capital.  
8.3.4 A mechanism to achieve a democratic system 
As stated in the section above, nonprofits not only share information cohesively, but also become 
efficient in exchanging information when other sector organizations are introduced into the 
network.  In particular, as the communication costs drop considerably by the introduction of low-
cost cutting-edge information technology such as email, computer programs or cell phone, 
nonprofits that maintain good intention in sharing but have a limited budget can use technology 
to exchange information more fluently.  As a result, information, knowledge or innovation can 
be diffused more evenly and efficiently in the collaboration network.  These wide-spread and 
efficient information sharing indicates a fact that collaboration networks are democratic systems 
where all members in the network share the same information evenly.   
8.3.5 Efficiency in conflicts solving 
Collaboration networks are expected to solve conflicts efficiently.  As shown in the regular 
meeting network in North Hills Community, establishing regular meetings among community 
 179
leader nonprofits is strongly recommended.  This cohesive regular meeting is expected to play a 
coordinating role in the community by finding potential problems, solving conflicts in the 
community, preventing service duplication and so forth.  Intensive exchange of information, 
coupled with well-coordinated leader groups in the network (as seen in the regular meeting 
network), is likely to prevent potential conflicts among nonprofits.   
8.3.6 Organizational learning through collaboration networks 
In complex and rapid changing environments, managers see what they expect to see on the basis 
of their own perceptual framework (Bolman and Deal, 2003).  These parochial perspectives 
usually lead their organizations into troubles in the long run.  In order to prevent this, this study 
recommends participating in collaboration networks such as the information sharing and regular 
meeting network, because through the extensive and enduring exchanges of information and 
discussions, nonprofit managers can cluster fragmented bits of information into meaningful and 
comprehensive sets of information.  The accumulation of these efforts, in the long run, becomes 
organizational learning, which will in turn enhance organizational capacity.     
8.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the patterns of collaboration within and across 
sectors.  On the basis of the findings, this study has proposed many issue-specific and plausible 
hypotheses for future studies.  Since major findings summarized in the above section are not 
generalized theory, these findings should also be re-researched in future studies to check 
applicability to other settings and places.  In this sense, future studies should test the generability 
and applicability of plausible findings uncovered in this study.  In order to do it, this study makes 
three suggestions which come from methodological limitations of this study.  First, future studies 
should collect time-series data of collaboration relationships.  This study used a cross-sectional 
data set for analysis.  The cross-sectional data analysis has weaknesses in that it cannot provide 
information about time-serial dynamics of network structures.  Even though this study simulated 
 180
the network robust test in order to compensate for this weakness, this simulation does not 
provide enough information to confirm the structural changes by the time series.  Thus, future 
studies should collect time-series data of collaborative relationships to explore the dynamic 
features of the collaboration networks.   
Second, future studies should collect data on the basis of a large number of population.  
With a large population - at least several hundreds organizations, - future studies will be able to 
test many hypotheses and findings.  Finally, future studies should conduct a comparative study in 
terms of geographical comparisons.  Since this study chose only one geographical place (the 
North Hills Community in Allegheny County, Pittsburgh), it is hard to determine its applicability 
over other geographical areas.  Comparative studies with different geographical locations will 
enlarge the scope of available knowledge. 
8.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter has summarized major findings and policy implications.  Most of the findings in 
this study are only plausible suggestions for the future study, not confirmed or tested findings for 
generalization.  In this sense, this study has raised many new questions, some of which are 
partially answered but most of which have to be researched in depth in the future.  Most of all, 
this study provides a firm cornerstone for future studies of collaboration patterns across sectors.   
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 1 DEFINITIONS OF COLLABORATION FROM THE LITERATURE 
• Bardach (1998): “Any Joint Activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public 
value by their working together rather than separately” (p.8) 
• Gray (1989): “A process through which parties who see different aspects of problem can 
constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited 
vision of what is possible” (p.5) 
• Hilmmelman (1996): “Organizational collaboration is defined as a process in which 
organizations exchange information, alter activities, share resources, and enhance each other’s 
capacity for mutual benefit and a common purpose by sharing risks, responsibilities and 
rewards” (p.22) 
• Kraus (1984): “A cooperative venture based on shared power and authority. It is 
nonhierarchical in nature. It assumes power based on a knowledge or expertise as opposed to 
power based on role or role function” (p.19)  
• Mattessich, Murray-Close, and Monsey (2001): “Collaboration is a mutually beneficial and 
well-defined relationship entered into by two or more organizations to achieve common goals” 
(p.4) 
• Murray (1999): “A process in which organizations with a stake in a problem seek a mutually 
determined solution by which they seek to accomplish objectives they could not achieve working 
alone” (p.1188)  
• Wood and Gray (1999): “Collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of 
problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules, norms, and structures, to 
act or decide on issues related to that domain” (p.146) 
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APPENDIX 2 THE COLLABORATION CONTINUUM  
• Arsenault (1998): consolidation continuum: Joint venture or partnership – management 
service organization – parent corporation – merger  
• Austin (2000): Philanthropic stage – transactional stage – integrative stage  
• Huxham (1996): very comprehensive and considering various dimensions.   
Identifying and sharing problems, setting meta strategy, and maintaining and 
adjusting networks 
• Kanter (1994): mutual service consortia – joint venture – value chain partnership 
• Kearns (2000): Resource sharing – joint venture – strategic alliance 
• La Piana (2001): collaboration – strategic alliance – merger  
• Murray (1999): according to the degree of interdependence between the parties. 
Information sharing – joint efforts (i.e. fund raising) – joint delivery of program – 
rationalization of existing services – mergers  
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APPENDIX 3 GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARY 
 
 
     
   : Target region 
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APPENIX 4 SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 Identification No. 
 
 
 
Survey of Interorganizational Relationships 
 
 
Name of Person Completing the Survey:                                                     a 
 
Phone:                                            Fax:                                              Email:                                    a  
 
Position/title in the organization:                                                                 a 
 
Address:                                                                                                                                  a 
               City                                   State                  Zip code:                                              a 
 
 
All of the information you provide on this survey will remain strictly confidential.  Neither your nor your 
organization will be identified with the data you provide.  The information above is requested so that we 
may contact with you if we need to clarify information.  Also, we need to know that you have completed 
survey so that we do not contact you again. 
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QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR ORGANIZATION 
 
 
 
1. What is your organization’s primary mission?  Describe it within two lines.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
       
 
 
 
2. What year was your organization founded?                    Year 
 
 
3. What programs does your organization provide either alone or in collaboration with others? 
(Check all that apply)   (Note that the term collaboration includes both formal relations (such as 
joint venture or formal contracts) as well as informal relations (such as information exchange or 
work referrals).) 
 
We provide the 
following 
program(s) on 
our own 
We provide the 
following 
program(s) in 
collaboration with 
other organizations 
 
 
Programs 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Children and youth services (e.g., Adoption, foster 
care, or child daily care) 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Family services (e.g., Single parent services, family 
violence shelters, or family counseling) 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Personal social services (e.g., Financial counseling, 
transportation services, or gift distribution) 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Emergency Assistance (e.g., Food, clothing, and/or 
cash for traveler or victims) 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Residential, custodial care (e.g., Group home, hospice, 
or senior care communities) 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Services to promote the independence of specific 
population (Seniors, disabled, homeless, blind, or deaf) 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Mental health, crisis intervention (mental health 
treatment, alcohol or drug abuse, hot lines for rape etc.) 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Employment assistance, job training, vocational 
rehabilitation 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Food Service, Free Food Distribution Programs 
 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Housing development/Home repairs, rent assistance 
 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Crime prevention/ legal services (e.g., Delinquency or 
drunk driving prevention, protection of neglect, abuse) 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Recreation, sports, leisure, and athletics (e.g., 
Recreational facilities, social club, amateur sports club) 
 
          a 
 
          a 
Others (Please specify:                                                     ) 
 
 186
4. Approximately how many of your current board members come from the following types of 
organizations respectively?   
 
              Federal government                State government 
              County government                  Municipal government 
              Private business                 Nonprofit organization 
              Congregation                 Others 
 
 
5. For the most recent completed fiscal year, approximately what percentage of your revenues came 
from the following sources?  
 
            %  Individual donation      
            %  Private corporation donation   
            %  United Way       
            %  Membership dues 
            %  Government contract or grant     
            %  Foundation grants  
            %  Congregation/denomination contributions  
            %  Social enterprise 
            %  Other earned income related to your mission 
            %  Earned income unrelated to your mission  
            %  Others 
 
 
6. Roughly how many people work in your organization? 
 
               Paid (Full-time equivalents: at least 40 hours per week)  
               Volunteers (who work 10 or more hours per week) 
 
 
7. For the most recently completed fiscal year, what was your organization’s total expenditure? 
 
$                                Total Expenditure 
 
a) Roughly what percentage of total expenditures were devoted to administrative expenses (i.e., 
overhead and expenses for management and fund-raising)? 
 The sum of a) and b) should 
be 100%.                    % (Administrative Expenditure) 
 
b) Roughly what percentage of total expenditures were devoted to program expenses? 
 
                    % (Program Expenditure) 
 
 
8. For the most recently completed fiscal year, what were your organization’s total revenues from 
all sources? 
 
$                                Total Revenue  
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                QUESTIONS ABOUT INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
 
This part consists of two parts.  First, tables 10 to 12 provide a list of nonprofit organizations that are 
located in Northern Allegheny County.  I would like to know if your organization is engaged in any type 
of relationships with one or more of these organizations listed during the past year.   
Second, for questions 13 to 15, I would like you to list a name(s) of organizations with which your 
organization is engaged in any type of relationships not listed in the tables 10 to 12.  Please follow the 
instruction below.   
 
 
Instructions 
 
Please don’t be intimidated by the size of tables in the following pages.  Completing the tables will take 
only a few minutes, if you follow the instructions.  Please complete all 6 tables.     
 
1) Please read carefully the definitions of interorganizational relationships below.   
2) Look through the first column of the table, which is a list of organizations by alphabetical order, 
and make a ‘√’ if your organization has a relationship with the organizations named in the first 
column. 
3) For each organization selected by you, please check across all relationships with the selected 
organization(s) by marking a ‘√’ in all appropriate boxes provided in the tables.  
 
     
Definition of interorganizational relationships 
 
· Irregular information exchange: Your organization has informal and/or irregular contacts such as 
exchanges of information or advice with the organization listed. 
· Referrals received: Your organization receives client referrals with some regularity from the 
organization listed.  
· Referrals sent: Your organization refers clients with some regularity to the organization listed. 
· Regular meeting: Your organization meets regularly (at least quarterly) to discuss problems or to share 
knowledge with the organization listed. 
· Physical resource sharing: Your organization shares personnel and/or physical resources such as 
offices with the organization listed. 
· Formal contract: Your organization has a contract with the organization listed to perform or jointly 
perform services.   
· Joint programming: Your organization undertakes joint activity such as joint programs or joint venture 
with the organization listed.  
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                                               Check all   relationships   that apply  
√ 
                      Interorganizational 
                                     Relations 
Organizations 
Irregular 
information 
exchange 
Referrals 
received 
Referrals 
Sent 
Regular 
meeting 
Physical 
resource 
sharing 
Formal 
contract 
Joint 
programs 
 AARP (American Association 
of Retired Person) 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Allegheny County Bar 
Association 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Allegheny Valley Association 
of Churches 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Allegheny Valley Employment             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Bradley Center             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Bread of Life Food Pantry             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Christian Literacy Associates             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Community Auto             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Crisis Center North             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Emanuel Lutheran Church             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Forbes Funds             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Glenshaw Valley Presbyterian             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 HEARTH             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Holy Family Institute             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Hosanna Industries             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Light of Life Ministries             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Lutheran Service Society             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Manchester Craftsmen’s 
Guild 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Millvale Food Cupboard             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Mt. Nazareth             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Network of Hope            A           a           a           a           a           a          a 
 North Hills Community 
Outreach 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
A contract to 
perform or 
jointly 
perform 
services 
Regular 
meetings for 
discussing 
problems or 
sharing 
Receiving 
client referrals 
/referring 
clients  
Part I: Please first select organizations with which your organization is/was linked during the past year.  
Then, check all relationships that apply (with the checked organizations) across each row.   
Irregular/ 
informal 
contacts for 
information 
exchange or 
advice 
Share of 
personnel and/or 
physical 
resources such 
as offices 
Joint activity 
such as joint 
programs or 
joint venture 
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                                              Check all   relationships    that apply  
√ 
                   Interorganizational 
                                  Relations 
Organizations 
Irregular 
information 
exchange 
Referrals 
received 
Referrals 
Sent 
Regular 
meeting 
Physical 
resource 
sharing 
Formal 
contract 
Joint 
programs 
 North Hills Food Bank             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 North Hills YMCA             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 North Hills Youth Ministry 
Counseling Center 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 North Suburban Adult 
Services 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 North Way Christian 
Community Pantry 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Northern Area Multi Service 
Center 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Northside Common Ministries             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Open Door Ministries             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Orion Personal Care             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Papen-North Chapter             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Priority Two             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Sewickley Valley YMCA             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Share One Food Pantry             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Sharpsburg/ St. Vincent 
DePaul 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Society of St. Vincent DePaul, 
Council of Pittsburgh 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 St. Margaret Foundation             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 St. Mary’s Church             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 St. Paul’s United Methodist 
Church 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Tickets for Kids Foundation             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 Treasure House Fashions             A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 United Way of Allegheny 
County 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 YWCA of Greater Pittsburgh 
Center for Race Relations 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
A contract to 
perform or 
jointly 
perform 
services 
Regular 
meetings for 
discussing 
problems or 
sharing 
Receiving 
client 
referrals 
/referring 
clients  
Joint activity 
such as joint 
programs or 
joint venture 
Share of 
personnel 
and/or 
physical 
resources such 
as offices 
Irregular/ 
informal 
contacts for 
information 
exchange or 
advice 
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9.  If your organization engaged in any interorganizational relationship described below with any other 
nonprofit organizations not listed in the above tables, please list these at the below table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II: Please list nonprofit, business, and public organizations with which your organization is/was 
linked during the past year and whose activities are related to your social service mission and location is 
Allegheny County. 
 
 
                                             Check all    relationships  that apply                    Interorganizational 
                                  Relations 
Organizations 
Irregular 
Information 
exchange 
Referrals 
received 
Referrals 
Sent 
Regular 
meeting 
Physical 
resource 
sharing 
Formal 
contract 
Joint 
programs 
 
A contract to 
perform or 
jointly 
perform 
services 
Regular 
meetings for 
discussing 
problems or 
sharing 
knowledge
Receiving 
client 
referrals 
/referring 
clients  
Joint activity 
such as joint 
programs or 
joint venture 
 
Share of 
personnel 
and/or 
physical 
resources such 
as offices
Irregular/ 
informal 
contacts for 
information 
exchange or 
advice 
 
 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a Secular 
Non-
Profit   
 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 
 
 
 
           A 
 
          a 
     
          a           a           a           a          a Faith-
Based 
Non-
Profit 
        
            a           a           a           a           a           a          a 
 
 
 
10. If your organization engaged in any interorganizational relationship described below with 
business(es), please list these at the below table. 
 
                                              Check all    relationships   that apply                    Interorganizational 
                                  Relations 
Organizations 
Irregular 
Information 
exchange 
Physical 
resource 
sharing 
Referrals 
received 
Referrals 
Sent 
Regular 
meeting 
Formal 
contract 
Joint 
programs 
       
            A           a           a           a           a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 
 
 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
  
           A 
 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
  
           A 
 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
Business 
 
 
 
 
           a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
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11. If your organization engaged in any interorganizational relationship described below with public 
agencies, please list these at the below table.  Please list only organizations whose activities are 
related to your social service mission and location is Allegheny County. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              Check all    relationships   that apply                    Interorganizational 
                                  Relations 
Organizations 
Irregular 
Information 
exchange 
Referrals 
received 
Referrals 
Sent 
Regular 
meeting 
Physical 
resource 
sharing 
Formal 
contract 
Joint 
programs 
 
 
 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 
 
 
 
           A 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
  
           A 
 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
  
           A 
 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
Public 
agency 
 
 
 
 
           a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
          a 
 
         a 
 
 
12. Based on your experiences, what are the positive and negative aspects of collaboration with other 
organizations?    
 
a) Positive aspects: 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Negative aspects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much! 
A contract to 
perform or 
jointly 
perform 
services 
Regular 
meetings for 
discussing 
problems or 
sharing 
knowledge
Receiving 
client 
referrals 
/referring 
clients  
Irregular/ 
informal 
contacts for 
information 
exchange or 
advice 
Share of 
personnel 
and/or 
physical 
resources such 
as offices
Joint activity 
such as joint 
programs or 
joint venture 
 
 192
APPENDIX 5 LIST OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION71
Number Name of Business Abbreviation 
1 A Second Chance ASC 
2 Alicia Photography APH 
3 All of Us Care AUC 
4 AUMA Actuators, Inc. USA AUMA 
5 Baierl Form of Relationships BFR 
6 Citizens Bank CB 
7 Columbia Gas CG 
8 Csazar Plumbing and Heating CPH 
9 Dollar Bank DB 
10 Duquesne Light Company DLC 
11 Family Guidance FG 
12 Fidelity Bank FB 
13 Franhin Interiors FI 
14 Freestyle Body & Soul Day Spa FBSDS 
15 Gateway Rehab GRE 
16 H.P. HP 
17 INCH’s Infants and Children’s Resale IICR 
18 Keygroup KG 
19 Kohl’s Department Store KDS 
20 Lenscrafters LCS 
21 Lincoln Enterprise LE 
22 Marton Electric ME 
23 Mercy Behavioral MB 
24 Mick’s Crysler Jeep MCJ 
25 National City Bank NCB 
26 Nexis/Lexis NL 
27 Orion Personal Care OPCA 
28 Outlook Pointe OP 
29 Parkvale Bank PB 
30 Pyramid Health PH 
31 Richnar Rotary RR 
32 Splendid Thread ST 
33 Steelcase Corp. SC 
34 Suburban General Hospital SGH 
35 Vitelli Eye Care VEC 
36 Westview Savings Bank WSB 
37 FHL Bank of Pittsburgh FHLBP 
38 Mars national bank MNB 
39 Amcthis merit AM 
40 Mcdonald Furniture MF 
41 Shop'n'Save SNS 
                                                 
71 With deep investigation of the list, four organizations in this list are suspicious of misclassification.  However, this 
study included them in this list because; 1) survey respondents classified them as the business sector and 2) when 
suspicious organizations are classified as other sector organizations, the analysis results are the same as before.    
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42 SSL tools SSLT 
43 Bar Tools Co. BTCO 
44 Anderson paving AP 
45 Blair manoring BM 
46 Brothers plumbing BPL 
47 Brown trucking BTR 
48 Dice tree service DTS 
49 Evans Landscape supply ELS 
50 Frankenstein concrete FCO 
51 Gumto landscaping GL 
52 Hamburg block HB 
53 McMeekin Inc. MMI 
54 Melooing Electric MEE 
55 Parker trucks co. PTC 
56 Park moving and storage PMS 
57 Saver heating SH 
58 Shield paving SP 
59 Shomp engineering SE 
60 T&S Harper concrete THHC 
61 Uncir chell mattress UCM 
62 John Henry Chair JHC 
63 Rossan Housing RH 
64 Senior news SN 
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APPENDIX 6 LIST OF PUBLIC AGENCIES 
Number Name of public agency Abbreviation 
1 Allegheny County Department of Economic Development ACDED 
2 Allegheny County Department of Human Services ACDHS 
3 Allegheny County government ACG 
4 Allegheny County Housing Authority ACHA 
5 Allegheny County Public Library ACPL 
6 Borough of Milvale BOM 
7 Career Link CL 
8 District Attorney’s Office DAO 
9 Employment Office Western & Allegheny EOWA 
10 Flood Relief FR 
11 HUD HUD 
12 Local Magistrate & Police LMP 
13 National Endowment for the Art NEA 
14 PA Council of the Art PACA 
15 Pennsylvania State Government PSG 
16 Pittsburgh City government PCG 
17 Public School District PSD 
18 Sewickley Valley Borough SVB 
19 Street Ministry SMI 
20 US Department of Education USDE 
21 CMS CMS 
22 PA department of health PADH 
23 Apprise program APR 
24 Grubudsman program GPR 
25 PANA PANA 
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APPENDIX 7 TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 4 
Appendix 7-1) Network centralization index of three centrality measures 
 
 
Information 
sharing 
network 
Work 
referrals 
network 
Regular 
meeting 
network 
Resource 
sharing 
network 
Formal 
contract 
network 
Joint 
program 
network 
Degree 65.1% 61.9% 60.3% 44.7% 25.3% 49.1% 
Closeness 66.6% 71.5% 60.9% 53.1% 33.2% 50.2% 
Betweenness 19.0% 36.1% 44.7% 60.3% 39.3% 62.8% 
 
   
Appendix 7-2) Results of network robustness analysis 
 
 N  Member Number of components 
Number of 
isolates %*** 
Information sharing 
network* 42 Core group 
NHCO, SVYMCA 1 0  
Work referral 
network* 41 Core group 
NH, NHCO 1 1 2.4 
Regular meeting 
network* 35 Core group 
NHCO NHYMCC 2 4 11.4 
Resource sharing 
network* 34 Core group 
NHCO SPUMC 2 4 11.8 
Core group MFC NHCO 2 3 13.6 Formal contract 
network**  22 Betweenness FF 3 0  
Core group FF NHCO 2 10 45.5 Joint program 
network 22 Betweenness HI 1 8 36.4 
* The number one actor of betweenness centrality is also a member of core group.  
** Only main components 
*** % of individually isolated actors due to removing important actor(s)  
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APPENIX 8 TABLES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 5 
 
Appendix 8-1) Differences in total number of ties between business and public agency 
 
Differences in total number of ties between Business 
and Government
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Appendix 8-2) Network centralization index 
 
  
  
Information 
sharing 
network 
Work 
referrals 
network 
Regular 
meeting 
network
Resource 
sharing 
network 
Formal 
contract 
network 
Joint 
program 
network 
Degree 47.27% 49.5% 54.96% 45.57% 27.60% 66.73% 
Closeness 49.04% 58.64% 58.84% 45.95% 28.88% 64.79% Business 
Betweenness 49.91% 34.1% 49.90% 58.07% 39.13% 85.15% 
Degree 49.21% 50.09% 55.79% 41.49% 18.21% 29.41% 
Closeness 52.48% 57.54% 59.47% 52.32% 36.97% 43.25% Public agency 
Betweenness 15.70% 33.24% 44.05% 63.01% 29.33% 40.71% 
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Appendix 8-3) Comparisons of collaborative relationships by network centralization index and 
three centrality measurements 
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APPENDIX 9 TALBES AND FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 6 (BLOCKMODEL) 
42 NPO networks 
 
Appendix 9-1) Blocked adjacency matrix for information sharing network 
 
             2 2 2 3   3   3 2 1 3 2 3 3   2 3   4 3   2 2 3 4     2 1     3   1 1 1 1 2 1     1   4 1 1   
             2 3 6 8   0 5 4 9 1 1 8 3 2   4 6 6 2 9 2 0 7 7 1 1   5 4 8 3 5 7 3 5 2 7 1 0   9 9 4 0 8 6   
             N N N S   P B S O G P N S S   N S C Y T A N N S U A   N H C A S C H L H M N F   E M B T M L   
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 22     NH |   1 1 1 |   1 1     1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1   1   1 1   | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 |     1 1     | 
 23   NHCO | 1   1 1 | 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 | 1     1 1   | 
 26 NHYMCC | 1 1   1 | 1     1 1 1   1 1 |   1   1 1   1 1   1   | 1 1 1   1   1   1   1 1 | 1 1 1 1   1 | 
 38 SVYMCA | 1 1 1   | 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1   1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1   | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 30    PNC |   1 1 1 |           1       |                       |                         |             | 
  5   BLFP | 1 1   1 |                   |                 1     |                         |         1   | 
 34   SOFP | 1 1   1 |                   |                       |                         |             | 
 29    ODM |   1 1   |                   |                       |               1         |             | 
 11    GVP |     1 1 |                   |                       |   1 1         1         |             | 
 31     PT | 1 1 1 1 | 1                 |                       |   1           1         |             | 
 28  NWCCP | 1 1   1 |                   |                       |   1                     |             | 
 33    SMF | 1 1 1 1 |                   |                       | 1 1   1               1 |             | 
 32    SMC | 1 1 1 1 |                   |                 1     |                         |             | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 24   NHFB | 1 1   1 |                   |           1   1       |   1                     |             | 
 36   SSVD | 1 1 1 1 |                   |     1 1 1       1 1   | 1         1 1       1 1 |             | 
  6     CA | 1 1   1 |                   |   1   1               |       1               1 |             | 
 42   YWCA | 1 1 1 1 |                   |   1 1   1   1     1 1 | 1       1 1       1     |             | 
 39    THF | 1 1 1 1 |                   |   1   1               |         1               |             | 
  2   ACBA |       1 |                   | 1                 1   | 1     1                 |             | 
 20  NAMSC | 1 1 1 1 |                   |       1         1     |       1                 |             | 
 27   NSAS |   1 1 1 |                   | 1                     | 1   1 1                 | 1         1 | 
 37    SVD | 1 1   1 |   1             1 |   1         1         |   1   1       1         |             | 
 41   UWAC | 1 1 1 1 |                   |   1   1   1           | 1 1   1         1     1 |             | 
  1   AARP |   1   1 |                   |       1               |       1 1 1             |             | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 25 NHYMCA | 1 1 1 1 |               1   |   1   1   1   1   1   |   1 1   1 1 1   1   1   |           1 | 
 14     HI | 1 1 1 1 |         1 1 1 1   | 1               1 1   | 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |   1         | 
  8    CLA | 1 1 1   |         1         |               1       | 1 1   1 1 1 1 1     1   | 1 1 1   1 1 | 
  3   AVAC | 1 1   1 |               1   |     1     1 1 1 1 1 1 |   1 1     1   1 1   1 1 |     1 1   1 | 
 35  SPUMC | 1 1 1 1 |                   |       1 1           1 | 1 1 1         1 1     1 |         1 1 | 
  7    CCN | 1 1   1 |                   |   1   1             1 | 1 1 1 1     1     1 1 1 |   1         | 
 13    HFI | 1   1   |                   |   1                   | 1 1 1     1   1   1   1 |             | 
 15    LLM | 1 1   1 |       1 1 1       |                 1     |   1 1 1 1   1       1   |             | 
 12 HEAETH | 1 1 1 1 |                   |                   1   | 1 1   1 1         1   1 |   1   1     | 
 17    MCG | 1 1   1 |                   |       1               |   1       1 1   1   1 1 |       1     | 
 21    NCM |   1 1 1 |                   |   1                   | 1 1 1 1   1   1   1   1 |             | 
 10     FF | 1 1 1 1 |               1   |   1 1             1   |   1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1   |             | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  9    ELC |   1 1 1 |                   |               1       |     1                   |             | 
 19     MN |     1 1 |                   |                       |   1 1     1     1       |             | 
  4     BC | 1   1 1 |                   |                       |     1 1                 |             | 
 40    TKF | 1 1 1 1 |                   |                       |       1         1 1     |             | 
 18    MFC |   1   1 |   1               |                       |     1   1               |             | 
 16    LSS |     1   |                   |               1       | 1   1 1 1               |             | 
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 9-2) Means of variables within positions for information sharing network  
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 n Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Commercial 
revenue 4 
19.75% 
(19.60) 6 
1.55% 
(3.80) 8 
42.43% 
(39.53) 
1
1 
12.99% 
(19.61) 2 
0 
(0) 
Revenue(Go
-vernment)  4 
3.75% 
(6.85) 6 
0 
(0) 8 
13.53% 
(33.11) 
1
1 
25.12% 
(30.11) 2 
0 
(0) 
Size (expen-
diture)  4 
$1,334,942 
(1,647,540.94) 7 
$194,103.4 
(458,313.74) 9 
$7,328,764 
(17,621,671.73) 
1
2 
$3,506,006 
(8,327,510.53) 6 
$4,271,837 
(6,316,202.77) 
Years in 
operation 4 
42.75 
(47.83) 7 
20.43 
(16.06) 
1
0 
58.5 
(53.38) 
1
2 
46 
(41.25) 6 
57.5 
(45.05) 
CRI 4 167.5 (107.83) 9 
28.11 
(18.27) 
1
1 
42.45 
(19.01) 
1
2 
72.83 
(34.10) 6 
31 
(15.10) 
Power 
centrality 4 
3.08 
(17.76) 9 
3.69 
(11.39) 
1
1 
5.60 
(15.37) 
1
2 
-0.139 
(19.22) 6 
-0.414 
(14.29) 
Betweennes
s centrality 4 
13.32 
(5.04) 9 
0.028 
(0.038) 
1
1 
0.298 
(0.297) 
1
2 
1.56 
(1.39) 6 
0.042 
(0.03) 
** Hereafter all parentheses in means of variables table include standard deviation. 
 
 
Appendix 9-3) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for information sharing relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total 
Block 1 12 28 35 40 15 130 
Block 2 28 2 2 11 1 44 
Block 3 35 2 28 30 2 97 
Block 4 40 11 30 88 16 185 
Block 5 15 1 2 16 0 34 
Total 130 44 97 185 34 490 
 
 
Appendix 9-4) Reduced block density matrix for information sharing 
 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1.000 0.778 0.795 0.833 0.625 
  2  0.778 0.028 0.020 0.102 0.019 
  3  0.795 0.020 0.255 0.227 0.030 
  4  0.833 0.102 0.227 0.667 0.222 
  5  0.625 0.019 0.030 0.222 0.000 
 
 
Appendix 9-5)  Image Matrix  
 
     1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(SE) 1(SE) 1(SE) 1(SE) 1(RE) 
  2  1(SE) 0     0     0     0 
  3  1(SE) 0     1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
  4  1(SE) 0     1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 
  5  1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 0 
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Appendix 9-6) Blocked adjacency matrix for work referral network 
 
             1   1   3   1 2   2   3 3 3 2   1 2 3 1 1 2 3 4 2   1 2   2 3 3       2 3 2     1 3 1 1 4   
             8 2 2 4 9   6 1 3 5 7 6 4 7 2   3 0 5 1 4 3 1 0 6   0 7 9 4 0 2   8 1 8 3 9 5 6 7 8 9 5 1   
             M A H B T   M N A N C S S S N   H N S H L N S U N   G N E N P S   C A O S P B C M T N L Y   
            -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 18     MN |           |                   | 1                 |             |                         | 
  2   ACBA |           |                   |                   |             |                         | 
 12    HFI |           | 1   1             |                   |             | 1                       | 
  4     BC |     1     |                   |                   |             |                         | 
 39    TKF |           | 1                 |                   |             |                         | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 16    MCG |   1 1   1 |                 1 |                   |             |                         | 
 21     NH |     1 1   |     1 1 1 1     1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |   1   1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1   1 1   1 1 1 1 | 
  3   AVAC |         1 |         1 1     1 | 1 1     1     1   |             |             1     1 1   | 
 25 NHYMCC |     1     |   1 1   1   1   1 | 1 1   1           | 1     1 1   | 1               1     1 | 
  7    CCN | 1 1       | 1 1   1         1 | 1 1   1 1 1   1   |   1   1 1   |   1             1 1     | 
 36    SVD |           |   1 1           1 | 1   1   1   1     |     1       |           1       1     | 
 34  SPUMC |       1   |       1 1       1 |       1   1       |             |               1 1   1 1 | 
 37 SVYMCA |     1     | 1               1 |                   |       1     |     1               1   | 
 22   NHCO |   1       | 1 1 1 1 1   1     | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 |   1   1 1   | 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1   1   | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 13     HI |           | 1 1 1           1 |     1             |             |                         | 
 20    NCM |           |   1 1             | 1       1         |             |                         | 
 35   SSVD |           | 1 1       1     1 |   1         1     |             |                         | 
 11 HEARTH |           |   1   1 1       1 |               1   |             |                 1     1 | 
 14    LLM |           | 1 1       1     1 |   1               |         1   |                     1   | 
 23   NHFB |           |                 1 | 1               1 |             |                         | 
 31    SMC |           |   1       1     1 |     1             |             |                         | 
 40   UWAC |           |   1 1   1         |       1           |             |                         | 
 26   NSAS |           |         1       1 |           1       |       1     | 1                       | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 10    GVP |           |       1         1 | 1                 |             |                         | 
 27  NWCCP |           |   1             1 | 1                 |         1   |                         | 
  9    ELC |           |                 1 |           1       |             |                         | 
 24 NHYMCA |           |   1   1         1 | 1               1 |             |                         | 
 30     PT |           |   1   1         1 | 1       1     1   |   1         |         1               | 
 32    SMF |           |   1   1         1 | 1                 |             |                         | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  8    CLA |           |       1         1 |                   |             |                         | 
  1   AARP |           | 1               1 |                   |             |                         | 
 28    ODM |           |   1               |                   |             |                         | 
 33   SOFP |           |   1             1 |                   |             |                         | 
 29    PNC |           |                 1 |                   |         1   |                         | 
  5   BLFP |           |   1 1     1     1 |                   |             |               1         | 
  6     CA |           |   1               |                   |             |                         | 
 17    MFC |           |                 1 |                   |             |                         | 
 38    THF |           |   1     1         |                   |             |                         | 
 19  NAMSC |           |   1 1   1 1     1 |                   |             |                         | 
 15    LSS |           |   1 1       1   1 |                   |             |                         | 
 41   YWCA |           |   1   1         1 |                   |             |             1           | 
            -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Appendix 9-7) Means of variables within positions for work referral network  
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 n Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Commercial 
revenue 2 
51.95% 
(34.01) 9 
11% 
(15.91) 7 
23.1% 
(32.94) 4 
15% 
(30.0) 8 
14.5% 
(33.26) 
Revenue 
(government) 2 
27.9% 
(39.46) 9 
17.83% 
(28.29) 7 
12.6% 
(21.69) 4 
0 
(0) 8 
11.86% 
(33.59) 
Size 
(expenditure)  5 
$10,532,172.80 
(12,442,485.18) 9 
$1,087,147 
(1,197,418.09) 8 
$929,950.3 
(1,041,465.98) 5 
$606,787.60 
(751562.92) 10 
$6,629,860 
(16,826,559.69) 
Years in 
operation 5 
80.4 
(51.04) 9 
40.78 
(30.09) 8 
42.25 
(37.12) 5 
66.6 
(63.47) 11 
30.27 
(38.50) 
CRI 5 28.2 (24.25) 9 
110 
(87.24) 9 
68.22 
(38.45) 6 
39.33 
(19.38 12 
31.75 
(16.13) 
Betweenness 
centrality 5 
0.57 
(1.24) 9 
10.54 
(13.42) 9 
0.73 
(1.16) 6 
0.25 
(0.44) 12 
0.21 
(0.34) 
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Appendix 9-8) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for Work referrals relations 
 
 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total 
Block 1 1 3 1 0 1 6 
Block 2 12 32 36 15 36 131 
Block 3 0 27 12 2 4 45 
Block 4 0 14 9 2 1 26 
Block 5 0 28 0 1 2 31 
Total 13 104 58 20 44 239 
 
 
Appendix 9-9) Reduced Block density Matrix for work referrals 
 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.050 0.067 0.022 0.000 0.017 
  2  0.267 0.444 0.444 0.278 0.333 
  3  0.000 0.333 0.167 0.037 0.037 
  4  0.000 0.259 0.167 0.067 0.014 
  5  0.000 0.259 0.000 0.014 0.015 
 
 
Appendix 9-10) Image Matrix  
 
     1     2     3     4     5      
     ----- ----- ----- ----- -----  
  1  0     0     0     0     0       
  2  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE)  
  3  0     1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0   
  4  0     1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0  
  5  0     1(RE) 0     0     0   
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Appendix 9-11) Blocked adjacency matrix for regular meeting network 
 
             1 3   1     2   3 1 2 3     1 2   3 2 1 2 2   1 1 1 3 3   2 1     2 2 2 1       
             7 4 3 2 5 6 5 8 0 4 9 3   7 9 3 4 1 2 8 0 4   1 5 0 5 2   6 3   2 1 7 8 6 9 1   
             N U C L C E N G S M S T   F N N C S N N N N   H M H Y S   P L   B N S S M H A   
            -------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 17  NAMSC |                         |   1               |           |     |               | 
 34   UWAC |                         | 1         1       |           |     |               | 
  3     CA |                         | 1             1   |           |     |               | 
 12    LLM |                         |             1     |           | 1   |               | 
  5    CLA |                         |             1   1 |           |     |               | 
  6    ELC |                         |     1         1   |           |   1 |               | 
 25  NWCCP |                         |               1   |           |     |               | 
  8    GVP |                         |     1             |           |     |               | 
 30  SPUMC |                         |     1         1   |           |     |               | 
 14    MCG |                         | 1                 |           |     |               | 
 29   SOFP |                         |               1   |           |     |               | 
 33    THF |                         |   1   1 1         |           |     |               | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  7     FF |   1 1             1     |   1 1 1 1   1 1   | 1   1     |     |           1   | 
 19     NH | 1                     1 | 1   1 1 1 1 1 1   | 1     1   |     |     1 1   1   | 
 23 NHYMCC |           1   1 1       | 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1     1   |     |     1     1 1 | 
  4    CCN |                       1 | 1 1 1   1 1 1 1   |       1   |     |           1   | 
 31   SSVD |                       1 | 1 1 1 1   1 1 1   |       1 1 |     |     1     1   | 
 22 NHYMCA |   1                     |   1 1 1 1   1 1 1 |       1   |     |       1   1   | 
 18    NCM |       1 1               | 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 | 1     1   |     |           1   | 
 20   NHCO |     1     1 1   1   1   | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 | 1 1 1 1 1 |     | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 
 24   NSAS |         1               |     1     1 1 1   | 1         |     |   1           | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 11     HI |                         | 1 1 1       1 1 1 |           |     |       1       | 
 15    MFC |                         |               1   |           |     | 1 1           | 
 10    HFI |                         | 1             1   |           |     |         1   1 | 
 35   YWCA |                         |   1 1 1 1 1 1 1   |           |     |         1 1   | 
 32    SVD |                         |         1     1   |           |     |     1         | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 26     PT |       1                 |                   |           |     |               | 
 13    LSS |           1             |                   |           |     |               | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  2   BLFP |                         |               1   |   1       |     |               | 
 21   NHFB |                         |               1 1 |   1       |     |               | 
 27    SMC |                         |   1 1   1     1   |         1 |     |               | 
 28    SMF |                         |   1       1   1   | 1         |     |               | 
 16     MN |                         |               1   |     1 1   |     |               | 
  9 HEARTH |                         | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   |       1   |     |               | 
  1   AVAC |                         |     1         1   |     1     |     |               | 
            -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Appendix 9-12) Means of variables within positions for regular meeting network 
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 n Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Commercial 
revenue 9 
15% 
(31.23) 9 
30.71% 
(31.35) 5 
6.78% 
(11.99) 1 0 4 
4.83% 
(5.58) 
Revenue 
(government) 9 
5.94% 
(13.18) 9 
17.91% 
(31.57) 5 
30.16% 
(43.56) 1 0 4 
8.25% 
(10.90) 
Size 
(expenditure)  
1
0 
$1,235,608 
(1,906,110.74) 9 
$896,862 
(718,903.81) 5 
$17,012,182.8 
(24,289,201.91) 2 
$3,117,620 
(4,324,126.97) 7 
$439,940.3 
(504,893.56) 
Years in 
operation 
1
0 
34.7 
(33.48) 9 
49 
(52.28) 5 
65 
(53.03) 2 
33.5 
(14.85) 7 
31 
(21.06) 
Collaborative 
relation index 
1
2 
35.58 
(17.89) 9 
118.44 
(81.07) 5 
79.8 
(47.87) 2 
38.5 
(7.78) 7 
49 
(14.27) 
Betweenness 
centrality 
1
2 
0.98 
(2.29) 9 
12.03 
(14.07) 5 
0.471 
(0.47) 2 
0 
(0) 7 
0.10 
(0.078) 
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Appendix 9-13) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for regular meeting relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total 
Block 1 0 19 0 2 0 21 
Block 2 19 62 18 0 21 120 
Block 3 0 18 0 0 8 26 
Block 4 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Block 5 0 21 8 0 0 29 
Total 21 120 26 2 29 198 
 
 
Appendix 9-14) Reduced Block density Matrix for regular meeting 
 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.000 0.176 0.000 0.083 0.000 
  2  0.176 0.861 0.400 0.000 0.333 
  3  0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.229 
  4  0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  5  0.000 0.333 0.229 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Appendix 9-15) Image matrix  
 
     1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0     1(RE) 0     0     0  
  2  1(RE) 1(SE) 1(RE) 0     1(RE) 
  3  0     1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 
  4  0     0     0     0     0 
  5  0     1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0 
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Appendix 9-16) Blocked adjacency matrix for resource sharing network 
 
             2 3 2 2 1   1     1 1 1 3     1 2 2         1 3 2 3     1 2 2 2 1 3 2 1     
             2 0 0 1 3 8 5   2 8 0 1 2 9 6 7 6 5 5   7 3 9 3 7 4   4 2 3 8 9 4 1 4 6 1   
             N S N N H E L   A N G H T F C M P N C   C A N T S U   B H N S S L S N M A   
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 22   NHFB |   1   1   1   |                       |             |         1           | 
 30  SPUMC | 1     1 1   1 |                       |             |     1               | 
 20     NH |       1 1     |   1   1     1         |         1   |     1 1     1       | 
 21   NHCO | 1 1 1   1 1 1 | 1       1 1         1 |             | 1 1 1 1 1   1   1   | 
 13     HI |   1 1 1       |     1       1 1 1 1   |   1         |       1     1       | 
  8    ELC | 1     1     1 |                       |             |               1     | 
 15    LSS |   1   1   1   |                       |             |                 1   | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  2   ACBA |       1       |                       |             |                     | 
 18  NAMSC |     1         |                       |             |                     | 
 10    GVP |         1     |                       |             |                     | 
 11 HEARTH |     1         |                       |             |                     | 
 32    THF |       1       |                       |             |                     | 
  9     FF |       1       |                       |             |                     | 
  6    CCN |     1   1     |                       |             |                     | 
 17     MN |         1     |                       |             |                     | 
 26     PT |         1     |                       |             |                     | 
 25  NWCCP |         1     |                       |             |                     | 
  5     CA |       1       |                       |             |                     | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  7    CLA |               |                       |             | 1                   | 
  3   AVAC |         1     |                       |             |   1                 | 
 19    NCM |               |                       |             |   1       1       1 | 
 33    TKF |               |                       |             |     1     1         | 
 27    SMC |     1         |                       |             |             1       | 
 34   UWAC |               |                       |             |     1               | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  4   BLFP |       1       |                       | 1           |                 1   | 
 12    HFI |       1       |                       |   1 1       |                     | 
 23 NHYMCC |   1 1 1       |                       |       1   1 |       1             | 
 28    SMF |     1 1 1     |                       |             |     1               | 
 29   SOFP | 1     1       |                       |             |                     | 
 14    LLM |               |                       |     1 1     |                     | 
 31    SVD |     1 1 1     |                       |         1   |                     | 
 24   NSAS |           1   |                       |             |                     | 
 16    MFC |       1     1 |                       |             | 1                   | 
  1   AARP |               |                       |     1       |                     | 
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Appendix 9-17) Means of variables within positions for resource sharing network 
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 n Block 3 n Block 4 
Commercial 
revenue 6 
7% 
(7.4833) 7 
31.57% 
(38.9951) 4
2.33% 
(4.65) 8 
15.16% 
(21.8605) 
Revenue from 
government 6 
4% 
(6.3245) 7 
12% 
(31.7490) 4
20.75% 
(28.3240) 8 
8.85% 
(19.6834) 
Size 
(expenditure) 7 
$1,463,673 
(2,142,942.55) 10 
$1,255,794.9 
(1,949,898.67) 5 
$663,743.4 
(775,428.44) 9 
$3,788,637.67 
(9,809,789.49) 
Years in 
operation 7 
36.86 
(38.6152) 10
34.1 
(38.96) 5
28.6 
(19.7307) 10 
39 
(28.1741) 
Collaborative 
relation index 7 
121.57 
(100.2644) 11
39.64 
(27.5255) 6
50.67 
(18.4463) 10 
56.2 
(32.6149) 
Power 
centrality 7 
7.57 
(4.911) 11
1.04 
(0.295) 6
1.8 
(0.748) 10 
2.82 
(1.48) 
Betweenness 
centrality 7 
17.34 
(23.0608) 11
0 
(0) 6
2.33 
(2.2647) 10 
3.88 
(5.7822) 
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Appendix 9-18) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for resource sharing relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total 
Block 1 24 12 2 16 54 
Block 2 12 0 0 0 12 
Block 3 2 0 0 9 11 
Block 4 16 0 9 4 29 
Total 54 12 11 29 106 
 
 
Appendix 9-19) Reduced Block density Matrix for resource sharing 
 
         1     2     3     4 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.571 0.156 0.048 0.229 
  2  0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  3  0.048 0.000 0.000 0.150 
  4  0.229 0.000 0.150 0.044 
 
 
Appendix 9-20) Image matrix  
 
     1     2     3     4 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     1(RE) 
  2  1(RE) 0     0     0 
  3  0     0     0     1(RE) 
  4  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0 
 
 
 206
Appendix 9-21) Blocked adjacency matrix for formal contract network 
 
               2 2       1         1     1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 2   
             6 0 1   2 3 1 7 8 4 9 7   1 3 4 5 6 2 8 9 5 0 2   
             H S T   B C N H L F M S   A N N H S N S S S N U   
            -------------------------------------------------  
  6    HFI |   1 1 |           1     |                     1 | 
 20 SVYMCA | 1     |                 |                       | 
 21    TKF | 1     |                 |                       | 
           --------------------------------------------------- 
  2   BLFP |       |     1       1   |                       | 
  3     CA |       |     1     1     |                       | 
 11   NHCO |       | 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 |                   1   | 
  7     HI |       |     1           |         1             | 
  8    LSS |       |     1       1   |                       | 
  4     FF | 1     |   1 1           |             1         | 
  9    MFC |       | 1   1   1       |                       | 
 17  SPUMC |       |     1           |                       | 
           --------------------------------------------------- 
  1   AARP |       |                 |                   1   | 
 13 NHYMCC |       |                 |       1             1 | 
 14   NSAS |       |                 |                     1 | 
  5 HEAETH |       |                 |   1                 1 | 
 16    SMF |       |       1         |                   1   | 
 12 NHYMCA |       |                 |                     1 | 
 18   SSVD |       |           1     |                 1     | 
 19    SVD |       |                 |                 1     | 
 15    SMC |       |                 |             1 1       | 
 10     NH |       |     1           | 1       1             | 
 22   UWAC | 1     |                 |   1 1 1   1           | 
            -------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Appendix 9-22) Means of variables within positions for formal contract network 
 
Position  n Block 1 n Block 2 n Block 3 
Revenue from commercial 
activity 2 28.95% 7 11.71% 7 35.53% 
Revenue from government 2 28.4% (38.75) 7 2% (5.29) 7 0.46% (1.21) 
Size (expenditure) 3 $11,864,099 (15,601,078.31) 8 
$1,336,561.75 
(2,043,898.05) 9 
$729,649.67 
(833,743.96) 
Years in operation 3 73 (60.70) 8 19.75 (14.75) 10 53.2 (18.17) 
Collaborative relation 
index 3 46.33 (24.01) 8 100.5 (93.60) 11 74.73 (43.82) 
Power centrality 3 1.99 (1.73) 8 2.98 (2.20) 11 1.99 (1.18) 
Betweenness centrality 3 12.11 (20.98) 8 11.17 (19.74) 11 4.88 (7.93) 
 
 
Appendix 9-23) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for formal contract relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Total 
Block 1 4 1 1 6 
Block 2 1 20 3 24 
Block 3 1 3 18 22 
Total 6 24 22 52 
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Appendix 9-24) Reduced Block density Matrix for formal contract 
 
         1     2     3 
     ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.667 0.042 0.030 
  2  0.042 0.357 0.034 
  3  0.030 0.034 0.164 
 
 
 
Appendix 9-25) Blocked adjacency matrix for joint program network 
 
               1       1             1   1 1 1 1 1 1   2 2   1 2   
             7 3 9   1 8   6 5 3 8   0 4 2 1 9 5 6 7 2 1 0   4 2   
             F N H   A S   E C B H   M C N M S N P S A U S   N Y   
            -----------------------------------------------------  
  7     FF |   1   |   1 |       1 |         1             |     | 
 13   NHCO | 1   1 | 1 1 | 1   1 1 | 1       1     1       |     | 
  9     HI |   1   |   1 |   1     |   1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 |     | 
           ------------------------------------------------------- 
  1   AARP |   1   |   1 |         |                       |   1 | 
 18  SPUMC | 1 1 1 | 1   |         |                       | 1   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------- 
  6    ELC |   1   |     |     1   |                       |     | 
  5    CLA |     1 |     |       1 |                       |     | 
  3   BLFP |   1   |     | 1       |                       |     | 
  8    HFI | 1 1   |     |   1     |                       |     | 
           ------------------------------------------------------- 
 10    MFC |   1   |     |         |                       |     | 
  4    CCN |     1 |     |         |                       |     | 
 12     NH |     1 |     |         |                       |     | 
 11     MN |     1 |     |         |                       |     | 
 19   SSVD | 1 1   |     |         |                       |     | 
 15  NWCCP |     1 |     |         |                       |     | 
 16     PT |     1 |     |         |                       |     | 
 17    SMF |   1 1 |     |         |                       |     | 
  2   AVAC |     1 |     |         |                       |     | 
 21   UWAC |     1 |     |         |                       |     | 
 20    SVD |     1 |     |         |                       |     | 
           ------------------------------------------------------- 
 14 NHYMCC |       |   1 |         |                       |     | 
 22   YWCA |       | 1   |         |                       |     | 
            ------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 9-26) Means of variables within positions for joint program network 
 
Position  
N Block 1 n Block 2 n Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Commercial 
revenue 3 
14% 
(13.89) 1 20% 4 
6.98% 
(13.95) 8 
10.75% 
(30.41) 2 
21.5% 
(28.99) 
Revenue from 
government 3 
4.67% 
(8.08) 1 0 4 
13.95% 
(27.90) 8 
13.78% 
(29.46) 2 
47.5% 
(67.18) 
Size 
(expenditure) 3 
$992,633.33 
(311,221.27) 1 $1,500,000 4 
$7,538,747.5 
(14,872,184.54) 
1
0 
$621,424.4 
(762,238.19) 2 
$27,171,294.5 
(37,923,967.37) 
Years in 
operation 3 
18.67 
(4.04) 2 
41 
(8.49) 4 
61.5 
(59.05) 
1
0 
39.6 
(35.13) 2 
87 
(67.88) 
Collaborative 
relation index 3 
186.33 
(111.20) 2 
54.5 
(33.23) 4 
50.25 
(13.40) 
1
1 
64.45 
(42.67) 2 
98 
(57.98) 
Betweenness 
centrality 3 
38.25 
(33.43) 2 
13.14 
(5.11) 4 
1.05 
(1.21) 
1
1 
0 
(0) 2 
0 
(0) 
 
 
 
Appendix 9-27) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for joint program relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total 
Block 1 4 4 5 13 0 26 
Block 2 4 2 0 0 2 8 
Block 3 5 0 4 0 0 9 
Block 4 13 0 0 0 0 13 
Block 5 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Total 26 8 9 13 2 58 
 
 
Appendix 9-28) Reduced Block density Matrix for joint program 
 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.667 0.667 0.417 0.394 0.000 
  2  0.667 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 
  3  0.417 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 
  4  0.394 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  5  0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
NPO and business networks blockmodel 
 
Appendix 9-29) Blocked adjacency matrix for information sharing network (NPO and business) 
        5 3 5 3 4 8 1 5   2 5 5 5 5 9 8 1 8 9 3 8   6 6 3 4 7 1 4   4 2   2 3   3 7 2 1 4 6 3 2 1 2 4 7 4 7 1   5 8 7 6 3 9 8 8 1 8 6 3 7 2   4 3 7 8 4 9 1 6 6   6 2 1 6 5 5 9 9 7 2 1     8   6 4 2     7   7   
             9 6 5 8 4 8 8 6   8 0 8 2 4 5 3 6 5 3 7 9 8 9 0 4 1 8 9 2   9 4 4 9 3 5 5 2 7 5 0 3 0 6 0 1 5 0 7 1 4 3 1 6 6 7 2 0 0 1 2 2 1 9 4 2 7 3 1 3 4 6 2 3 6 5   4 5 7 8 3 7 1 4 7 0 1 9   7 2 2 8 3 1   5 6 9   
             N H N H M S C N   F M N N N Y S C S U H T A P N G L S C L   M E A F G A H R F B J O F F B D M P M R B A M S S P G T S S B S N H S D A M F S S M U B P P   O F C P N N T W S D B B   S A O M E A   S A S   
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 59 NHYMCC |   1 1 1   1   1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1   1 1 1 |           1           1     1 1                                                             |   1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1   1 |     1   1   |       | 
 36 HEAETH | 1   1 1 1 1   1 | 1 1 1       1     1     1               |           1                                   1                                           1 |             1           |             |       | 
 55     NH | 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 | 1   1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1     1 1 1   |       1                                                   1     1       1                   | 1         1 1   1   1 1 | 1           |       | 
 38     HI | 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1   1   1     1 1   1 1   1 1 1 1   | 1 1 1       1   1 1 1   1         1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1   1 1         1 1 1 1     |           1             | 1           |       | 
 44    MCG |   1 1 1   1 1 1 | 1       1 1         1                   |                                                                   1         1 1             |             1           |             |       | 
 88 SVYMCA | 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1     |                                                           1     1                           | 1     1   1 1   1   1 1 | 1 1   1 1 1 |       | 
 18    CCN |     1 1 1 1   1 | 1 1 1   1 1     1   1   1           1   |         1     1                 1                                 1       1             1   |                         |           1 |       | 
 56   NHCO | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   | 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1   |                           1                               1     1                           | 1     1   1 1   1   1   | 1   1 1 1 1 |       | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 28     FF | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |         1   1 1 1 1 1   1         1     |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 50     MN | 1 1   1   1 1   |                                     1   |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 58 NHYMCA | 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 |         1 1 1   1 1 1       1     1 1 1 |                                                                                             |   1 1         1         |   1         |       | 
 52  NAMSC | 1   1     1   1 |           1             1               |                                                                                             |                         | 1           |       | 
 54    NCM | 1     1 1 1 1 1 | 1   1           1       1       1   1   |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 95   YWCA | 1   1   1 1 1 1 |     1 1     1 1 1 1   1                 |                                                                                             |     1   1         1     |           1 |       | 
 83  SPUMC | 1 1 1 1   1   1 | 1   1     1           1         1   1 1 |                                                                                             | 1                       |       1   1 |       | 
 16     CA |     1     1   1 | 1         1     1       1               |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 85   SSVD | 1   1     1 1 1 | 1   1   1 1   1   1 1 1                 |                                                                                             |                         | 1           |       | 
 93   UWAC | 1 1 1 1   1   1 | 1   1     1     1       1               |                                                                                             |                         |   1         |       | 
 37    HFI | 1   1 1 1   1   | 1   1           1               1   1   |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 89    THF | 1   1     1   1 |           1 1   1                       |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
  8   AVAC |   1 1 1   1 1 1 | 1     1 1     1   1         1   1 1 1 1 |                                                                                             |             1         1 | 1 1       1 |       | 
 69     PT | 1   1 1   1   1 |                                 1       |                                                                                             |       1                 |             |       | 
 60   NSAS | 1         1   1 |     1                   1           1 1 |                                                                                             |           1             |         1   |       | 
 34    GVP | 1     1   1     |                                 1   1   |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 41    LLM |     1 1   1   1 |         1   1       1   1 1   1     1   |                                                                                             |                         | 1   1       |       | 
 78    SMF | 1   1 1   1   1 | 1   1                   1               |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 19    CLA | 1   1 1     1 1 |   1 1   1   1       1   1   1 1 1     1 |                                                                                             |                       1 |       1 1   |       | 
 42    LSS | 1               |     1       1           1   1       1   |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 49    MMI |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 24    ELS |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
  4     AP |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 29     FG |     1           |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 33    GRE |             1   |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
  5    APH | 1 1             |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 35     HB |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 72     RR |             1   |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 27    FCO |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 15    BTR |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 40    JHC |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 63     OP | 1               |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 30  FHLBP |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 26  FBSDS |               1 |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 10    BFR | 1               |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 21    DLC | 1               |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 45    MCJ |             1   |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 70    PTC |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 47     MF |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 71     RH |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 14   BTCO |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
  3     AM |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 51    MNB |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 86     ST |   1             |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 76     SH |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 67    PMS |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 32     GL |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 90   THHC |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 80    SNS |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 81   SOFP |     1     1   1 |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 12     BM |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 82     SP |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
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Appendix 9-29) Blocked adjacency matrix for information sharing network (NPO and business) (Continued) 
 
 61  NWCCP |     1 1   1   1 |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 39     HP |         1   1   |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 74     SE |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 22    DTS |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
  7    AUC |     1           |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 43     MB |             1   |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 31     FI |         1       |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 73     SC |         1       |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 84   SSLT |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 46    MEE |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 92    UCM |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 13    BPL |       1         |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 66     PH |             1   |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 65     PB |   1             |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 64   OPCA |     1     1   1 |             1                           |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 25     FB | 1               |     1                                   |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 17     CB | 1               |     1     1                             |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 68    PNC | 1         1   1 |                           1             |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 53    NCB | 1               |           1                             |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 57   NHFB |     1 1   1   1 |                             1           |                                                                                             |                         |   1         |       | 
 91    TKF | 1 1 1   1 1   1 |                         1               |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 94    WSB | 1               |     1                                   |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 77    SMC | 1   1     1   1 |                                         |                                                                                             |                         | 1           |       | 
 20     DB | 1               |           1                             |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
 11   BLFP |     1     1   1 |                                         |                                                                                             |                         | 1     1     |       | 
  9     BC | 1   1     1     |                         1           1   |                                                                                             |                         |             |       | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 87    SVD |     1 1   1   1 |       1         1       1       1       |                                                                                             |                 1   1   |             |       | 
  2   ACBA |           1     |     1             1     1               |                                                                                             |           1             |             |       | 
 62    ODM | 1             1 |                                 1       |                                                                                             |                         |             |   1   | 
 48    MFC |           1   1 |             1                       1   |                                                                                             |                     1   |             |       | 
 23    ELC | 1         1   1 |                             1       1   |                                                                                             |                         |             | 1     | 
  1   AARP |           1 1 1 |           1 1           1               |                                                                                             |                         |             |     1 | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 75    SGH |                 |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |         1   |       | 
  6    ASC |                 |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |     1       |       | 
 79     SN |                 |                                         |                                                                                             |                         |           1 |       | 
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 9-30) Means of variables within positions for information sharing network 
 
Position  
n Block 1 n 
Block 
2  n 
Block 
3  n 
Block 
4  n 
Block 
5 n 
Block 
6 
Proportion of 
business sector 8 0% 
2
0 0% 
4
6 95.65% 
1
2 50% 6 16.67% 3 100% 
Collaborative 
relation index 8 
182.25 
(146.80) 
2
0 
52.95 
(21.83) 
4
6 
8.87 
(3.92) 
1
2 
19.83 
(16.15) 6 
35.83 
(20.16) 3 
3.33 
(4.04) 
Power centrality 8 -1.29 (8.29) 
2
0 
4.24 
(12.14) 
4
6 
2.32 
(1.50) 
1
2 
2.78 
(5.45) 6 
5.19 
(11.54) 3 
-1.51 
(1.46) 
Betweenness 
centrality 8 
15.14 
(14.99) 
2
0 
0.76 
(1.05) 
4
6 
0 
(0) 
1
2 
0.032 
(0.08) 6 
1.16 
(1.07) 3 
0 
(0) 
 
 
Appendix 9-31) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for information sharing 
relations 
 
 Block1 Block2 Block3 Block4 Block5 Block6 Total 
Block1 50 97 53 31 15 0 246 
Block2 97 108 0 12 15 0 232 
Block3 53 0 0 0 0 0 53 
Block4 31 12 0 0 4 0 47 
Block5 15 15 0 4 0 3 37 
Block6 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Total 246 232 53 47 37 3 618 
 
 
Appendix 9-32) Reduced Block density Matrix for information sharing 
 
         1     2     3     4     5     6 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.893 0.606 0.144 0.323 0.313 0.000 
  2  0.606 0.284 0.000 0.050 0.125 0.000 
  3  0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  4  0.323 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 
  5  0.313 0.125 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.167 
  6  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000 
 
 
Appendix 9-33) Blocked adjacency matrix for work referral network 
 
             4 2 3   3     5 4   5 1 1   1 4 3 2 1 3   4   5   5 1 1 2 3 5 1 3 2   2 2 1   4 3 2 3 4 1   2 2 5   4 1 3 2 3 4 4 4     
             6 9 0 8 3   3 5 5 9 0 1 2 7 4 0 6 5 9 9   2 5 4 2 1 3 7 0 7 3 0 8 6   2 8 6 4 3 2 1 4 8 8 6 7 4 2   4 5 1 3 5 9 7 1 1   
             S N N C N   A Y S C T E F C G P O M I P   S B W A T F H L O V D P M   L N H A S N L N S H B N M U   S G N M N S S P A   
            -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 46  SPUMC |     1 1 1 |   1     1             1     |   1             1         | 1   1                       |     1             | 
 29     NH |     1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1   1 1     1       |   1         1       1     | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 | 1   1   1   1 1 1 | 
 30   NHCO | 1 1   1 1 |     1 1 1     1   1   1 1   |       1       1   1       | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1   1   |     1   1   1 1 1 | 
  8    CCN |   1 1   1 |         1       1         1 |       1                 1 |   1 1     1 1     1   1 1 1 |     1 1 1     1 1 | 
 33 NHYMCC | 1 1 1 1   |   1   1 1                   |             1             |   1 1 1   1       1         |   1           1   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  3    AUC |   1       |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 55   YWCA |   1 1   1 |               1             |                           |                             |                   | 
 45   SOFP |   1 1     |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
  9    CLA |     1   1 |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 50    THF |   1   1   |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 11    ELC |     1     |                             |                           |                             |     1             | 
 12     FG |   1       |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
  7     CA |   1       |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 14    GRE |       1   |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 40    PNC |     1     |                             |                           |                             |               1   | 
 36    ODM |   1       |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 25    MFC |     1     |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 19   IICR |     1     |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 39     PH |       1   |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 42     SC |           |                             |                           |                         1   |                   | 
  5     BC |           |                             |             1             |                             |                   | 
 54    WSB |           |                             |                           |           1                 |                   | 
  2   ACBA |           |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 51    TKF |           |                             |                           |                         1   |                   | 
 13     FI |           |                             |                           |                         1   |                   | 
 17    HFI |           |       1                     |                           |       1                 1   |                   | 
 20    LCS |           |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 37   OPCA |           |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 53    VEC |           |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 10    DLC |           |                             |                           |                             |                   | 
 38     PB |           |                             |                           |     1                       |                   | 
 26     MN |           |                             |                           |                   1         |                   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 22    LSS | 1 1 1     |                             |                           |       1                     |                   | 
 28    NCM |   1       |                             |                           |       1     1     1         |                   | 
 16 HEAETH |   1 1 1 1 |   1     1                   |                           |                           1 |                   | 
  4   AVAC |     1 1   |               1             |         1                 | 1 1         1   1 1   1   1 |                   | 
 43    SMC |   1 1     |                             |                           |                 1           |             1     | 
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Appendix 9-33) Blocked adjacency matrix for work referral network (Continued) 
 
 32 NHYMCA |   1 1   1 |                             |     1                     |               1   1         |                   | 
 21    LLM |   1 1     |                             |                           | 1 1             1       1   |       1       1   | 
 34   NSAS |     1 1   |       1                     |                           |           1                 |     1             | 
 48    SVD |   1 1     |           1                 |                           |       1 1   1     1 1 1     |             1     | 
 18     HI |   1 1     |                             |                           |       1                 1   |             1     | 
  6   BLFP |   1 1     |                       1     |                           |       1         1           |                   | 
 27  NAMSC |   1 1 1   |                             |                           |       1         1           |                   | 
 24    MCG |     1     |                             |       1 1   1             |                             |                   | 
 52   UWAC |   1   1   |                             |                           |     1 1                     |                   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 44    SMF |   1 1   1 |                             |                           |                   1         |                   | 
 15    GVP |     1   1 |                             |                           |                   1         |                   | 
 31   NHFB |     1     |                             |                           |               1   1         |                   | 
 23     MB |       1   |                             |                           |             1               |                   | 
 35  NWCCP |   1 1     |                             |                           |                   1         |               1   | 
 49 SVYMCA |     1     |                     1       |             1             | 1         1             1   |                   | 
 47   SSVD |   1 1     |                             |                           |   1     1       1       1   |                   | 
 41     PT |   1 1   1 |                   1         |                           |             1     1       1 |         1         | 
  1   AARP |     1     |                             |                           |                         1   |                   | 
            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 9-34) Means of variables within positions for work referral network 
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 N Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Proportion of 
business 5 0% 14 35.71% 13 69.23% 14 0% 9 22.22% 
Collaborative 
relation index 5 
189.6 
(128.15) 14 
23.43 
(19.94) 13 
16.62 
(17.67) 14 
81.64 
(95.18) 9 
37.44 
(21.19) 
Betweenness 
centrality 5 
16.70 
(14.53) 14 
0.074 
(0.21) 13 
0.16 
(0.56) 14 
1.84 
(2.03) 9 
0.14 
(0.26) 
 
 
Appendix 9-35) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for work referral relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total 
Block 1 17 24 11 39 19 110 
Block 2 19 1 0 0 2 22 
Block 3 0 1 1 8 0 10 
Block 4 31 6 5 34 6 82 
Block 5 16 2 1 17 2 38 
Total 83 34 18 98 29 262 
 
 
Appendix 9-36) Reduced Block density Matrix for work referrals 
 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.850 0.343 0.169 0.557 0.422 
  2  0.271 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.016 
  3  0.000 0.005 0.006 0.044 0.000 
  4  0.443 0.031 0.027 0.187 0.048 
  5  0.356 0.016 0.009 0.135 0.028 
 
 
Appendix 9-37) Image matrix  
 
     1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 
  2  1(RE) 0     0     0     0  
  3  0     0     0     0     0  
  4  1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 0 
  5  1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 0 
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Appendix 9-38) Blocked adjacency matrix for regular meeting network 
 
             2 2 2 1   2 4 1 2 1 4   3 1 3   1 4     2 4 4   3 2 3 3 1 3 4   1       3 3 1 2 2 1 4 2   1   3 3   
             4 5 6 5 5 9 6 3 8 0 0   2 1 7 4 6 1 8 1 0 4 5 6 9 3 1 8 2 3 3   9 2 3 7 0 6 4 7 2 7 2 1   8 9 4 5   
             N N N H C N Y H N F S   O F S C K S D A M U W C S N N S G P T   M A B C N S H N M L S M   L E P S   
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 24    NCM |   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |                                       | 1     1 1         1     |         | 
 25     NH | 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |   1 1         1           1         1 |           1             |         | 
 26   NHCO | 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1   1 1 1   1         1 1   1 1       |   1 1   1 1 1 1 1   1 1 |   1     | 
 15     HI | 1 1 1     1       1   |     1                                 |         1               |         | 
  5    CCN | 1 1 1     1 1 1 1 1 1 |                                     1 |                         |         | 
 29 NHYMCC | 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 |                         1       1     |   1     1 1             |   1     | 
 46   YWCA | 1 1 1   1 1   1 1   1 |                                       |                 1       |         | 
 13 HEAETH | 1 1 1   1 1 1   1 1 1 |           1                       1   |                         |         | 
 28 NHYMCA | 1 1 1   1 1 1 1     1 |     1             1 1                 |         1               |         | 
 10     FF | 1 1 1 1 1 1   1     1 |       1         1 1                   |             1           |         | 
 40   SSVD | 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1   |                                     1 |           1         1   |         | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 32   OPCA |     1                 |                                       |                         |         | 
 11     FG |   1                   |                                       |                         |         | 
 37    SMF |   1 1 1         1     |                                       |                         |         | 
  4     CA |     1             1   |                                       |                         |         | 
 16     KG |     1                 |                                       |                         |         | 
 41     ST |               1       |                                       |                         |         | 
  8    DLC |     1                 |                                       |                         |         | 
  1    AUC |   1                   |                                       |                         |         | 
 20    MCG |                   1   |                                       |                         |         | 
 44   UWAC |                 1 1   |                                       |                         |         | 
 45    WSB |                 1     |                                       |                         |         | 
  6     CG |     1                 |                                       |                         |         | 
 39  SPUMC |     1     1           |                                       |                         |         | 
 23  NAMSC |   1                   |                                       |                         |         | 
 31  NWCCP |     1                 |                                       |                         |         | 
 38   SOFP |     1                 |                                       |                         |         | 
 12    GVP |           1           |                                       |                         |         | 
 33     PB |               1       |                                       |                         |         | 
 43    THF |   1     1           1 |                                       |                         |         | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 19     MB | 1                     |                                       |                   1     |         | 
  2   AVAC |     1     1           |                                       |             1           |         | 
  3   BLFP |     1                 |                                       |                       1 |         | 
  7    CLA | 1                     |                                       |         1               |         | 
 30   NSAS | 1   1 1   1     1     |                                       |       1       1         |         | 
 36    SMC |   1 1     1         1 |                                       |                     1   |         | 
 14    HFI |     1             1   |                                       |   1             1       |         | 
 27   NHFB |     1                 |                                       |         1             1 |         | 
 22     MN |     1       1         |                                       |             1           |         | 
 17    LLM | 1                     |                                       | 1                       |     1   | 
 42    SVD |     1               1 |                                       |           1             |         | 
 21    MFC |     1                 |                                       |     1         1         |         | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 18    LSS |                       |                                       |                         |   1     | 
  9    ELC |     1     1           |                                       |                         | 1     1 | 
 34     PT |                       |                                       |                   1     |         | 
 35    SGH |                       |                                       |                         |   1     | 
            ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------       
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Appendix 9-39) Means of variables within positions for regular meeting network 
 
Position  n Block 1 n Block 2 n Block 3 n Block 4 
Proportion of 
business sector 11 0% 19 47.37% 12 16.67% 4 25% 
Collaborative 
relation index 11 
158.91 
(128.38) 19
25.89 
(20.38) 12
46.17 
(16.26) 4 
33.25 
(17.99) 
Betweenness 
centrality 11 
11.37 
(14.55) 19
0.005 
(0.014) 12
0.58 
(1.32) 4 
2.19 
(4.39) 
 
 
Appendix 9-40) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for regular meeting relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total 
Block 1 96 27 23 2 148 
Block 2 27 0 0 0 27 
Block 3 23 0 16 1 40 
Block 4 2 0 1 4 7 
Total 148 27 40 7 222 
 
 
Appendix 9-41) Reduced block density matrix for regular meeting  
 
         1     2     3     4 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.873 0.129 0.174 0.045 
  2  0.129 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  3  0.174 0.000 0.121 0.021 
  4  0.045 0.000 0.021 0.333 
 
 
Appendix 9-42) Blocked adjacency matrix for resource sharing network 
         3 5   6 2 6 5 5 3 6   1 4   5 5   1 7 6 3 1 4     3 2 5     2   3 2 2 1 3 4 3 7 4 5 5 4 1 2 3 1 4 6 2 1 1 4   2 6 7 5 5 7 6 6 7 2   6   1 2 4 4 3 4 1   6 7 3 7   
             3 1   9 1 7 2 4 8 2   8 9 8 0 3 6 5 1 5 2 3 3   3 9 0 5 4 9 8 2 5 2 3 0 0 4 6 5 5 8 9 1 9 5 4 6 6 6 9 1 2 2 5 4 3 3 6 7 0 8 1 2 7   0 1 7 6 8 0 1 7 4 7 4 4 7 6   
             H N   S E S N N L S   D N B N N A C S S H C M   A M D N A B G A K E F B H M L U M P R M D F J C M S G B B M A F S T P P S S S T F   R A C F N M H N C B S T L U   
            -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 33     HI |   1 | 1             |       1   1 1 1 1       | 1   1 1 1 1 1     1   1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1     1   1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 |                             | 
 51   NHCO | 1   | 1 1 1 1   1   | 1   1 1 1     1 1 1 1 1 |   1           1 1   1       1           1 1   1             1                 1   |                             | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 69  SPUMC | 1 1 |       1   1   |         1               |                                                                                   |                             | 
 21    ELC |   1 |       1 1 1 1 |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 67   SOFP |   1 |       1       |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 52   NHFB |   1 | 1 1 1         |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 54   NSAS |     |   1           |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 38    LSS |   1 | 1 1           |                       1 |                                                                                   |                             | 
 62    SGH |     |   1           |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 18     DB |   1 |               |         1               |                                                                                   |                             | 
 49    NCM |     |               |                   1     |                                                                                   |   1                     1   | 
  8   BLFP |   1 |               |                       1 |                                                                                   |     1                       | 
 50     NH | 1 1 |               |         1   1 1 1       |                                                                                   |       1     1 1 1   1       | 
 53 NHYMCC |   1 | 1             | 1     1         1       |                                                                                   |         1         1   1   1 | 
  6   AVAC | 1   |               |                   1     |                                                                                   |                             | 
 15    CCN | 1   |               |       1                 |                                                                                   |                             | 
 71    SVD | 1 1 |               |       1                 |                                                                                   |                     1       | 
 65    SMF | 1 1 |               |       1 1               |                                                                                   |                             | 
 32    HFI |   1 |               |   1       1             |                                                                                   |                             | 
 13     CA |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   | 1         1                 | 
 43    MFC |   1 |           1   |     1                   |                                                                                   |                             | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  3     AM | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 39    MCJ |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 20    DTS | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 55  NWCCP | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
  4     AP | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
  9     BM | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 28     GL | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
  2   ACBA |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 35     KG |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 22    ELS | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 23     FB |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 10    BPL | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 30     HB | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 44    MMI | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 36     LE |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 75    UCM | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 45     MN | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 58    PTC | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 59     RH | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 41    MEE | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 19    DLC |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 25     FF |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 34    JHC | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 16     CG |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 46    MNB | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 66    SNS | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 29    GVP | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 11   BTCO | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 12    BTR | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 42     MF | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
  5   AUMA |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
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Appendix 9-42) Blocked adjacency matrix for resource sharing network (Continued) 
 
 24    FCO | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 63     SH | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 73   THHC | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 56    PMS | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 57     PT | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 70   SSLT | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 68     SP | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 61     SE | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 72    THF |   1 |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 27  FHLBP | 1   |               |                         |                                                                                   |                             | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 60     RR |     |               |                     1   |                                                                                   |                             | 
  1   AARP |     |               |   1                     |                                                                                   |                             | 
 17    CLA |     |               |     1                   |                                                                                   |                             | 
 26     FG |     |               |       1                 |                                                                                   |                             | 
 48    NCB |     |               |         1               |                                                                                   |                             | 
 40     ME |     |               |                     1   |                                                                                   |                             | 
 31 HEAETH |     |               |       1                 |                                                                                   |                             | 
 47  NAMSC |     |               |       1                 |                                                                                   |                             | 
 14     CB |     |               |       1                 |                                                                                   |                             | 
  7    BFR |     |               |         1               |                                                                                   |                             | 
 64    SMC |     |               |       1       1         |                                                                                   |                             | 
 74    TKF |     |               |         1               |                                                                                   |                         1   | 
 37    LLM |     |               |   1                     |                                                                                   |                       1     | 
 76   UWAC |     |               |         1               |                                                                                   |                             | 
            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Appendix 9-43) Means of variables within positions for resource sharing network 
 
Position  N Block 1 n Block 2 N Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Proportion of 
business sector 2 0% 7 14.29% 12 8.33% 41 82.93% 14 42.86% 
Collaborative 
relation index 2 
404 
(4.24) 7 
40.71 
(23.21) 12 
78.58 
(54.49) 41 
13.22 
(13.47) 14 
29.29 
(24.15) 
Power 
centrality 2 
29.83 
(12.26) 7 
1.65 
(1.12) 12 
1.91 
(2.62) 41 
-0.95 
(0.43) 14 
0.9 
(0.41) 
Betweenness 
centrality 2 
61.12 
(9.09) 7 
1.23 
(2.13) 12 
4.08 
(4.74) 41 
0 
(0) 14 
0.15 
(0.50) 
 
 
Appendix 9-44) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for resource sharing relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total 
Block 1 2 6 14 41 0 63 
Block 2 6 14 2 0 0 22 
Block 3 14 2 18 0 15 49 
Block 4 41 0 0 0 0 41 
Block 5 0 0 15 0 2 17 
Total 63 22 49 41 17 192 
 
 
Appendix 9-45) Reduced Block density Matrix for resource sharing 
 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1.000 0.429 0.583 0.500 0.000 
  2  0.429 0.333 0.024 0.000 0.000 
  3  0.583 0.024 0.136 0.000 0.089 
  4  0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  5  0.000 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.011 
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Appendix 9-46) Blocked adjacency matrix for formal contract network 
 
               1     1   2 1       1 1   1 2 1       2 2 1 1 3 2 3   2 2 1 2 2 2   
             1 7 3 4 8 9 4 6   8 6 4 5 7 0 5 3 2   5 2 0 9 1 0 1 1   6 7 2 9 3 8   
             A N B C N F S M   D C K L C F S H A   C P N N H U N W   S S H T S S   
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------  
  1   AARP |   1             |                   |                 |             | 
 17     NH | 1       1   1   |           1     1 |                 |             | 
  3   BLFP |         1     1 |                   |                 |             | 
  4     CA |         1 1     |                   |                 |             | 
 18   NHCO |   1 1 1   1   1 | 1 1 1 1 1   1 1   |                 |             | 
  9     FF |       1 1       |                   |                 | 1   1       | 
 24    SMF |   1             |               1   |                 |             | 
 16    MFC |     1   1       |       1           |                 |             | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  8    DLC |         1       |                   |                 |             | 
  6     CG |         1       |                   |                 |             | 
 14     KG |         1       |                   |                 |             | 
 15    LSS |         1     1 |                   |                 |             | 
  7    CPH |         1       |                   |                 |             | 
 10     FG |   1             |                   |                 |             | 
 25  SPUMC |         1       |                   |                 |             | 
 13     HI |         1   1   |                   |                 |             | 
  2    AUC |   1             |                   |                 |             | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  5     CB |                 |                   |         1       |             | 
 22     PB |                 |                   |         1       |             | 
 20 NHYMCC |                 |                   |         1 1     |             | 
 19 NHYMCA |                 |                   |           1     |             | 
 11 HEAETH |                 |                   | 1 1 1     1   1 |             | 
 30   UWAC |                 |                   |     1 1 1   1   |     1       | 
 21   NSAS |                 |                   |           1     |             | 
 31    WSB |                 |                   |         1       |             | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 26   SSVD |           1     |                   |                 |         1   | 
 27    SVD |                 |                   |                 |         1   | 
 12    HFI |           1     |                   |           1     |       1   1 | 
 29    TKF |                 |                   |                 |     1       | 
 23    SMC |                 |                   |                 | 1 1         | 
 28 SVYMCA |                 |                   |                 |     1       | 
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Appendix 9-47) Means of variables within positions for formal contract network 
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 n Block 3 n Block 4 
Proportion of 
business sector 8 0% 9 66.67% 8 37.5% 6 0% 
Collaborative relation 
index 8 
115 
(128.75) 9 
67.33 
(129.53) 8 
58.62 
(50.49) 6 
54.17 
(20.18) 
Power centrality 8 2.78 (3.47) 9 
0.24 
(0.4187) 8 
1.55 
(1.63) 6 
1.46 
(0.99) 
Betweenness 
centrality 8 
18.84 
(28.99) 9 
0.32 
(0.96) 8 
7.36 
(14.65) 6 
11.57 
(19.47) 
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Appendix 9-48) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for formal contract relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total 
Block 1 18 11 0 2 31 
Block 2 11 0 0 0 11 
Block 3 0 0 16 1 17 
Block 4 2 0 1 8 11 
Total 31 11 17 11 70 
 
 
Appendix 9-49) Reduced block density matrix for formal contract 
 
         1     2     3     4 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.321 0.153 0.000 0.042 
  2  0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  3  0.000 0.000 0.286 0.021 
  4  0.042 0.000 0.021 0.267 
Appendix 9-50) Blocked adjacency matrix for joint program network 
 
           3 2         3   3   1   1 1 4 1 1 4 1 1 4 2 2 2 5 1 2 5 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 4 3   3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4   3 1 5   2 2   5 2 1 5   
             7 5   2 3 5 5 7 0 9 0 4 2 3 3 5 6 6 8 9 9 1 2 3 3 1 6 6 8 9 4 1 2 3 4 2 6 8 8 5 0 1 8 7 1 4 5 7   9 7 0 6 0 4 1 2 7 4 8   
             N H   A A A N B M B B A C C P D D S E F S F G H S C J U K M R M M M M P N B N S N P S W S T U S   N E S B F H A S K C Y   
            -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 37   NHCO |   1 |       1         1   1   1                   1     1     1                       1       1 |   1 1 1 1 1 1 1       | 
 25     HI | 1   | 1 1 1   1 1 1 1   1   1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1   1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 |     1             1   | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  2     AM |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
  3     AP |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
  5   AVAC |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 35    NCB | 1   |                                                                                           |                       | 
  7     BM |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 30     MF |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
  9   BTCO |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 10    BTR |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
  4    APH | 1   |                                                                       1                   |                       | 
 12    CCN |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 13     CG | 1   |                                                                                           |                       | 
 43    PTC |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 15    DLC | 1   |                                                                                           |                       | 
 16    DTS |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 46     SH |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 18    ELS |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 19    FCO |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 49     SP |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 21  FHLBP |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 22     GL |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 23     HB |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 53    SVD |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 11     CB | 1   |                                                                                           |                       | 
 26    JHC |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 56   UWAC |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 28     KG | 1   |                                                                                           |                       | 
 29    MEE |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 44     RH |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 31    MFC | 1   |                                                                                           |                       | 
 32    MMI |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 33     MN |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 34    MNB |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 42     PT |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 36     NH |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
  8    BPL |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 38 NHYMCA |     |                 1                                                                         |                       | 
 45     SE |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
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Appendix 9-50) Blocked adjacency matrix for joint program network (Continued) 
 
 40  NWCCP |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 41    PMS |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 48    SNS |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 57    WSB | 1   |                                                                                           |                       | 
 51   SSLT |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 54   THHC |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 55    UCM |   1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
 47    SMF | 1 1 |                                                                                           |                       | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 39 NHYMCC |     |                                                                                           |     1                 | 
 17    ELC | 1   |                                                                                           |       1               | 
 50  SPUMC | 1 1 |                                                                                           | 1       1   1         | 
  6   BLFP | 1   |                                                                                           |   1             1     | 
 20     FF | 1   |                                                                                           |     1     1   1       | 
 24    HFI | 1   |                                                                                           |         1         1   | 
  1   AARP | 1   |                                                                                           |     1               1 | 
 52   SSVD | 1   |                                                                                           |         1             | 
 27    KDS |     |                                                                                           |       1               | 
 14    CLA |   1 |                                                                                           |           1           | 
 58   YWCA |     |                                                                                           |             1         | 
            -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 9-51) Means of variables within positions for joint program network 
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 n Block 3 
Proportion of business sector 2 0% 45 77.78% 11 9.09% 
Collaborative relation index 2 404 (4.24) 45 24.42 (35.40) 11 64.82 (39.48) 
Betweenness centrality 2 65.87 (28.87) 45 0.078 (0.52) 11 1.44 (2.29) 
 
 
Appendix 9-52) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for joint program relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Total 
Block 1 2 45 9 56 
Block 2 45 2 0 47 
Block 3 9 0 18 27 
Total 56 47 27 130 
 
 
Appendix 9-53) Reduced block density matrix for joint program 
 
         1     2     3 
     ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1.000 0.500 0.409 
  2  0.500 0.001 0.000 
  3  0.409 0.000 0.164 
NPO and public agency networks blockmodels 
 
Appendix 9-54) Blocked adjacency matrix for information sharing network 
 
         3   1 5 4 5 5   3 1     5 2 1 5   4 1 1 3 4   5 1 2   4   4   1 4     1 4 4   3 2 3 1 3 3 2 5 5 4   2 4 2 5 2 6   1 5 3 3 2 2 3 2   
             8 9 8 6 8 2 5   6 1 2 7 9 3 4 3   0 3 0 2 1 6 8 7 5   6 5 2 1 5 4 3 4 9 7 3   9 0 5 6 0 1 6 1 7 5 8 2 9 9 0 8 0   2 4 3 4 7 1 7 4   
             N B F T P S S   N C A A U H C S   O C B N P A U E L   P A P A C P A A G P P   N G N E N N L S T P B H S M S M Y   C S N N M H N L   
            -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 38   NSAS |             1 | 1     1     1   |                   |                       |     1 1     1                     |       1     1   | 
  9   BLFP |             1 |                 |                   |                       |                               1   |   1 1 1         | 
 18     FF |           1 1 |   1   1 1 1   1 |                   |                       |           1           1     1     | 1   1 1 1 1 1   | 
 56    THF |           1 1 |               1 |                   |                       |                                 1 |     1 1     1   | 
 48     PT |             1 |           1     |                   |                       |                   1               |     1 1     1 1 | 
 52  SPUMC |     1 1     1 | 1   1     1 1   |                   |                       |             1                 1 1 |     1 1   1 1 1 | 
 55 SVYMCA | 1 1 1 1 1 1   | 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 |                   |             1         | 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 36 NHYMCA | 1         1 1 |         1 1 1 1 |                   |             1 1       |           1 1         1     1   1 | 1   1 1   1 1   | 
 11     CA |     1       1 |       1       1 |                   |               1       |                                 1 |     1 1         | 
  2   AARP |           1 1 |       1         |                   |     1 1 1       1   1 |                                 1 | 1     1         | 
  7   AVAC | 1   1       1 |   1 1   1 1 1   |                   |             1         |         1 1 1   1   1       1     | 1 1 1 1   1   1 | 
 59   UWAC |     1       1 | 1     1   1   1 |                   |             1         |                                 1 |     1 1   1 1   | 
 23     HI |     1   1 1 1 | 1     1 1   1   |                   |                       | 1 1 1     1           1   1 1     | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 
 14    CLA | 1         1   | 1     1   1     |                   | 1                     |   1   1   1 1       1 1   1   1   | 1   1 1     1 1 | 
 53   SSVD |     1 1     1 | 1 1     1       |                   |   1       1   1   1   |           1           1         1 | 1 1 1 1     1   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 40    ODM |               |                 |                   |                       |                                   |       1     1 1 | 
 13     CL |               |                 |                   |                       |                                   |     1 1         | 
 10    BOM |               |                 |                   |                       |                                   |             1   | 
 32    NEA |               |                 |                   |                       |                                   |         1       | 
 41   PACA |               |                 |                   |                       |                                   |         1       | 
  6   ACPL |               |                 |                   |                       |                                   |         1       | 
 58   USDE |               |                 |                   |                       |                                   |         1       | 
 17   EOWA |               |                 |                   |                       |                                   |         1       | 
 25    LMP |               |                 |                   |                       |                                   | 1               | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 46    PSD |               |             1   |                   |                       |                                   |                 | 
  5    ACG |               |               1 |                   |                       |                                   |                 | 
 42   PADH |               |     1           |                   |                       |                                   |                 | 
  1    APR |               |     1           |                   |                       |                                   |                 | 
 15    CMS |               |     1           |                   |                       |                                   |                 | 
 44    PCG |               |               1 |                   |                       |                                   |                 | 
  3   ACBA |             1 | 1     1 1       |                   |                       |     1                             |                 | 
  4  ACDHS |               | 1 1           1 |                   |                       |                                   |     1       1   | 
 19    GPR |               |     1           |                   |                       |                                   |                 | 
 47    PSG |               |               1 |                   |                       |                                   |                 | 
 43   PANA |               |     1           |                   |                       |                                   |                 | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 39  NWCCP |             1 |           1     |                   |                       |                                   |     1 1         | 
 20    GVP |             1 |           1 1   |                   |                       |                                   |             1 1 | 
 35   NHFB | 1           1 |           1     |                   |             1         |                                   |     1 1         | 
 16    ELC | 1           1 |             1   |                   |                       |                                   |       1     1   | 
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Appendix 9-54) Blocked adjacency matrix for information sharing network (Continued) 
 
 30  NAMSC |             1 |       1         |                   |                       |                                 1 |   1 1 1     1   | 
 31    NCM |     1       1 | 1     1   1 1 1 |                   |                       |                                   | 1     1 1   1 1 | 
 26    LSS | 1         1   | 1     1     1   |                   |                       |                                   |             1   | 
 51   SOFP |             1 |                 |                   |                       |                                   |     1 1         | 
 57    TKF |             1 |       1         |                   |                       |                                   |     1 1 1 1 1   | 
 45    PNC |         1   1 |                 |                   |                       |                                   |       1     1   | 
  8     BC |             1 |       1     1   |                   |                       |                                   |     1       1   | 
 22    HFI |     1         | 1         1 1 1 |                   |                       |                                   | 1   1   1   1 1 | 
 49    SMC |             1 |                 |                   |                       |                                   |   1 1 1     1   | 
 29     MN |             1 |           1 1   |                   |                       |                                   | 1         1 1   | 
 50    SMF |     1       1 | 1     1   1     |                   |                       |                                   |     1 1     1   | 
 28    MFC |   1       1 1 |             1   |                   |                       |                                   |       1         | 
 60   YWCA |       1   1 1 | 1 1 1   1     1 |                   |                       |         1                         | 1   1 1 1   1   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 12    CCN |     1       1 | 1   1 1   1 1 1 |                 1 |                       |           1           1   1     1 |     1 1 1       | 
 54    SVD |   1         1 |       1   1   1 |                   |                       |         1               1         |     1 1       1 | 
 33     NH |   1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 |   1               |               1       | 1   1   1     1 1   1 1 1   1   1 | 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 | 
 34   NHCO | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1               |                       | 1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1     1   1 1 1 | 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 | 
 27    MCG |     1       1 |           1     |       1 1 1 1 1   |                       |           1     1     1         1 | 1   1 1   1     | 
 21 HEAETH |     1     1 1 | 1     1 1 1     |                   |                       |                 1         1       |     1 1 1   1   | 
 37 NHYMCC | 1   1 1 1 1 1 | 1       1 1 1 1 | 1   1             |               1       |   1   1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 |     1 1   1     | 
 24    LLM |         1 1 1 |       1   1 1   | 1                 |                       |   1       1           1           |   1 1 1         | 
            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 9-55) Means of variables within positions for information sharing network (with 
public agencies) 
 
Position  
N Block 1  n Block 2 n Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5  n Block 6 
Proportion of 
public sector 7 0% 8 0% 9 88.89% 
1
1 90.91% 
1
7 0% 8 0% 
Collaborative 
relation index 7 
55.14 
(21.98) 8 
76.63 
(42.97) 9 
4.78 
(2.64) 
1
1 
11 
(14.87) 
1
7 
37.53 
(21.84) 8 
121.98 
(95.41) 
Power 
centrality 7 
3.39 
(1.87) 8 
3.75 
(4.81) 9 
3.53 
(2.73) 
1
1 
0.44 
(2.19) 
1
7 
2.60 
(2.98) 8 
-0.81 
(5.32) 
Betweenness 
centrality 7 
2.99 
(6.47) 8 
5.21 
(5.60) 9 
0.001 
(0.004) 
1
1 
0.006 
(0.013) 
1
7 
0.27 
(0.64) 8 
7.63 
(6.92) 
 
 
Appendix 9-56) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for information sharing 
relations 
 
 Block1 Block2 Block3 Block4 Block5 Block6 Total 
Block1 16 21 0 1 27 31 96 
Block2 21 26 0 15 32 37 131 
Block3 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 
Block4 1 15 0 0 1 2 19 
Block5 27 32 0 1 2 50 112 
Block6 31 37 12 2 50 34 166 
Total 96 131 12 19 112 166 536 
 
 
Appendix 9-57) Reduced Block density Matrix for information sharing  
 
         1     2     3     4     5     6 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.381 0.375 0.000 0.013 0.227 0.554 
  2  0.375 0.464 0.000 0.170 0.235 0.578 
  3  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 
  4  0.013 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.023 
  5  0.227 0.235 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.368 
  6  0.554 0.578 0.167 0.023 0.368 0.607 
 
Appendix 9-58) Image matrix  
 
     1     2     3     4     5     6 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 1(RE) 
  2  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 
  3  0     0     0     0     0     1(RE) 
  4  0     1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
  5  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     0     1(RE) 
  6  1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0     1(RE) 1(RE)     
Appendix 9-59) Blocked adjacency matrix for work referrals network 
 
           2 3 1   2   2 4 4   3 1 1 3 4 5   3 4 1 1 2   3 1 4 4   5 3 2 3   3 5 1   4 4 1   2 4     2   3 1 4 2     2 1 5 3 5 2   
             9 0 1   8 4 5 0 8 9 7 8 5 8 1 2   3 7 3 9 3   2 6 4 3 1 4 5 7 1   4 0 7 6 9 2 4 3 0 6   5 6 8 6 2 5 4 7 2 2 0 1 9 3 1   
             N N C   N A M P S B P H F P P T   N S C H M   N G S S A Y N N N   N S H A S P E A L S   A N B O C S M B A L C T P U L   
            -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 29     NH |   1 1 |               1         | 1 1 1 1   | 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1   1 1 1 1   1 1   | 1 1 1 1 1 1   1   1 1 1   1   | 
 30   NHCO | 1   1 |                         | 1 1 1 1 1 | 1     1 1   1 1 1 | 1   1 1   1     1 1 |     1   1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1     | 
 11    CCN | 1 1   |     1                   | 1     1 1 | 1       1   1 1 1 |     1     1     1   |   1             1     1   1 1 | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 28    NEA |       |                         |         1 |                   |                     |                               | 
  4    ACG |       |                         |   1       |                   |                     |                               | 
 25     MN |       |                         |       1   |                   |                     |                               | 
 40    PSD |       |                         |     1     |                   |                     |                               | 
 48    SVB |       |                         |     1     |                   |                     |                               | 
  9    BOM |       |                         | 1         |                   |                     |                               | 
 37   PACA |       |                         |         1 |                   |                     |                               | 
 18    HFI |       |                         |     1   1 |                   |       1             |                               | 
 15     FR |       |                         |           |                   |                     |     1                         | 
 38    PCG |       |                         |   1       |                   |                     |                               | 
 41    PSG |       |                         |   1       |                   |                     |                               | 
 52    TKF |       |                         |         1 |                   |                     |                               | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 33 NHYMCC | 1 1 1 |               1         |     1 1   | 1 1       1   1   |     1 1   1   1   1 |                       1       | 
 47   SSVD | 1 1   |   1               1     |         1 |       1       1   |               1     |                               | 
 13    CLA |   1   |                         | 1         |                   |                     |                               | 
 19     HI | 1 1   |                         |   1     1 |                   |       1             |                               | 
 23    MCG |   1   |               1       1 |           |                   |                     |                 1             | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 32 NHYMCA | 1 1   |                         | 1     1   |                   | 1                   |                               | 
 16    GVP |   1   |                         | 1     1   |                   |                     |                               | 
 44    SMF | 1 1   |                         | 1     1   |                   |                     |                               | 
 43    SMC | 1 1   |                         |   1       |                   |         1           |                               | 
  1   AARP |   1   |                         |         1 |                   |                     |                               | 
 54   YWCA | 1 1   |                         | 1         |                   |                     |                     1         | 
 35  NWCCP | 1 1   |                         |       1   |                   |           1         |                               | 
 27    NCM | 1     |                         |       1   |                   |       1         1   |                               | 
 31   NHFB |   1   |                         |       1   |                   | 1                   |                               | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 34   NSAS |   1 1 |                         |     1     | 1               1 |                     |                               | 
 50 SVYMCA |   1   |               1         |         1 | 1                 |                     |       1           1           | 
 17 HEAETH | 1 1 1 |                         | 1         |           1       |               1     |         1             1   1   | 
  6   AVAC |   1 1 |                       1 |       1   |               1   |         1       1   |   1               1 1     1   | 
 49    SVD | 1 1   |                         |   1   1   |       1           |       1     1   1   |   1 1                         | 
 42     PT | 1 1   |                         | 1     1   |             1     |                 1   |                         1 1   | 
 14    ELC |   1   |                         |           |                 1 |                     |                               | 
  3  ACDHS |       |                         | 1 1       | 1                 |     1 1             |                               | 
 20    LLM | 1 1   |                         |         1 |               1   |         1 1         |                   1           | 
 46  SPUMC |   1 1 |                         | 1         |           1     1 |     1               |             1 1   1   1       | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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  5   ACHA | 1     |                         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
 26  NAMSC | 1 1 1 |                         |           |                   |       1 1           |                               | 
  8   BLFP | 1 1   |                 1       |           |                   |       1 1           |             1                 | 
 36    ODM | 1     |                         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
 12     CL |   1   |                         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
 45   SOFP | 1 1   |                         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
 24    MFC |   1   |                         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
  7     BC |       |               1         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
  2   ACBA |       |                         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
 22    LSS | 1 1   |                         |           |                   |       1           1 |                               | 
 10     CA | 1     |                         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
 51    THF | 1   1 |                         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
 39    PNC |   1   |                         |           |                   |           1         |                               | 
 53   UWAC | 1   1 |                         |           |                   |     1 1             |                               | 
 21    LMP |     1 |                         |           |                   |                     |                               | 
            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 9-60) Means of variables within positions for work referral network  
 
Position  
n Block 1  n Block 2 n Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5  n Block 6 
Proportion of 
public sector 3 0% 
1
2 83.33% 5 0% 9 0% 10 10% 15 20% 
Collaborative 
relation index 3 
201 
(116.05) 
1
2 
16.08 
(19.34) 5 
104.8 
(51.51) 9 
49.44 
(20.06) 10 
56.2 
(15.65) 15 
23.87 
(18.92) 
Betweenness 
centrality 3 
23.12 
(13.84) 
1
2 
0.17 
(0.57) 5 
6.01 
(2.50) 9 
0.13 
(0.17) 10 
1.11 
(1.59) 15 
0.31 
(0.97) 
 
 
Appendix 9-61) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for work referrals relations 
 
 Block1 Block2 Block3 Block4 Block5 Block6 Total 
Block1 6 2 12 19 16 25 80 
Block2 0 0 12 0 1 1 14 
Block3 9 5 6 6 7 2 35 
Block4 14 0 12 0 6 1 33 
Block5 17 2 12 12 12 18 73 
Block6 20 2 0 0 9 1 32 
Total 66 11 54 37 51 48 267 
 
 
Appendix 9-62) Reduced block density matrix for work referrals 
 
         1     2     3     4     5     6 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1.000 0.056 0.800 0.704 0.533 0.556 
  2  0.000 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.008 0.006 
  3  0.600 0.083 0.300 0.133 0.140 0.027 
  4  0.519 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.067 0.007 
  5  0.567 0.017 0.240 0.133 0.133 0.120 
  6  0.444 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.005 
 
 
Appendix 9-63) Image matrix  
 
     1     2     3     4     5     6 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(SE) 0     1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 
  2  0     0     1(RE) 0     0     0 
  3  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0     0     0 
  4  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0     0     0 
  5  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0 
  6  1(RE) 0     0     0     0     0    
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Appendix 9-64) Blocked adjacency matrix for regular meeting network 
 
               2 2 2   2 2 1 3   2 1 3 2   1     1 1 3 3   1 2   2     2 1     3 3 1 1 3 3   1   
             5 0 1 2 9 4 5 1 3   6 4 0 8 6 3   1 7 8 7 4 3 2 3 2 9   4 7 0 7 8 1 2 9 6 5 6   5   
             C N N N F N N H S   N L S P C H   A M M Y S B H N A S   C N G D E S S N M T U   L   
            -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  5    CCN |   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 |             |       1             |       1           1   |   | 
 20    NCM | 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1     1 1 |       1             |                       |   | 
 21     NH | 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 1 |     1     1 |       1           1 |               1   1   |   | 
 22   NHCO | 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 1 | 1   1     1 |   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | 1 1     1 1 1         |   | 
  9     FF | 1 1 1 1     1 1 1 |           1 |             1       | 1               1   1 |   | 
 24 NHYMCA | 1 1 1 1     1 1 1 | 1   1       |       1             |                     1 |   | 
 25 NHYMCC | 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 1 | 1         1 |       1         1 1 |     1   1   1         |   | 
 11 HEAETH | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   1 |             |       1             |                       |   | 
 33   SSVD | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1   |             |       1 1         1 |                   1   |   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 26   NSAS |   1   1   1 1     |         1 1 |               1     |                       |   | 
 14    LLM |   1               |       1     |                     |                       |   | 
 30    SMF |     1 1   1       |           1 |                     |                       |   | 
 28     PT |                   |   1         |                     |                       |   | 
  6    CLA |   1               | 1           |                     |                       |   | 
 13     HI |   1 1 1 1   1     | 1   1       |                     |                       |   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  1  ACDHS |                   |             |                 1   |                       |   | 
 17    MFC |       1           |             |           1   1     |                       |   | 
 18     MN |       1           |             |       1     1       |                       |   | 
 37   YWCA | 1 1 1 1   1 1 1 1 |             |     1               |                       |   | 
 34    SVD |       1         1 |             |                   1 |                       |   | 
  3   BLFP |       1           |             |   1                 |                       |   | 
 12    HFI |       1 1         |             |     1           1   |                       |   | 
 23   NHFB |       1           | 1           |   1                 |                       |   | 
  2   AVAC |       1     1     |             | 1           1       |                       |   | 
 29    SMC |     1 1     1   1 |             |         1           |                       |   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  4     CA |       1 1         |             |                     |                       |   | 
 27  NWCCP |       1           |             |                     |                       |   | 
 10    GVP |             1     |             |                     |                       |   | 
  7    DAO | 1                 |             |                     |                       |   | 
  8    ELC |       1     1     |             |                     |                       | 1 | 
 31   SOFP |       1           |             |                     |                       |   | 
 32  SPUMC |       1     1     |             |                     |                       |   | 
 19  NAMSC |     1             |             |                     |                       |   | 
 16    MCG |         1         |             |                     |                       |   | 
 35    THF | 1   1           1 |             |                     |                       |   | 
 36   UWAC |         1 1       |             |                     |                       |   | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 15    LSS |                   |             |                     |         1             |   | 
            ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 9-65) Means of variables within positions for regular meeting network 
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 N Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Proportion of 
public sector 9 0% 6 0% 10 10% 11 9.09% 1 0% 
Collaborative 
relation index 9 
128.67 
(82.899) 6 
66.67 
(48.4094) 10 
55.5 
(16.1606) 11 
33.27 
(21.22) 1 - 
Betweenness 
centrality 9 
12.16 
(13.81) 6 
1.41 
(2.22) 10 
0.79 
(1.75) 11 
0.51 
(1.67) 1 - 
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Appendix 9-66) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for regular meeting relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total 
Block 1 70 14 22 17 123 
Block 2 14 8 1 0 23 
Block 3 22 1 14 0 37 
Block 4 17 0 0 0 17 
Total 123 23 37 17 200 
 
Appendix 9-67) Reduced Block density Matrix for regular meeting 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.972 0.259 0.244 0.172 0.000 
  2  0.259 0.267 0.017 0.000 0.000 
  3  0.244 0.017 0.156 0.000 0.000 
  4  0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 
  5  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091       
 
 
Appendix 9-68) Blocked adjacency matrix for resource sharing network 
 
             2 1 2   2 2     2 1 1   1 3 1   1 1       2 2 3 3     2 3   2 1 3 3 3   2   3 1 1 3   
             2 5 3   0 8 2 7 7 3 0 6 2 6 9   4 6 5 3 1 9 5 3 2 9   1 7 8 6 1 4 1 8   4 4 5 7 8 0   
             N H N   N P A C N H F C G T M   H L B A A S N S S E   N T C N F S S U   N A S L M S   
            -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 22     NH |   1 1 | 1     1   1           |           1 1       |                 |     1     1 | 
 15     HI | 1   1 |   1   1 1       1   1 |               1     |                 |   1 1     1 | 
 23   NHCO | 1 1   |     1       1 1   1   | 1   1 1     1 1 1 1 |                 | 1   1 1 1 1 | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 20  NAMSC | 1     |                       |                     |                 |             | 
 28     PT |   1   |                       |                     |                 |             | 
  2   ACBA |     1 |                       |                     |                 |             | 
  7    CCN | 1 1   |                       |                     |                 |             | 
 27  NWCCP |   1   |                       |                     |                 |             | 
 13 HEAETH | 1     |                       |                     |                 |             | 
 10     FF |     1 |                       |                     |                 |             | 
  6     CA |     1 |                       |                     |                 |             | 
 12    GVP |   1   |                       |                     |                 |             | 
 36    THF |     1 |                       |                     |                 |             | 
 19     MN |   1   |                       |                     |                 |             | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 14    HFI |     1 |                       |                     | 1               |   1         | 
 16    LLM |       |                       |                     | 1 1             |             | 
  5   BLFP |     1 |                       |                     |     1   1       |         1   | 
  3  ACDHS |     1 |                       |                     |           1     |   1         | 
  1   AARP |       |                       |                     | 1               |             | 
 29    SMC | 1     |                       |                     |             1   |     1       | 
 25 NHYMCC | 1   1 |                       |               1     |   1           1 |           1 | 
 33  SPUMC |   1 1 |                       |             1       |                 | 1     1     | 
 32   SOFP |     1 |                       |                     |                 | 1           | 
  9    ELC |     1 |                       |                     |       1         | 1     1     | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 21    NCM |       |                       | 1 1     1           |                 |             | 
 37    TKF |       |                       |   1         1       |                 |             | 
  8    CLA |       |                       |     1               |                 |             | 
 26   NSAS |       |                       |                   1 |                 |             | 
 11     FR |       |                       |     1               |                 |             | 
 34   SSVD |       |                       |       1             |                 |             | 
 31    SMI |       |                       |           1         |                 |             | 
 38   UWAC |       |                       |             1       |                 |             | 
           --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 24   NHFB |     1 |                       |               1 1 1 |                 |             | 
  4   AVAC |   1   |                       | 1     1             |                 |             | 
 35    SVD | 1 1 1 |                       |           1         |                 |             | 
 17    LSS |     1 |                       |               1   1 |                 |         1   | 
 18    MFC |     1 |                       |     1               |                 |       1     | 
 30    SMF | 1 1 1 |                       |             1       |                 |             | 
            -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix 9-69) Means of variables within positions for resource sharing network 
 
Position  n Block 1 n Block 2 N Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Proportion of 
public sector 3 0% 11 0% 10 10% 8 25% 6 0% 
Collaborative 
relation index 3 
224 
(87.98) 11 
40.91 
(28.56) 10
61 
(33.33) 8 
48 
(35.38) 6 
54.83 
(14.86) 
Power 
centrality 3 
10.33 
(8.34) 11 
-1.15 
(1.34) 10
-0.047 
(1.54) 8 
1.25 
(0.79) 6 
-0.35 
(1.86) 
Betweenness 
centrality 3 
37.07 
(25.46) 11 
0 
(0) 10
5.56 
(5.01) 8 
1.36 
(2.71) 6 
1.39 
(1.56) 
 
 
Appendix 9-70) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for resource sharing relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total 
Block 1 6 12 10 0 10 38 
Block 2 12 0 0 0 0 12 
Block 3 10 0 2 11 10 33 
Block 4 0 0 11 0 0 11 
Block 5 10 0 10 0 2 22 
Total 38 12 33 11 22 116 
 
 
Appendix 9-71) Reduced block density matrix for resource sharing 
 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1.000 0.364 0.333 0.000 0.556 
  2  0.364 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  3  0.333 0.000 0.022 0.138 0.167 
  4  0.000 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.000 
  5  0.556 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.067 
 
Appendix 9-72) Image matrix  
 
     1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  1(SE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 0     1(RE) 
  2  1(RE) 0     0     0     0 
  3  1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 1(RE) 
  4  0     0     1(RE) 0     0 
  5  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0     0 
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Appendix 9-73) Blocked adjacency matrix for formal contract network 
 
               1     2   2 1 2   1 1 3 2 3 3   3 2   1 1   2 2 1 2 2 2 1         1 1     
             9 0 3 4 3 6 6 4 2   3 7 1 4 2 0   3 7 7 2 8   1 9 9 0 5 8 1 1   8 2 5 6 5   
             C F A A P A S H P   H N T S U S   Y S A H N   N S N N S S H A   B A L M A   
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  9     CA |   1               |             |         1 |                 |           | 
 10     FF | 1                 |             |   1   1 1 |                 |           | 
  3  ACDED |                   |             |     1     |                 |           | 
  4  ACDHS |                   |             | 1 1 1 1 1 |                 |           | 
 23    PSG |                   |             |   1       |                 |           | 
  6   ACHA |                   |             | 1         |                 |           | 
 26  SPUMC |                   |             |         1 |                 |           | 
 14    HUD |                   |             |   1       |                 |           | 
 22    PCG |                   |             |   1       |                 |           | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 13     HI |                   |             |         1 |         1       |           | 
 17     NH |                   |             |         1 |         1     1 |           | 
 31    TKF |                   |             |       1   |                 |           | 
 24    SMC |                   |             |   1       |   1             |           | 
 32   UWAC |                   |             |       1   | 1   1 1     1   |           | 
 30 SVYMCA |                   |             |       1   |           1     |           | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 33   YWCA |       1   1       |             |           |                 |   1       | 
 27   SSVD |   1   1 1     1 1 |       1     |           |                 |         1 | 
  7   AVAC |     1 1           |             |           |                 |           | 
 12    HFI |   1   1           |     1   1 1 |           |                 |           | 
 18   NHCO | 1 1   1     1     | 1 1         |           |                 | 1   1 1   | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 21   NSAS |                   |         1   |           |                 |           | 
 29    SVD |                   |       1     |           |                 |           | 
 19 NHYMCA |                   |         1   |           |                 |           | 
 20 NHYMCC |                   |         1   |           |             1   |           | 
 25    SMF |                   | 1 1         |           |                 |           | 
 28    SVB |                   |           1 |           |                 |           | 
 11 HEAETH |                   |         1   |           |       1         |           | 
  1   AARP |                   |   1         |           |                 |           | 
           ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  8   BLFP |                   |             |         1 |                 |       1   | 
  2   ACBA |                   |             | 1         |                 |         1 | 
 15    LSS |                   |             |         1 |                 |       1   | 
 16    MFC |                   |             |         1 |                 | 1   1     | 
  5    ACG |                   |             |   1       |                 |   1       | 
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
Apeendix 9-74) Means of variables within positions for formal contract network 
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 N Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Proportion of 
public sector 9 66.67% 6 0% 5 0% 8 12.5% 5 20% 
Collaborative 
relation index 9 
30.89 
(33.87) 6 
88.67 
(67.17) 5 
131.4 
(109.73) 8 
63.25 
(36.78) 5 
35.6 
(19.27) 
Power 
centrality 9 
0.95 
(0.85) 6 
1.75 
(1.27) 5 
4.34 
(2.51) 8 
1.02 
(0.43) 5 
1.35 
(0.44) 
Betweenness 
centrality 9 
7.93 
(16..75) 6 
8.03 
(8.25) 5 
27.58 
(17.96) 8 
0.025 
(0.07) 5 
0.403 
(0.64) 
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Appendix 9-75) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for formal contract relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total 
Block 1 2 0 15 0 0 17 
Block 2 0 0 6 9 0 15 
Block 3 15 6 0 0 5 26 
Block 4 0 9 0 2 0 11 
Block 5 0 0 5 0 6 11 
Total 17 15 26 11 11 80 
 
 
Appendix 9-76) Reduced Block density Matrix for formal contract 
 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.028 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 
  2  0.000 0.000 0.200 0.188 0.000 
  3  0.333 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.200 
  4  0.000 0.188 0.000 0.036 0.000 
  5  0.000 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.300 
 
 
Appendix 9-77) Image matrix 
 
     1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0     0     1(RE) 0     0 
  2  0     0     1(RE) 1(RE) 0 
  3  1(RE) 1(RE) 0     0     1(RE) 
  4  0     1(RE) 0     0     0 
  5  0     0     1(RE) 0     1(RE) 
 236
Appendix 9-78) Blocked adjacency matrix for joint program network 
 
             1   2 1       1 1 2 2 2     1 1   1       2 2   1   1 2   2 2 2 1 3 3   
             9 9 9 1   6 4 6 2 1 6 2 7   8 0 2 4 8   5 7 5   7 1 3 4 3 3 0 8 5 0 1   
             N E S F   B A M G P S P C   N F A H C   B S S   N A H S A P N S M U Y   
            -----------------------------------------------------------------------  
 19 NHYMCC |         |                 |           |     1 |                       | 
  9    ELC |         |                 | 1         | 1     |                       | 
 29 SVYMCA |         |                 |           |   1   |                       | 
 11     FR |         |                 |           | 1     |                       | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  6    BOM |         |                 | 1         |       |                       | 
  4   AVAC |         |                 |       1   |       |                       | 
 16     MN |         |                 |       1   |       |                       | 
 12    GPR |         |                 |     1     |       |                       | 
 21   PANA |         |                 |     1     |       |                       | 
 26   SSVD |         |                 | 1 1       |       |                       | 
 22    PSD |         |                 |         1 |       |                       | 
  7    CCN |         |                 |       1   |       |                       | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 18   NHCO |   1     | 1         1     |   1 1 1   | 1   1 |     1 1 1       1     | 
 10     FF |         |           1     | 1         |     1 |     1                 | 
  2   AARP |         |       1 1       | 1         |     1 |   1                 1 | 
 14     HI |         |   1 1         1 | 1       1 |     1 | 1     1   1 1 1   1   | 
  8    CLA |         |             1   |       1   |   1   |     1                 | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  5   BLFP |   1   1 |                 | 1         |       |                       | 
 27    SVB |     1   |                 |         1 |       |                       | 
 25  SPUMC | 1       |                 | 1 1 1 1   |       |                       | 
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 17     NH |         |                 |       1   |       |                       | 
  1    APR |         |                 |     1     |       |                       | 
 13    HFI |         |                 | 1 1     1 |       |                       | 
 24    SMF |         |                 | 1     1   |       |                       | 
  3  ACDHS |         |                 | 1         |       |                       | 
 23     PT |         |                 |       1   |       |                       | 
 20  NWCCP |         |                 |       1   |       |                       | 
 28    SVD |         |                 |       1   |       |                       | 
 15    MFC |         |                 | 1         |       |                       | 
 30   UWAC |         |                 |       1   |       |                       | 
 31   YWCA |         |                 |     1     |       |                       | 
            ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 9-79) Means of variables within positions for joint program network 
 
Position  
n Block 1 n Block 2 N Block 3 n Block 4 n Block 5 
Proportion of 
public sector 4 25% 8 50% 5 0% 3 33.33% 11 18.18% 
Collaborative 
relation index 4 
62.25 
(57.02) 8 
41.88 
(46.16) 5 
135.8 
(115.41) 3 
49.33 
(33.17) 11 
59.64 
(45.56) 
Betweenness 
centrality 4 
0 
(0) 8 
0 
(0) 5 
31.43 
(23.73) 3 
9.44 
(4.80) 11 
0.57 
(1.89) 
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Appendix 9-80) Frequency of choices within and between blocks for joint program relations 
 
 Block1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Total 
Block 1 0 0 1 4 0 5 
Block 2 0 0 9 0 0 9 
Block 3 1 9 5 6 14 35 
Block 4 4 0 6 0 0 10 
Block 5 0 0 14 0 0 14 
Total 5 9 35 10 14 73 
 
Appendix 9-81) Reduced Block density Matrix for joint program 
 
         1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0.000 0.000 0.050 0.333 0.000 
  2  0.000 0.000 0.225 0.000 0.000 
  3  0.050 0.225 0.400 0.400 0.255 
  4  0.333 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 
  5  0.000 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.000 
 
Appendix 9-82) Image matrix  
 
     1     2     3     4     5 
     ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
  1  0     0     0     1(RE) 0 
  2  0     0     1(RE) 0     0 
  3  0     1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 1(RE) 
  4  1(RE) 0     1(RE) 0     0 
  5  0     0     1(RE) 0     0 
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APPENDIX 10 TALBE AND FIGURES FOR CHPATER7 
Appendix 10-1) Profile descriptive statistics: Dependent variable: CRI 
 
    n mean SD 
Government  2 182 176.78 Social enterprise 
revenue   No government  3 74 77.95 
Government  9 59.44 20.57 No social enterprise 
revenue   No government  17 57.35 44.08 
 
 
Appendix 10-2) Simple t-test by social enterprise revenue source dummy variable 
 
 Group Statistics 
 
  
social enterprise 
revenue dummy N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
.00 26 1982695.4231
5794694.2676
0 
1136433.0
4407
Total annual 
expenditure 
1.00 5 11171731.6000
23939848.729
13 
10706225.
82588
.00 26 50.1154 44.35072 8.69789Years in operation 
1.00 5 34.4000 56.71684 25.36454
.00 26 4.0769 1.80938 .35485Revenue diversity 
1.00 5 5.0000 1.87083 .83666
.00 26 4.6154 3.74248 .73396Program diversity 
1.00 4 6.2500 3.77492 1.88746
 
 
 
 240
Appendix 10-3) Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
  
  
  
  
  
                Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 17.328 .000 -1.811 29 .081 -9189036.1769 5074765.98021
-
19568097.
98653
1190025.6
3268
Total annual 
expenditure 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.853 4.091 .440 -9189036.1769 10766371.32456
-
38822077.
53009
20444005.
17625
Equal variances 
assumed .168 .685 .696 29 .492 15.7154 22.58669 -30.47958 61.91035
Years in 
operation 
Equal variances not 
assumed   .586 4.985 .583 15.7154 26.81442 -53.27568 84.70645
Equal variances 
assumed .282 .599 -1.040 29 .307 -.9231 .88776 -2.73876 .89260
Revenue 
diversity 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.016 5.540 .352 -.9231 .90880 -3.19239 1.34623
Equal variances 
assumed .055 .817 -.812 28 .423 -1.6346 2.01191 -5.75582 2.48659
Program 
diversity 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -.807 3.965 .465 -1.6346 2.02514 -7.27694 4.00771
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Appendix 10-4) Simple t-test by government revenue source dummy variable 
 Group Statistics 
 
  
Government 
revenue dummy N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Total annual 
expenditure 
.00 20 519475.60 885297.36 197958.51
  1.00 11 8819929.73 17268996.42 5206798.33
Years in operation .00 20 38.4000 44.43967 9.93701
  1.00 11 64.2727 45.61160 13.75242
Revenue diversity .00 20 3.4000 1.56945 .35094
  1.00 11 5.7273 1.19087 .35906
Program diversity .00 19 4.0000 3.84419 .88192
  1.00 11 6.2727 3.16515 .95433
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Appendix 10-5) Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
  
  
  
  
  
                Lower Upper 
Equal variances 
assumed 19.158 .000 -2.175 29 .038 -8300454.1273 3816095.33111
-
16105245.
41567
-
495662.83
888
Total annual 
expenditure 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.593 10.029 .142 -8300454.1273 5210560.08849
-
19905769.
22899
3304860.9
7444
Equal variances 
assumed .763 .390 -1.537 29 .135 -25.8727 16.83470 -60.30355 8.55809
Years in 
operation 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.525 20.261 .143 -25.8727 16.96682 -61.23569 9.49024
Equal variances 
assumed 1.513 .229 -4.275 29 .000** -2.3273 .54434 -3.44057 -1.21397
Revenue diversity 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -4.635 25.827 .000 -2.3273 .50208 -3.35965 -1.29490
Equal variances 
assumed .755 .392 -1.659 28 .108 -2.2727 1.37011 -5.07928 .53383
Program diversity 
Equal variances not 
assumed   -1.749 24.462 .093 -2.2727 1.29943 -4.95194 .40649
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 10-6) Model Summary of the multiple regression model  
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
.793(a) .629 .511 42.101
a  Predictors: (Constant), Interaction term: government revenue times revenue diversity, social enterprise revenue 
dummy, Program diversity, Years in operation, Total annual expenditure, Revenue diversity, Government revenue 
dummy 
 
Appendix 10-7) ANOVA(b) for multiple regression model using all independent variables 
 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 69509.133 9 7723.237 4.084 .008(a) 
Residual 28368.867 15 1891.258    
Total 97878.000 24     
a  Predictors: (Constant), Proportion of board member from business, Program diversity, Proportion of administrative 
expenditure, Total annual expenditure, Revenue diversity, Years in operation, social enterprise revenue dummy, 
Government revenue dummy, Interaction term: government revenue times revenue diversity 
b  Dependent Variable: Collaboration Relationship Index 
 
 
Appendix 10-8) Model summary of the best-fit regression model 
 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson  
.722(c) .521 .466 43.984 1.777 
c  Predictors: (Constant), Revenue diversity, social enterprise revenue dummy, Total annual expenditure 
 
 
Appendix 10-9) ANOVA(b) for the best-fit multiple regression model  
 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 54790.348 3 18263.449 9.441 .000(c) 
Residual 50299.119 26 1934.582    
Total 105089.467 29     
c  Predictors: (Constant), Revenue diversity, social enterprise revenue dummy, Total annual expenditure 
d  Dependent Variable: Collaboration Relationship Index 
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Appendix 10-10)  
Regression Standardized Residual
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Appendix 10-11)  
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Stand
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Appendix 10-12) 
Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: Collaboration Relationship
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Appendix 10-13) 
Partial Regression Plot
Dependent Variable: Collaboration Relationsh
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Appendix 10-14) 
Partial Regression Plot
Dependent Variable: Collaboration Relationsh
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Appendix 10-15)  
Partial Regression Plot
Dependent Variable: Collaboration Relationsh
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Appendix 10-16) Strategic collaborative relations with business model if Term Removed(a) 
  
Variable 
Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood df 
Sig. of the 
Change 
BUSBOARD -10.041 2.183 1 .140 
COMREVEN -11.981 6.064 1 .014 
ADMNEXP -15.315 12.732 1 .000 
YEAR -11.762 5.626 1 .018 
REVDIVER -9.256 .613 1 .434 
PROGDIVE -16.201 14.503 1 .000 
Whole 
model 
GOVREVEN -8.962 .026 1 .871 
COMREVEN -13.811 7.759 1 .005 
ADMNEXP -15.537 11.211 1 .001 
YEAR -12.078 4.294 1 .038 
Best-fit 
model 
PROGDIVE -15.112 10.361 1 .001 
a  Based on conditional parameter estimates 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 10-17) Strategic collaborative relations with public agency model if Term Removed(a) 
  
Variable 
Model Log 
Likelihood 
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood df 
Sig. of the 
Change 
BUSBOARD -12.051 .245 1 .620 
COMREVEN -12.520 1.183 1 .277 
ADMNEXP -11.966 .076 1 .783 
YEAR -13.820 3.783 1 .052 
REVDIVER -13.639 3.421 1 .064 
PROGDIVE -14.003 4.151 1 .042 
Whole 
model 
GOVREVEN -12.437 1.018 1 .313 
COMREVEN -14.221 3.528 1 .060 
YEAR -15.241 5.568 1 .018 
REVDIVER -14.608 4.303 1 .038 
Best-fit 
model 
PROGDIVE -14.829 4.744 1 .029 
a  Based on conditional parameter estimates 
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